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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines New Zealand's role 
in and contribution to the British Commonwealth 
in the crucial years immediately following the 
Second World War . A thematic approach is taken, 
highlighting economic, constitutional and defence 
ties, as well as the less discernable links of 
sentiment. The premise is that the Commonwealth was 
essentially a paradoxical association; the juncture 
between independent nationhood and collective 
solidarity. The thesis, therefore, aims to show how 
New Zealand exhibited both these traits and tried 
to maintain some equilibrium between them. However, 
the latter role of the loyal Commonwealth partner 
increasingly prevailed in the difficult international 
situation of the late 1940's. Certainly, by the 
defeat of the first Labour government in 1949, New 
Zealand had strongly reaffirmed its commitment to 
Commonwealth unity. Confirmed sovereignty was 
qualified by a residual imperial ' focus. The 
various influences contributing to New Zealand's 
inherent support for the Commonwealth will be 
considered. 
New Zealand's commitment to the Commonwealth 
has to, however, be seen in the context of a changing 
international environment. The established 
independence of member states, combined with Britain's 
iv 
decline as a major power, ensured that the 
Commonwealth could not function as a unitary bloc. 
A bi - polar balance of power, centred on the United 
States and the Soviet Union was to become the 
predominant feature of the post - war world, and 
Commonwealth members had to respond accordingly. In 
turn, the Commonwealth itself was an elastic 
association and continued to evolve relative to 
changing circumstances, as highlighted by the impact 
of the independence of the Indian subcontinent. 
This gave greater emphasis to the Commonwealth's 
basis as a free association of independent nations 
rather than a formalised alliance. The New Zealand 
government's conservative, even reactionary, attitude 
to such developments will be discussed, showing 
Wellington's role as the advocate of the "Old 
Commonwealth". 
The External Affairs files of the National 
Archives, Wellington, provided the bulk of primary 
research. This was supplemented by parliamentary 
records, newspapers and the excellent published 
collections of primary sources. The extensive corpus 
of secondary literature also provided valuable 
background detail. The thematic approach taken may 
be at the expense of a full chronological overview, 
but it aims to illustrate the major comparative 
trends of the period. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I often think that to the outsider the 
British Commonwealth must surely appear 
an almost inexplicable freak of nature. 
We can imagine the bewilderment of an 
intelligent visitor from another planet 
on being confronted with its manifest 
contradictions. 
The Earl of Halifax to the Toronto 
Board of Trade, 24 January 1944. 
From Documents and Speeches on British 
Commonwealth Affairs 1931 - 52 Vol. I, 
Nicholas Mansergh (Ed.) (London, 1953), 
p.575. 
The Commonwealth defies a straight-forward 
definition. Even its name was variable - the terms 
British Commonwealth, Commonwealth of Nations and 
British Empire were all in concurrent usage in the 
post-war period, highlighting a unique flexibility 
and complexity. Rather than an organic entity, 
the Commonwealth was a voluntary association of 
independent nations, that had gradually evolved out 
of colonialism. Elastic rather than formalised, it 
had developed relative to the needs of its members. 
Consequently, there was no such thing as a unitary 
Commonwealth policy, only the willingness of members 
to seek consensus and agreement. The basis of the 
Commonwealth was, therefore, essentially paradoxical, 
a balance of the seemingly conflicting ideals of 
independence and interdependence, sovereignty and 
solidarity. 
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As independent nations, members were able 
to define the Commonwealth in their own terms. For 
example, in 1949 New Zealand's perception of the 
Commonwealth sharply differed from that of India, but 
the very nature of the association meant that both 
views could be accommodated. This was at the expense 
of uniform obligations and commitments. Functional 
rather than logical, the Commonwealth was a distinctly 
British creation. As an American broadcaster 
remarked in 1943: 
People can be pardoned for not understanding the 
structure of the British Commonwealth, because 
it is a thing without precedent, and without 
parallel. One can say more, it is distinctly 
abstruse and unless one can find his way about 
in the British thinking as to constitutionalism, 
it remains baffling. 1 
Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand 
achieved independence by a gradual constitutional 
process rather than an explicit surrender of imperial 
authority. The Balfour Report thus defined Dominion 
status as it had emerged by 1926: 
autonomous communities within the British Empire, 
equal in status, in no way subordinate one to 
another in any aspect of their domestic or 
external affairs, though united by a common 
allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated 
as members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations. 2 
However, certain technical restrictions remained on 
the sovereignty of Dominion parliaments. The Statute 
of Westminster, 1931, removed these limitations, though 
New Zealand did not adopt this legislation until 1947. 
1Raymond Gram Swing, 26 October 1943. Written 
transcript of radio broadcast, EA 159/1/5, pt.2. 
2Quoted N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience 
(London, 1969), p.232. 
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By 1945 the practical and theoretical sovereignty 
of Commonwealth members was an established fact. 
The Second World War showed that while the Dominions 
supported Britain, they did so as sovereign nations, 
pursuing their own policies. A paper by the New 
Zealand External Affairs Department in 1947 recognised 
that "the policy of each member is based largely on 
its conception of its own interests.,,3 Consequently, 
there was strong opposition (though not from New 
Zealand) to proposals for the establishment of 
centralised machinery to facilitate Commonwealth 
interchange. 
However, independence was tempered by an 
unwritten commitment to .consultation and co- operation, 
as evident in foreign policy, defence, economics and 
constitutional matters. Commonwealth ties were 
primarily a series of bilateral relations between 
individual Dominions and Britain, though broader 
contacts also occurred ; Rather than infringe on 
national sovereignty, this system of familial diplomacy 
allowed governments to freely exchange views and 
information. Ongoing consultation between governments 
thus provided the essential practical feature of the 
Commonwealth relationship, aptly described by the 
Canadian Prime Minister, W.L. MacKenzie King, in 1944 
as "a continuing conference of the cabinets of the 
3'Dominion Status and Independence within 
the Commonwealth', 19 May 1947, EA 205/3/4, pt.7. 
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4 Commonwealth." Consultation was not always 
conclusive, as evidenced by some of Britain's arbitrary 
actions in wartime, but was very extensive. 
Close and effecti ve inter-Commonwealth 
co-operation was achieved in the Second World War 
and was maintained in peacetime. The apex of this 
system were Prime Ministers' Meetings, which had 
replaced the more formal and outdated Imperial 
Conferences during the war. Such meetings were held 
in 1946, 1948 and 1949, supplemented by other 
ministerial meetings. These were fairly informal 
get-togethers, providing valuable personal exc hange s 
rather than official decisions. In turn, the 
bulk of Commonwealth consultation took the form of 
continuous flows of telegrams and communiques between 
capitals. The scale of this correspondence was high. 
For example, between 1937 and 1947, the number of 
circular telegrams and written communication s sent 
from the Commonwealth Relations Office to other 
governments increased by eleven and four times, 
respectively.5 
The high level of post-war inter-Commonwealth 
consultation reflected the many important developments 
in the international environment. The Second World 
War marked a watershed for the Commonwealth and the 
aftermath saw a period of significant transition. 
Primarily, this related to Britain's decline as a major 
4Extract from address to British Parliament, 
11 Ma y 1944, Docum ents and Speec hes on British Common-
wealth Affairs 1931-52, Vol. I, N. Mansergh (Ed.) 
(London, 1953) p.587. 
5 pMM (48) Minutes of 8th Meeting 18 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
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economic and military power. Britain's deficiencies 
were already evident before the war, but had now 
become dramatically heightened. The Dominions were, 
consequently, required to take increased responsibilitie s, 
which co rresponded with their established status as 
independent nations. The post - war Commonwealth was 
clearly not a self- sufficient bloc, but was increasingly 
dependent on the economic and military power of the 
United States. Further, the structure of the Commonwealth 
was also significantly changed by the independence of the 
Indian subcontinent. The addition of new Asian member s , 
more inclined towards non -a lignment and republicanism, 
marked the end of the "Old Commonwealth", an intimate 
family of predominantly European, English speaking 
countries. However, the basis of the Commonwealth as 
a free association of so vereign nations was unaffected, 
even strengthened, by such developments. 
Post-war New Zealand aptly illustrated the 
essential paradox of Commonwealth membership. While 
the Statute of Westminster was not adopted until 1947, 
thereby confirming New Zea land's sovereignty, the 
government espoused a distinctly independent foreign 
policy, vigorously supporting wider international 
co-operation. Both the Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, 
and the Deputy Prime Minister, Walter Nash, enjoyed 
a high international profile. However, New Zealand 
was also a devoted member of the Commonwealth, strongly 
supporting its continued so lidarity. New Zealand 's 
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identity remained essentially British: Britain 
provided New Zealand with its King, the ethnic origin 
of most of its people, its major export market and 
international focus. A real sense of commitment to 
the Mother Country and to Commonwealth unity was 
manifestly evident in the difficult post - war years, 
and there was strong opposition to any perceived 
weakening of these ties. Here, then, was the paradox 
of independence and interdependence, a fact recognised 
by Fraser in a telegram to the Australian Minister of 
External Affairs in 1947: 
.•• there comes a point where we have to 
decide how far we can have it both ways; how 
far we can reconcile our status as independent 
nations with joint Commonwealth action. 6 
Commonwealth membership did, indeed, seem to allow 
members to "have it both ways"; or, as Fraser also 
expressed it, "independence with something added.,,7 
6 Fraser to Evatt, 23 April 1947, 
EA 102/9/3, pt.l. 
7Statement by Fraser, 3 June 1947, 
EA 205/3/4, pt.7. 
CHAPTER I 
POST-WAR IDEALS AND REALITIES 
I believe that the war has created for us a 
revolution which we have not yet appreciated 
We must recognise the fact that Britain is not a 
Power in the East or in the Pacific today ... 
7 
That is not a reason why we should break 
allegiance with the Commonwealth, but it is a 
reason that we must think again about our position 
in the world. Today we cannot hide behind our 
mother's skirts. 
Ormond Wilson NZPD, S July 1947, 
Vol. 276, pp.29S-99. 
New Zealand entered the post - war world with an 
interesting dual identity. On one hand, its status as an 
independent nation was confirmed and extended, with the 
government following its own foreign policy and vigorously 
supporting the internationalism of the United Nations. 
This was the "post - Statute of Westminster era", with 
Dominion independence an established fact (although New 
Zealand did not formally legislate on this until 1947). 
Furthermore, the war had irrevocably changed the 
Commonwealth. Britain was severely weakened, unable to 
maintain the same extensive defence commitments, 
especially in the South Pacific, where it was no longer 
the effective guarantor of New Zealand's security. 
Consequently, the Dominions had to take increased 
re s ponsibility for their own defence, further advancing 
their independent status. In New Zealand's case, this 
involved increased regional c o- operation with Australia 
8 
and recognition of the need to come to some regional 
understanding with the United States, the great Pacific 
power. 
Yet, concurrently, New Zealand was ardently 
Anglophile and a devoted member of the British Commonwealth, 
strongly supporting its continued solidarity. In fact, 
Britain's post-war problems only served to heighten 
emotional and economic ties with the Mother Country. 
This was certainly a curious paradox, although the New 
Zealand government did not see a contradiction here. 
After all, the Commonwealth had evolved as a free 
association of independent states united by allegiance to 
the Crown and a willingness to consult and co-operate, not 
by unitary policy. Independence and inter-dependence 
thus co-existed in an apparent symbiosis, the ideal model, 
in Peter Fraser's view, for contemporary international 
. 1 
relatlons. On his return from the 1944 Prime Ministers' 
Meeting, he duly expressed the special Commonwealth 
relationship: 
Here is a paradox the world outside the British 
Commonwealth finds it difficult to understand - the 
paradox that, t~e freer we become, the closer we 
draw together; the more our constitutional bonds are 
relaxed, the more closely we are held in the bonds 
of friendship; the greater the extent to which 
governmental sovereignty is extended ... the more 
truly are we one in sentiment, in h2art and spirit, 
one in peace as well as one in war. 
Inevitably, there was some conflict between Commonwealth 
loyalty and an independent foreign policy (as the Labour 
1 Fraser commended the example of the Commonwealth to 
the United Nations Charter Conference at San Francisco, 
June 1945. 
2Statement by Fraser in House of Representatives, 
7 August 1944, New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and 
Documents 1943-57, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Wellington, 
1972), pp.77-78. 
9 
government had found in the pre - war years) . Wellington 
tried to balance these two f acto rs, though the former 
was to prove the more predominant. 
Certainly, New Zealand emerged from the Second 
World War with immense pride in the achievement of the 
British Commonwealth. The war had heightened Commonwealth 
unity in military and economic terms and accentuated New 
Zealand's bond with the Crown and Mother · Country. Fraser 
aptly represented the feelings of the nation when reading 
Parliament's message to King George VI after the final 
victory over Japan, 14 August 1945: 
We would express our gratitude to Your Majesty who 
throughout the years of the war kept us ever conscious 
of that union of hearts and purposes which links your 
peoples of the British Commonwealth and Empire, and 
which made our joint efforts the willing co-operation 
of a firm brotherhood determined t~ uphold the right 
and to defend our common heritage. 
New Zealand hoped that wartime solidarity would carry 
over into peace. Thus, at the 1944 Prime Ministers' 
Meetings, Fraser had supported Australian proposals to 
strengthen the established methods of Commonwealth 
consultation, particularly in defence. Fraser circulated 
proposals for a revived Committee of Imperial Defence, 
co-ordinating the resources of member states, ensuring 
equitable contributions and providing effective contingency 
planning. While recognising that in the future the might 
of the United States and an effective world security 
organisation would be crucial, he reaffirmed: 
at the same time we should realize as effective a 
development as possible of British power. This can 
3 N Z P D " 1 4 Aug u s t 1 945, vol. 269, p . 1 63 • 
be ensured if there is an adequate und~rstanding 
and co - ordination in Imperial defence. 
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This did not mean the subordination of national 
policy to centralised authority, but reflected Australian 
and New Zealand desire to effectively represent their 
interests in a united Commonwealth. Canada and South Africa 
did not share this enthusiasm for joint policy, which 
implied for them an infringement of sovereignty. Rather 
than formal machinery, extensive wartime co-operation had 
been achieved by constant inter-government communication. 
This was a flexible and informal system appropriate for a 
free association of independent nations. Canadian Prime 
Minister W.L. MacKenzie King aptly summarised this system, 
when addressing the British Parliament at the time of the 
meetings, as "a continuing conference of the cabinets of 
5 the Commonwealth". 
Despite New Zealand's commitment to the Commonwealth, 
the harsh reality of changes brought by the war had to be 
faced. The imperial defence strategy in the Pacific had 
dramatically collapsed in 1941 in the wake of Japan's 
onslaught. In response, New Zealand had to turn to the 
United States for security (a contingency British planning 
had, in fact, envisaged), while Commonwealth defence was 
absorbed into the wider structure of allied strategy. 
Clearly, the Commonwealth could no longer be considered a 
self-sufficient bloc, especially in the South Pacific. 
The war had left the United Kingdom irrevocably weakened, 
4PMM (44) British Commonwealth Defence Co - operation: 
Note by PM. of New Zealand Annex II Minutes of 14th meeting, 
15 May 1944 EA ,. 156/10/1 pt. 1. 
5Extract from address to both Houses of the United 
11 
no longer a pre - eminent military or economic power. As 
a result, the continued support of the Dominions was 
important in buttressing Britain's claim to major power 
6 
status. Australia and New Zealand, by lobbying for closer 
inter-Commonwealth defence planning, also reflected concern 
at the changed balance of power, hoping that increased 
unity here would compensate for Britain's diminished 
position. Britain's imperial authority was also undermined 
by the imminent independence of the Indian subcontinent 
and a weakened colonial position in South-East Asia - a 
consequence of Japan's wartime advance and rising 
nationalism. 
The relative decline of Britain's power led also 
to an increased devolution of responsibility to the 
Dominions in regional defence and foreign policy. Australia 
and New Zealand pre-empted this with the signing of the 
"Canberra Pact" in January 1944. This bi-lateral agreement, 
initiated independently of the United Kingdom, reflected the 
desire of the Australian Minister for External Affairs, 
Herbert Evatt, for an Anzac led "British sphere of influence 
in the South-west and South Pacific" and the desire to 
ensure that the two nations asserted their rightful voice 
Kingdom parliament 11 May 1944. Documents and Speeches on 
British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-52 Vol. I, N. Mansergh (ed. 
(London, 1953), p.587. 
6 Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador to Washington, 
speaking personally in Toronto 24 January 1944 voiced the 
opinion that "In the company of these Titans (the United 
States and Soviet Union), Britain, apart from the rest of 
the Commonwealth and Empire, could hardly claim equal 
partnership." Mansergh 1 Documents I, p.579. 
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7 in post - war developments there. In practical terms, 
the intention of Australia and New Zealand assuming 
responsibility for a regional zone of defence based on 
their metropolitan and island territory,8 was overly 
ambitious given their resources. However, symbolically, 
the agreement was a forward - looking expression of New 
Zealand's independent role in the post - war world. As a 
contemporary New Zealand commentator stated, it illustrat e d 
a "healthy Pacific mindedness".9 Significantly, the 
British government welcomed the agreement as a positive 
example of inter-Commonwealth co - operation, helping to 
alleviate its strained position. 10 
Clearly, the war had advanced New Zealand's status 
as an independent nation. The strenuous war effort (while 
in the context of Commo~wealth unity) greatly increased 
national self - esteem. 11 In particular, the exploits of the 
New Zealand Division, which functioned as the expeditionary 
7 High Commissioner for New Zealand to Minister of 
External Affairs 21 October 1943 after discussion s with 
Australian Minister of External Affairs Herbert Evatt, 
The Australian - New Zealand Agreement 1944, Robin Kay (ed.) 
(Wellington, 1972), p.47. Evatt's strong personality 
ensured Australian dominance of this issue, with New Zealand 
playing more of a moderating influence. Evatt even suggested 
the desirability of Britain transferring her South Pacific 
colonies to Australia and New Zealand. 
8Text of full Agreement in Kay, pp . 140- 148. 
9 L • Lipson, 'A Foreign Policy for New Zealand', 
New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster, J.C. Beaglehole 
(ed.) (Wellington, 1944), p.150. 
10 F.L.W. Wood, The New Zealand People at War 
(Wellington, 1958), p.317. 
11With a population approximating 1,632,000 in 1939, 
205,000 people had joined the armed forces, with 135,000 
serving overseas. In economic terms 3,110,000 tons of me a t, 
butter and cheese were exported to the United Kingdom -
J. Thorn, Peter Fraser (London, 1952), pp.227- 228 . 
13 
force of a sovereign state, highlighted New Zealand's 
specific identity. As General Freyberg wrote: "We are in 
the position of an ally, a very close one ... but we are 
not part of the British army ... All major decisions, such 
as the employment of the force, are made by the New Zealand 
War Cabinet.,,12 Wellington strongly maintained its own 
interests during the war and felt no inferiority. Certainly, 
New Zealand was exposed to an unprecedented level of 
international involvement, and was represented at numerous 
allied conferences and discussions, which carried over into 
the post-war period. In fact, there were 21 such events in 
13 1946 alone. Fraser particularly relished international 
relations, travelling widely durirlg the war and establishing 
. bl 14 a reputatlon as a nota e statesman. As a result of New 
Zealand's increased international responsibilities in 
wartime, the External Affairs Department was established in 
1943 and missions were set up in Washington, Ottawa, 
15 Canberra and Moscow. The scope of New Zealand's external 
interests had certainly advanced from the once all-encompassing 
relationship with the United Kingdom. 
I. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
An independent foreign policy was particularly 
manifest in the government's concern for the achievement of 
an effective post-war international order. In the years 
12 . Quoted Wood, The New Zealand People at War, p.102. 
13 K . h . l' elt Slnc alr, Walter Nash (Auckland, 1976), p.237. 
14A. D• McIntosh, 'Working with Peter Fraser in 
Wartime: Personal Reminiscences', The New Zealand Journal of 
History vol. 10, No.1 April 1976, pp.3, 19. 
14 
preceding World War II, the Labour Government adamantly 
upheld the principles of collective security at the League 
of Nations, often conflicting with the United Kingdom. 
Despite the League's failure, New Zealand remained committed 
to its principles and hoped that the thwarted idealism of 
the 1930's would achieve a post-war fruition. Thus, when 
the Moscow Declaration of the great powers (October 1943) 
announced the intention to create a new international 
organisation, New Zealand and Australia were prompted to 
assert in the Canberra Pact their desire to play an 
equitable role in its planning and establishment. 16 
However, it was the great powers - the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Great Britain and, nominally, China - that 
formalised the draft proposals at Dumbarton Oaks, August 
to October 1944. While Britain consulted with Dominion 
representatives in Washington (including the New Zealand 
Minister Carl Berendsen) during the discussions and made 
available the British draft memorandum, the Dominions had 
little influence . Britain essentially represented its own 
. t . 17 In erests as a major power. 
15A previous External Affairs Department was 
created in 1919 to administer the League mandate of 
Western Samoa and was transformed into the new Department 
of Island Territories. The small External Affairs 
Department was closely inter-related with the Prime Minister' s 
Department, in effect the Imperial Affairs Section of the 
Prime Minister's Department was simply extended. 
16 Clause 14 of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement 
in Kay, p.142. 
17W. D. McIntyre, 'Peter Fraser's Commonwealth' , 
New Zealand in World Affairs (Wellington, 1977), p.48. 
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The New Zealand government was not satisfied 
with the resulting proposals, which seemed to serve the 
interests of the sponsoring powers and not the majority 
of the international community - the smaller nations. As 
in 1936 when the Savage government presented its memorandum 
for improving the League of Nations Covenant, Wellington 
was quite prepared to express views contrary to London. 
At a meeting with the British delegates to Dumbarton Oaks 
in Washington 16 August 1944, Berendsen strongly voiced 
the perceived deficiencies in the British proposals. 
There was no definite commitment to universal collective 
security - the automatic application of sanctions against 
aggressors, nor was there guarantees for the territorial 
integrity and independence of all members. 18 Berendsen also 
criticised the disproportionate role allotted to small 
nations in the General Assembly vis-a-vis the great powers 
in the Security Council - "a negation in the international 
field of those principles of democracy for which this war 
19 is being fought". New Zealand and Australia publicly 
expressed these views in resolutions following their 
, 
Wellington conference in November 1944, the first to be 
20 held since the signing of the Canberra Pact. They also 
proposed the universal application of the principles of 
trusteeship for all colonial territories. This bi-lateral 
action caused some consternation in Whitehall, where the 
etiquette of Commonwealth consultation (particularly in the 
18 Ibid ., pp.48-49; Wood The New Zealand People at 
War, pp.324-25. 
19 Quoted Wood, The New Zealand People at War, p.325. 
20 Statements and Documents, pp.80-81. 
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sensitive matter of trusteeship) was seen to be overlooked. 21 
Here was certainly the "small power rampant",22 not the 
dutiful dominion. 
Before the opening of the United Nations Charter 
Conference at San Francisco in April 1945, Fraser joined 
other Commonwealth representatives in London for preliminary 
discussions of the various issues involved. This was an 
unprecedented meeting, though delegates were at pains to 
emphasise it did not represent the "ganging up" of a special 
bloc within the new international organisation. As the 
Dominions' Secretary, Lord Cranborn~ stated it was possible 
to be both "a citizen of the world and a member of a 
family".23 Consequently, the meeting allowed the Commonwealth 
governments the opportunity to clarify their policies after 
extensive prior exchanges. Certainly, the sharp differences 
between New Zealand and Australia on one hand and Britain 
on the other ensured there could be no united Commonwealth 
stance. What had been possible for the British Empire at 
the League of Nations in 1919 could not be repeated in 1945. 
The question of trusteeship in colonial territories 
received particular attention at the meeting. This system 
as established for the League of Nations mandates (the 
confiscated territories of the defeated powers of the First 
World War), involved the administering power ruling "in 
trust" for the local inhabitants under the general supervision 
of the international security organisation, rather than 
21 McIntyre, 'Peter Fraser's Commonwealth', p.50. 
22Title of Chapter 26 in Wood, The New Zealand People 
at War. 
23 BCM 
Bound volume 
Meeting 1945 
(45) Minutes of first meeting 4 April 1945, 
of Minutes ahd Memoranda of British Commonwealth 
in National Archives. 
17 
. . . t 24 
exerclslng soverelgn y. The basic obje c tives of the 
system involved promoting the welfare of dependent people s 
and their social, economic and political development. In 
the Canb e rra Pact and the subsequent Wellington conference, 
Australia and New Zealand had expounded the principles of 
trusteeship and advocated its application "in broad 
principle" to all colonial territories in the Pacific and 
25 beyond. Fraser and Evatt thus reaffirmed this commitment, 
proposing the establishment of a special supervisory body 
with the authority to commission reports, inspect conditions 
and provide recommendations in all colonial territories.26 
The two governments saw this as a key issue at San Francisco 
and hoped the rest of the Commonwea l th would give support, 
providing a united voice on the matter. 27 
However, the United Kingdom (the greatest colonial 
power) did not support the Australasian proposals. In fact, 
an earlier Colonial Office memorandum had proposed ending 
the existing mandate system and its supervisory commission, 
arguing it created a feeling of impermanence and restricted 
h h · f h d·· t . 28 t e aut orlty 0 tea mlnlS erlng power. This view 
had since been reconsidered and the Colonial Secretary, 
Oliver Stanley, told the meeting that the British government 
was now prepared to accept the continuation of the mandate 
24Keith Sinclair, Towards Independence (Auckland, 
1975), p.12. 
25 Clause 28 of Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 
Kay, p. 144. 
26 BCM (45) Minutes of second meeting,4 April 1945, 
Bound volume of Minutes and Memoranda,op. cit. 
27 Peter Fraser, ibid. 
28'The International Aspects of Colonial Policy' 
27 December 1944,quoted ~bid. 
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system and its extension to newly confiscated enemy 
. t' . h d . f . t . 29 terrl orles - Wlt some mo 1 lca lons. But he was adamant 
that Britain would not bring its e~tablished colonies under 
such a system, thereby making them accountable to an 
outside body. Furthermore, Whitehall did not want the 
details of trusteeship discussed at San Francisco,30 
anticipating an anti-colonial policy from most delegations. 
Britain's conservative approach did not please the 
New Zealand and Australian delegations. Fraser was also 
disturbed that Britain had formulated new trusteeship 
proposals without consulting its Commonwealth partners 
(though, ironically, London had previously criticised the 
two Tasman neighbours for doing the same at the Wellington 
conference). He emphasised that the value of such meetings 
would be questioned if decisions were reached before 
31 discussions began. Fraser further expressed a failure to 
understand Britain's objections to trusteeship, somewhat 
naively claiming that its enlightened colonial administrations 
would only receive "high honour and respect" if subject to 
trusteeship scrutiny.32 It was rather colonial territories 
where administration and conditions were poor - Fraser 
highlighted French and Dutch Pacific possessions - that 
would be shown up. By extending the trusteeship system, he 
argued,Britain would make a bold, progressive example to the 
rest of the world. Otherwise, Fraser warned, Britain's 
policy would appear reactionary, condemning her to the 
ci t. 
29 Such as removing restrictions on defence bases. 
30BCM (45) Minutes of second meeting, 4 April 1945, op. 
31 Ibid . 
32BCM (45) Minutes of 12th meeting~ 13 April 1945, ibid. 
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company of "predatory colonial powers". While not 
wanting to cause inter-Commonwealth embarrassment, Fraser 
emphasised that New Zealand would express its own views on 
tt t S F . 33 the ma er a an ranC1SCO. 
The second major issue of discussion at the meeting 
was the draft for the United Nations Charter. The New 
zealand delegation voiced strong criticism to the British 
government (one of the sponsors), highlighting two major 
deficiencies. Firstly, Fraser emphasised the excessive 
authQrity given to the great powers at the expense of other 
members. While appreciating that the new organisation's 
success ultimately depended on the continued co-operation of 
the major powers, their veto power in the Security Council 
(as agreed at the Yalta Conference, February 1945 - thereby 
ensuring great power unanimity of action) was seen as the 
"utter negation" of the Charter's avowed aim of an effective 
34 
universal collective security system. This would allow 
major powers and their surrogates to legitimise aggression 
and to hinder the resolution of disputes, in effect, 
holding the international organisation to ransom. In 
practice, the veto would only prevent aggression by small 
nations, who would in turn be bound to obey the monopoly 
voice of the great powers in the Security Council. 35 
In response, New Zealand recommended an enlarged 
role for smaller nations. Berendsen advocated achieving 
this by either increasing the representative character of 
33 BCM (45) Minutes of 12th meeting,13 April 1945, 
op. cit. 
34BCM (45) Minutes of 5th meeting,6 April 1945, ibid. 
35 BCM (45) Minutes of 7th meeting,10 April 1945, ibid. 
2 0 
the Security Councilor by referring the enforcement of 
sanctions to the approval of the General Assembly. This 
would complicate matters, but New Zealand was adamant that 
there would be "no shedding of our people's blood without 
a voice".36 The British authorities were concerned at New 
Zealand's stand, noting it was the only Dominion to 
adamantly oppose the security arrangements (Australia was 
more conciliatory) and had not expressed objection to the 
veto when previously consulted. 37 Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden attempted to allay New Zealand fears by 
clarifying that in Britain's view the veto would not be 
applied in a wholesale way. In turn, Attlee added that from 
a realistic viewpoint, the new organisation's ability to 
maintain peace and prevent aggression ultimately depended, 
not on idealistic and democratic machinery, but the agreement 
f t h t t h t . d 38 o e grea powers - as e ve 0 recognIse • Despite 
British pressure, Fraser was not prepared to modify his 
views, maintaining that changes would have to be made at 
San Francisco. 
New Zealand's second contention over the draft was 
the lack of explicit guarantees for the political 
independence and territorial integrity of members and the 
commitment to resist all acts of aggression. Berendsen 
reminded the meeting that despite the best intentions, the 
League of Nations had failed. This was because members had 
36 BCM (45 ) Minutes of 7th meeting,10 April 1945, 
op. ci t. 
37BCM (45) Minutes of 6th meeting,9 April 1945, ibid. 
38 BCM (45) Minutes of 6th meeting,9 April 1945, ibid . 
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lacked the "will and determination" to fulfil their 
responsibilities. If the League's successor was to avoid 
a similar fate, it was essential that all members were 
united and committed to collective security.39 However, 
New Zealand was being somewhat idealistic in hoping that a 
firm pledge . would ensure this end. The other delegations 
did not support such an absolute guarantee. Both Attlee 
and Smuts pointed out the difficulty of defining aggression 
in a complex modern world, when more subtle forms like 
economic penetration, propaganda and ideological offensives, 
40 
were present. 
In discussing the procedural matters involved in 
signing the United Nations Charter, the meeting confirmed 
New Zealand's practical status as a sovereign state, 
despite not having formally adopted the Statute of 
westminster. Rather than signing under the omnibus heading 
of the British Commonwealth, as had been the case with the 
League of Nations in 1919, it was agreed that the Dominions 
would be individual signatories in context with the other 
nations in alphabetical order. 41 This would help remove 
misconceptions about ' a Commonwealth bloc and affirm 
independent statehood. Canada and New Zealand also 
announced their intention as charter signatories to omit 
the official prefix "Dominion of" (which New Zealand had 
used in the Canberra Pact). The Secretary of External 
Affairs, A.D. McIntosh, saw this title as anachronistic 
39 BCM (45) 9th meeting,11 April 1945,op. cit. 
40 Wood, p. 381 . 
41 BCM (45) Note of meeting of Commonwealth officials, 
12 April 1945,op. cit. 
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and implying a different status from Britain. New 
zealand's recent actions show e d this was clearly not the 
case. 
Fraser maintained an outspoken and uncompromising 
stance at San Francisco. While the Commonwealth 
delegations held frequent meetings, New Zealand's 
independent v i ewpoint was not compromised. Rather than 
playing the part of a loyalist Dominion, New Zealand was 
a consistent advocate for the rights of small states. 
Addressing the conference, Fraser condemned the Security 
Council veto as "distasteful and possibly disastrous".42 
The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister was promoted to 
compliment the Prime Minister: "I wish I could have said 
what you said, 43 but I dare not." As with the League of 
Nations, New Zealand - given its relative unimportance 
internationally - was able to afford the privilege of 
displaying an international conscience. Consequently, the 
New Zealand delegation supported or initiated actions to 
strengthen the proposed charter. This included support for 
a n Australian amendment, restricting the use of the veto 
and a New Zealand am'endment requiring the General Assembly's 
endorsement of Security Council decisions - both of which 
44 
were defeated. Further, New Zealand introduced a clause 
pledging a universal commitment to collective security , but 
the amendment was opposed by the major powers, including 
"the Mother Country". While passed in the main committee 
42 Statement by Fraser at the Plenary Session of the 
San Francisco Conference, 3 May 1948,Statements and 
Documents, p.84. 
43 Quoted Thorn, p.233. 
44 Wood, pp.379, 381. 
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by 26 votes to 18, the amendment failed to attain the 
" d t thO d "" 45 requlre wo- lr s maJorlty. 
The highpoint for New Zealand at San Francisco 
was Fra s er's chairmanship of the I nternational Trusteeship 
Committee, responsible for the charter provisions on 
trusteeship. His skill in this position made a considerable 
impression, confirming his status as a notable statesman. 46 
The American Secretary of State, Edward Stettinus, wrote 
to Fraser expressing his admiration: "No - one at the 
conference has brought higher ideals to our work nor more 
persistence in seeking to give effect to them.,,47 Despite 
New Zealand's strong advocation of the universal application 
of the principles of trusteeship, Fraser played a creditable 
mediatory role as chairman. This was an area of great 
potential controversy, with the imperial powers rejecting 
any infringements on their jurisdiction, while many smaller 
countries and the United States and Soviet Union supported 
greater international supervision of territories. 
Australia played a leading role in lobbying for the wider 
application of trusteeship, in effect expressing New 
Zealand's view also. Ultimately, the resulting charter 
articles, while extensively defining the aims and 
responsibilities of trusteeship, made no attempt to enforce 
the system on all colonial territories - this was up to the 
"h f h " 48 W1S es 0 t e governlng power. 
45 Ibid ., p.382. 
46 McIntosh, 'Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime' ", p.16 
47 Quoted Wood, p.340. 
48United Nations Charter Chapter XII, Articles 75- 85. 
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Despite New Zealand's exposure to the wider 
responsibilities of post - war internationalism and some 
sharp differences of opinion with Britain, there was no 
lessening of the Commonwealth's importance. After all, 
Commonwealth consultation had given the government direct 
access to the proceedings of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference 
and the opportunity for full preliminary discussions of the 
issues involved. On his return from San Francisco, 
Fraser reassured Parliament that any differences with Britain 
in no way "loosened our close ties".49 Disagreements of 
this kind were in any case outside the Commonwealth context, 
rather a result of the great power / small power division. 
Such was the nature of the Commonwealth that the independent 
members could freely disagree and discuss matters while 
retaining a sense of solidarity. Thus the Commonwealth was 
seen to function as the ideal model for international 
co-operation - an effective United Nations in microcosm. 
Fraser strongly recommended the Commonwealth's example when 
Chairman of the Trusteeship Committee: 
We British peoples have learnt that as well as being 
independent, we are - interdependent, and that the 
future of the Briti sh Commonwealth depends upon our 
independence and co-operation. I go further: the 
future of the world depends upon our recognition of 
the interdependence of all nations and upon the 
co- operation58f one nation with one another and with 
all nations. 
New Zealand's increased international role was 
confirmed by active participation at the many post-war 
49 F' th H f Statement by Peter raser ln e ouse 0 
Representatives, 24 July 1945, Statements and Documents, p.95. 
50 Statement by Peter Fraser, Chairman of the 
Trusteeship Committee of the San Francisco Conference, June 
1945, Statements and Documents, p.93. 
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conferences and meetings: the International Monetary 
Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Paris 
Peace Conference, the development of the South Pacific 
Commission and representation to the Council of Foreign 
Ministers. Fraser attended the United Nations General 
Assembly in London in January 1946 and was appointed Chairman 
of the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, once 
again receiving extensive praise. Such increased exposure 
to the complexities of international relations, the reality 
of great power dominance and growing Soviet /Western tension 
obviously tempered the government's idealism. However, 
Wellington remained committed to forging a better world 
environment. 
New Zealand also had to accommodate the changed 
balance of power in the Pacific - the unchallenged pre-
eminence of the United States. This was highlighted by 
Washington's request in November 1945 for permanent base 
rights in various South and South-west Pacific islands under 
British, Australian and New Zealand control. During the 
war, the United States had established extensive facilities 
on many of these Commonwealth territories, including Upolu 
in New Zealand 's mandate, Western Samoa (1942)51 and desired 
to retain this strategic presence in peacetime. Exclusive 
control rights were requested & Funafuti in the Ellice 
Islands, and Canton and Christmas Islands. Joint rights 
were envisaged at other sites including Upolu, Fiji and 
Manus Island in the Admiralty chain. 52 Washington exercised 
51 T . R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States 1941 - 68 (London, 1969), p.50. 
52see full table over page - from Report by United 
Kingdom Chiefs of Staff,16 April 1946, EA 153/23/4. 
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APPENDIX. 
ISLANDS WHERE UNITED STATES SEEK L UNG - TERM MILITARY B .~SE RIGHTS . 
Place. 
I IN' f R' I t I U nited S~-~~;'-- ---
. . . I 6 Lure 0 IS I S d' 
I 
AdIIIlDlstrallon. d U Expen Iture on 
an 8e. Installations . 
Hnrbour. Air Facilitie •. Preo ent State of United States Bnue lind HeD1arks . 
.. ----~'~-------------------+--------------------~---------.----------------------------------
------ United st: tes-\ Exclusi-ve. Naval 1- -V~I~~~;00 I Yery limited .. I United States airfield,l United States will r etnin shore fa c iliti es for support 
British and Air seaplane base and: of loca l Bnd transit small craft. Air faciliti es for 
Can ton Island 
Chris tmas Island · ... 1 Briti sh Colony ... 1 Exclusive. Air ... 
Naval l 
1-
Funufuti 
Espirit 1I ::lanto Island 
G uada!cun nl- Tulagi, . 
Manus . 
Taruwa 
U polu ... 
Viti Levu 
A~cension Island 
British Colony .. . 1 Exclusive. i and A.ir 
Anglo - F rench I J oint . Kaval 
Condolllinium I Air 
British Col on)' .. . , J oint. Na\'a l 
Air 
and I 
1 
and ! 
Austrnlian Man 'l Joint. Naval and 
date Air 
British COlonY " '1 Joint. 
Air 
Naval and I 
Ne w Zealand 1 Joint. 
Mandate 
British Coluny . .. 1 J oint , 
Air 
B ritish Colony ... 1 Joint , 
Air I 
Naval and 
Air 
5,164 ,000 
3,793,500 
39,125,500 
31,405,300 
131,757,800 
3,836,700 
2,473,800 
4,000,000 
7,250,000 
commercial airport : emergency IBndings . 
I Narro'" atoll , lsrge l"goon 9 lIIile by 4 mile. 
I 
Very lllllited . . United State. airfield rnited States B nse inactive exce pt for wenther 
and seaplane bnse , report ing station. 
: Size of island i. npproximate ly 250 sq . mile8 . 
I 
Good for l11 edlllID s ized United States airfi eld Cnited Stntes BBse inactive e xcep t for weather 
ships and seaplan" base I reporting station . 
: Atoll with large lagoon 10 mile by 8 mile . 
I 
Fair Lnrge nnd deep Unit ed States airfi e ld i rnited Stat es B use inactive e xce pt for one emer-
I 
and na~al air base gency airfield t o be m a intained by Un ited Sta tes 
, Army. 
, Guadnlcolnal- F our Ij nited States a;r · Guadalcanal is oeing. reduced to: -
I Tulagi- baue at \.;uadalrannl. fields . Aircraft refuelling fa ciliti es. Army weath er 
i Open anc horage I fields and na~al air Une operationa l airfi e ld and t wo em ergency air · 
I Large and deep t>a\'al air base at "bsen'ing station . 
, Good . Large and dee p 
Fair for m edium sized 
sbips 
Fair for Ill edium sized 
ships 
Suva-
Deep water hnrbour, 
moderat.e size 
NQndi-
Oood nnchorage 
Ope n nn churnge only. 
Tulagi Tul8gi is being reduced to: -
Seapla ne base maintained by New Zealnnd for 
R.l\ .Z.A.F., aircraft with refu elling facilities . 
Minor task for ce anc horag e. 
United Stat es airfields P ost ·war Rtate t o pro\' id e operating base for com-
Bnd t ea plane ba." I pl ete logistic s upport for one carri er ta sk force ; 
no new faciliti es will be in st,all ed and all exi s ting 
faciliti es will be kept on c and m basis . Suppli es 
".-ill not be stored . 
A ~iation Faciliti es-For intermi t t ent reconnaissance 
and Aj S operations . One airfield to be ke pt in 
sufiicient operating status to s uppnrt inter · 
mittently heavy patrol bombers . F acilitiu at 
oth er three airfi elds on c Bnd m bns is . 
Unit ed States airfi eld .. . t:nit ed States bnse inILctive exce pt for weatb er 
reportin g station, 
United States airfield Being reduced to-
and seaplane base Token garrison . Seaplane base with limited 
fa ciliti es for staging , Eme rgency airfi eld . 
Fi\'e airfields Being reduced to-
United States airfi e ld 
Operational airfi eld for Air Transport Command . 
Emergenc)' airfield ",itb token garrison . Ne w 
Zealand sea plane hase . 
1\'a"al: reduced ~tn t us. 
Army: Air base.. Hoapitat 
Compiled froUl inforUiation in M .M . (S) (46) 2:l, and from Directory of United States t>a"al O\'Crseas Bases, December 1945. 
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considerable pressure on the Commonwealth here, even 
trying to coax Britain to cede Tarawa in the Gilbert 
Islands. 53 
This was a very controversial matter, as the 
28 
inter - war period had seen a conflict of claims between 
New Zealand and the United States over Pacific territory.54 
Further, the Canberra Pact emphasised that the construction 
or use of base facilities by another nation in wartime did 
not constitute a basis for sovereignty. 55 Consequently, in 
discussions with Secretary of State Byrnes in London 
22 January 1946, Fraser distinguished base rights from 
territorial sovereignty. He pointed out that the United 
States still laid claim to the Northern Cook Islands (New 
Zealand territory), caustically inquiring if such claims 
were based on occupation or discovery. As far as sovereignty 
over the disputed islands was concerned, Fraser was adamant 
that there was "nothing doing". The United States preferred 
to concentrate on the more pressing issue of base rights, 
but even here Fraser was less than enthusiastic. Despite 
considerable American expenditure at Upolu, New Zealand, he 
declared, was prepared to refund the money and establish a 
solely British base. 56 A residual suspicion of United 
States policy remained evident. However, in February 1946, 
the United States formally proposed a bi - Iateral agreement 
for the continued use of facilities in Western Samoa. 57 
53 Secretary of State Byrnes implied to Attlee in 
Paris, April 1946, that s uch an action would likely help 
attain Congressional approval of American loans - Sinclair, 
Walter Nash, p.248. 
54This related to the expanding needs of aviation 
and communications. 
55Clause 16 of Australian - New Zealand Agreement in 
Kay, p .143. 
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Despite Fraser's comments t o Byrnes (which amounted to 
an independent posture rather than practical policy),New 
zealand recognised the necessity of involving the United 
states in the defence of Commonwealth territory in the 
Pacific. It was thus hoped that the question of bases 
58 
would facilitate a regional security agreement. 
The new international environment did not, however, 
lessen New Zealand's British identity. At the opening of 
parliament in June 1946, the vice-regal speech emphasised 
that while New Zealand was "a sovereign state" with 
obligations to the United Nations Charter, it "justly 
prided itself on its traditions of loyalty to the throne 
59 
and its unswerving devotion to the British Commonwealth". 
Close inter-Commonwealth defence ties remained essential. 
Thus in early 1946 the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff advocated 
the establishment of an ex t ended Committee of Imperial 
Defence to supervise Commonwealth strategic planning, 
comprising the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff and Dominion 
staff representatives. A regional organisation for the 
Pacific, co-ordinating with the London headquarter~ was 
a 1 s 0 e n vis age d . 6 ° r 't was fur the rho p edt hat the s cop e 0 f 
this defence co-operation would extend to technical and 
scientific research. Such inter-Commonwealth machinery had 
56 Note of a meeting in Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs' office, London, 22 January 1946, EA 153/23/4. 
57 Reese, p.50. 
58Memorandum by U.K. Chiefs of Staff, 16 April 1946 
had emphasised this. EA 153/23/4. 
59NZP~, 26 June 1946, vol. 273,pp.1-3. 
60Minutes of 158th Meeting of NZ COS Committee 
29 March 1946,EA 156/10/1 pt. 1; NZ COS Paper (46) 10, 
Defence Co-operation Between Members of the British 
3 0 
not ~een present in the pre - war period, but New Zealand 
saw developments here as necessary safeguards for security. 
It remained to be seen if other Commonwealth members would 
endorse these ideas . 
II. THE 1946 PRIME MINISTER~ MEETING 
The first major occasion to test post - war 
Commonwealth solidarity was the Prime Ministers' Meeting 
in April and May 1946. Significantly, there was no return 
to the formality of an Imperial Conference (last held in 
1937), rather continuity with the informal exchange of 
views as established at the Prime Ministers' Meeting of 1944. 
Compared to the elaborate Imperial Conferences, these 
meetings were simply intimate get - togethers; no formal 
decisions were possible given the independence and equality 
of all members, while any recommendations required reference 
to the respective governments. Clement Attlee aptly 
described the meetings as "a talk round the table between 
friends ... As in a British Cabinet meeting, one arrived 
f .. ,,61 at a consensus 0 oRlnlon. 
New Zealand was represented by the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Walter Nash; Fraser, having been in London only 
a few months earlier, decided not to attend, although he did 
accompany Nash to Sydney for consultation with the Australian 
government. The meeting was notable as the last to comprise 
of just Britain and the "Old Dominions" - Indian independence 
Commonwealth 12 April 1946 EA81/4/3 pt. 5. 
61 C.R.A. Attlee, Empire into Commonwealth (London, 1961), 
p .2 5 . 
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in 1947 was to drastically alter the make - up of future 
such events. Following the meeting, Nash remained in 
London to represent the government at the Empire Victory 
Parade on 8 June. The presence of New Zealand troops here, 
clearly portrayed the country's strong identity with the 
62 Commonw~alth. 
The Prime Ministers' Meeting was initially an 
"ANZUK" affair - "the executive of the Empire Labour 
party,,63 in cbhvocation - with the South African and Canadian 
delegations arriving later. Pacific matters consequently 
dominated the early proceedings. Australia and New Zealand 
had already announced their intention of asserting regional 
Commonwealth leadership in the South Pacific; and this 
corresponded with the meeting's emphasis on the need for 
increased Dominion responsibility in regional defence. 64 
The Australian government was particularly eager to advance 
developments here and its spokesmen dominated disc0ssions. 
Prime Minister Ben Chifley strongly advocated that Canberra 
should take administrative responsibility' for joint 
Commonwealth defence activities in the Pacific. 65 External 
Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt further proposed the 
establishment of a "South Seas Commission~' providing regional 
.. . 1 d . tt 66 co-operatlon In SOCla an economlC ma ers. 
New Zealand supported increased inter-Commonwealth 
co-operation in the Pacific, but was not prepared to accept 
62The Press , 10 June 1946 gave extensive coverage of 
this occasion - "a mighty demonstration of Commonwealth 
solidarity". 
63Reported remark by British Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin at first session, quoted McIntyre, p.56. 
64 pMM (46) Minutes of 4th Meeting,25 April 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
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Australian domination. This concern was accentuated by 
Evatt's aggressive style. For example, the New Zealand 
delegation resented Australia's unilateral action and lack 
of prior consultation over the proposal for the South 
Pacific Commission, as both countries were jointly associated 
with this concept in the Canberra Pact. Fraser informed 
Nash that Australia's action here could "have the result of 
11 "f" 11 ff t t " " II 67 nu 1 y1ng a our e orts a ac 1ve co-operat1on . 
There was thus a degree of tension between the Tasman 
neighbours at the meeting. Frank Corner, an External Affairs 
official, wrote to McIntosh expressing an underlyin a 
vexation that Australia "might swamp New Zealand"; here was 
"a leadership which we do not trust as much as the British".68 
When Corner accompanied Evatt to Paris (14-19 May) for 
discussions with the French government over the proposed 
South Seas Commission, he took the opportunity to "keep 
69 Evatt aware that he was also thinking for New Zealand". 
Personal relations between Nas h a nd Evatt were also strained, 
with Corner stating that Nash was jealous and distrustful of 
Evatt, while Evatt apparently lacked patience with Nash and 
d " 1 d 1" h 70 regar ed h1m as a transp ante Eng 1S man. 
The major Pacific issue at the meeting was the 
achievement of an effective regional security arrangement, 
consistent with the United Nations Charter. A common scheme 
65 Ibid . 
66 pMM (46) Minutes of 11th Meeting,3 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
67 Fraser to Nash, 3 May 1946, EA 153/23/1 pt. 1. 
68 Letter Corner to McIntosh and Wilson,27 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/1 pt. 1. 
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of defence between the three Commonwealth partners was 
envisaged, but it was seen as essential to be associated 
71 
with the pre-eminent power of the United States. The 
Canadian-United States defence agreement was seen as the 
appropriate model. Chifley and Evatt thus proposed linking 
Washington's request for continued base rights with the 
development of a regional security commitment - though not 
necessarily a formal pact. Rather than separate bi-lateral 
negotiations, a united stance was agreed, making the granting 
72 
of bases conditional on an acceptable defence arrangement. 
It was also agreed that the request for exclusive rights 
was unacceptable, particularly as the three islands concerned 
were important for Australasian communications. Joint 
rights were permissible but all Commonwealth members were 
to have access, rather than the American proposal, limiting 
this to the administering power and the United States. This 
was a liability in the event of the United States remaining 
neutral while the Commonwealth was at war. The Commonwealth 
partners would also need to retain full jurisdiction over 
h · . 1 d . . 73 t e1r 1S an terr1tor1es. 
As Nash maintained, the Commonwealth was seeking 
partnership with the United States, not wholesale domination. 74 
69 Let t e r Cor n e r toM c I n t 0 s h, 31 May 1 946 , ib i d . T his 
was not an official trip but the result of a "vacant seat". 
70 Ibid • 
71pMM (46) Minutes of 3rd meeting, 24 April 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. This had also been the recommendation of a U.K. 
Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, 16 April 194& EA 153/23/4, OPe cit. 
72, 73 pMM (46) Minutes of 3rd meeting, 24 April 1946. 
74Nash to Prime Minister, 7 May 1946, EA 153/23/1 pte 1. 
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America was a reinforcement rather than a replacement for 
75 Commonwealth defence. An agreed formula to submit to 
Washington was approved by the three Commonwealth partners 
on 26 APr1ol.76 Th N Z 1 d t thO e ew ea an governmen saw 1S as an 
equitable proposal, it was only right that the United 
states "should give as well as receive".77 However, there 
was considerable doubt that Washington would commit itself 
78 to such an arrangement. 
Ernest Bevin approached the State Department with 
the Commonwealth proposal in early May, but true to Fraser 
and Nash's predictions, Secretary Byrnes was adamant that 
the United States was not interested in any regional defence 
79 
agreement. Discussions continued but it became clear that 
the three Commonwealth partners lacked sufficient leverage 
to force an agreement, particularly as American security 
interests were more in the North Pacific. Australia remained 
adamant that no base rights would be granted without a 
reciprocal commitment, though New Zealand was ultimately 
prepared to grant the United States base facilities without 
h Od 0 0 80 t 1S con 1t1on. However, American interest in South 
Pacific bases finaliy ended with President Truman's 1946 
751. C. MacGibbon, 'The Defe nce of New Zealand 1945-57", 
New Z e a 1 and i n W 0 rId A f f air s, Vol u mel (Well i n g ton, 1 9 77 ), p. 1 49 . 
76 pMM (46) Minutes of 5th meeting, 26 April 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
77 Fraser to Nash, 29 April 1946, EA 153/23/1 pt. 1. 
78 Nash to Fraser,24 April 1946, ibid; Fraser to Nash, 
29 April 1946,1bid. 
79 pMM (46) Minutes of 12th meeting, 6 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
80 Draft of USA-NZ agreement re Upolu 1946; Nash to 
Fraser 22 July 1946. In Nash Papers N2288, quoted Sinclair, 
Walter Nash, pp.249,400. 
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cuts in defence expenditure, and the concentration of 
81 
activities north of the equator. Australia and New 
zealand would have to wait until 1951 before a regional 
security arrangement was reached. 
In wider terms the 1946 meeting brought home the 
grim reality of Britain's post-war weakness. His Majesty's 
government were quite open about their critical finance 
and manpower situation, and by implication their diminished 
status as a major power. The war effort had liquidated 
much of Britain's foreign investment, which played an 
important part in financing both the costs of Commonwealth 
defence and Britain's imports. Britain was consequently 
now a debtor nation, needing to increase exports by 75% over 
f ' 82 pre-war 19ures. There was also the major burden of 
repaying American loans. Yet, simultaneously, huge defence 
expenditures (estimated at £1,176 million for 1946 -
2 0% of G.N.P.) and military manpower requirements (the 
united Kingdom armed forces were estimated at numbering 
1,077,000 by the end of 1946) remained. 83 This situation 
created an immense strain on precious resources and was 
emphasised with great concern by British ministers: 
The United Kingdom is bearing a burden of 
unprecedented magnitude in the field of defence 
which cannot be laid down or set aside without 84 
serious repercussions in international relations. 
It was also made clear that in a future war, the 
Commonwealth could not function as a self-sufficient bloc 
81 Reese, p.55. 
82Nash 's Report to Fraser on P.M. 's Meeting, 
22 July 1946,EA 153/23/5; C.J. Bartlett, The Long Retreat 
(London: 1972), pp.11 - 12. 
83 pMM (46) Minutes of 18th Meeting,22 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
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and would need the active support of the United States. 
Any Commonwealth defence system would thus have to be 
85 
capable of interlocking with American power. 
Such a resume had a very sobering effect on a 
Commonwealth fresh from the adulation of victory. As 
Frank Corner exclaimed: · 
Never before had the Dominions been spoken to like 
this ... the plain fact is that Britain is not a 
great power, she cannot a~~ord the expense and 
manpower to act like one. 
While Nash and most of his delegation were in utmost 
sympathy with the belea gu e red Mother Country, Corner was 
surprisingly less charitable, strongly criticising Britain's 
social and economic legacy: 
her industry was obsolete and inefficient before 
the war, ruined by a rotting capitalist system which 
denied healthy and enthusiastic workers, and a c lass 
education system which did §9t produ c e enough 
scientists to refurbish it. 
Here were the comments of an "angry young man", but they 
conveyed a brutal honesty, reflecting the bleak post-war 
environment. 
Clearly, the onus was on the Dominions to help 
alleviate some of Britain's immense burden: 
Unless some share of responsibility is assumed by 
the Dominions with all the difficulties that this 
imparts through our independence in foreign policy, 
the United Kingdom must have a serious stoc~saking 
of her position in the international order. 
84From paper submitted by Dominion s ' Secretary, 
Lord Addison, 22 May - recounted Nash to Fraser, 23 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/1 pt. 1. 
85UK COS memorandum 'Organisation for Commonwealth 
Defence', 1 May 1946, EA 153/23/4. 
86, . 87 Corner to McIntosh and Wilson, 2 7 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/1 pt. 1. 
88 From paper submitted by Dominion s ' Se c retary, 
22 Ma y,op. c it. 
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The problem was how to achieve a greater Dominion 
contributioh. Nash initially advocated that the 
Commonwealth should try to act as a united force in foreign 
policy, thereby maintaining a strong British influence and 
parallel the power of the United States and Soviet Union. 89 
However, this reassert ion of "Halifax's thesis" was 
unfeasible given Dominion sovereignty.90 Thus, when the 
United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff suggested the development 
f . . t d fl' 91 h d I . o JOln e ence p annlng, ot er e egatlons resoundly 
rejected this as an infringement of sovereignty.92 
Instead of the Dominions contributing to a more 
centralised defence system, as independent nations their 
role was best achieved by taking increased responsibility 
for their own regional security - a devolution rather than 
93 
concentration of resources. Australia and New Zealand 
had already announced their intention of doing so in the 
Canberra Pact. This policy would effectively relieve some 
of Britain's burden while also corresponding to the 
constitutional reality of sovereign status. As independent 
nations, the primary responsibility of Commonwealth members 
89 pMM (46) Minutes of first meeting,23 April 1946, 
EA 153 / 23/3. 
90corner was critical of a lot of Nash's contributions 
to the meeting - "Mr Nash was often too busy to study the 
P.M. 's Conference and expressed some very curious ideas." 
Letter to McIntosh 27 May 1946, lOp. cit. 
91UK COS memorandum: 'Responsibilities for Commonwealth 
Defence',20 April 1946,EA 153/23/4 - "Each member of the 
Commonwealth therefore should agree to take all steps, 
political and military, in those areas in which they are 
directly concerned so as to maintain conditions favourable to 
the Commonwealth in peace and to accept joint responsibility 
for the defence in war." Submitted to meeting 25 April 1946 
EA 153/23/3. 
92 Nash's Report,22 July 1946,EA 153/23 / 5. 
93 pMM (46) 18th Meeting, 23 May 1946, EA 153/23/3. 
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was the maintenance of their own security, though, given 
New Zealand's smallness and isolation, this needed expression 
in a wider defence arrangement. 
New Zealand was quite prepared to increase its 
share of defence responsibility. However, Nash still 
thought in terms of imperial strategy, rather than the more 
independent policies of Canada and South Africa. He 
asked for the full cost of Commonwealth-wide defence (in 
both finance and manpower), thereby allowing an equitable 
d · . , f d . 94 lV1Slon 0 expen lture. This attitude was criticised 
by other leaders. Smuts was adamant that the Dominions were 
not paying "tribute" to Britain, they were rather carrying 
out the national duty of ensuring their own security.95 
But while the Dominions could claim to be exercising greater 
national responsibility, Corner pointed out that "sheer 
necessity" rather than independent zeal had forced this 
decentralisation: 
it is dangerous to sentimentalise about a position 
into which we have been forced by weakness ••. Britain 
is reducing her commitments, cutting her losses, 
leaving herself free to concentrate her resources in 
the areas which she re gard g6 as most vital. The Pacific is not one of those areas. 
While a centralised Commonwealth defence system 
was not possible, an effective understanding and co-ordination 
of members' individual policies was desirable. During the 
war this had been achieved not by formal machinery but by 
constant communication between respective governments and 
defence authorities. This was a flexible, even improvised 
94 pMM (46) Minutes of 18th Meeting,22 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
95 Ibid • 
96 Corner to McIntosh and Wilson,27 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/1 pt . 1. 
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system, but proved effective, facilitating common 
military planning and co-ordinated arms production . 
Could similar co-ordination be maintained in peacetime 
without infringing on individual sovereignty? In pursuit 
of this, Nash circulated proposals by the New Zealand 
Chiefs of Staff for a new Imperial Defence Committee, 
comprising the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff and Dominion 
joint staff missions, with a common secretariat. 97 
However, the other delegations did not support such a concept, 
which seemed to imply a unitary policy. 
In turn, the British authorities proposed a more 
decentralised system involving the exchange of service 
missions between the Dominions and London and between 
. . h . t 9S Domlnlons were approprla e. These missions would 
represent their own Chiefs of Staff and provide liaison with 
the defence departments of the accredited nation . Such a 
system aimed to provide effective inter - Commonwealth defence 
consultation, integrating the various independent regional 
policies. The model for this arrangement was the wartime 
Combined Chiefs of Staff between the United States and 
Britain. 
The British proposals received a generally 
enthusiastic response. As the Australian delegation 
expressed: 
97NZ COS memorandum circulated by Nash, 'Defence 
Co-operation and Responsibilities within the British 
Commonwealth', 27 April 1946, EA 153/23/4. 
9S U. K• COS memorandum, 'Organisation for 
Commonwealth Defence',20 April 1946; Revised version 
1 May 1946,EA 153/23/4. 
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An entirely new concept in British Commonwealth 
relations is now emerging. This concept tends to 
reconcile full Dominion autonomy with full British 
Commonwealth co - operation .•. the machinery between 
nations of the British Commonwealth has now reached 
a stage where a common policy can be carried out 
through a chosen Dominion instrumentality in an 
area or in relation to a su~j~ct ~~tter which is of 
primary concern to that Dom1n10n. 
However, some minor problems were raised. Nash remarked 
that co-ordination between five partners would be more 
complex than the bi - lateral American/British arrangement 
. t h 100 1n e war. Smuts raised the further contention that 
military missions would give outsiders the impression 
that the Commonwealth was ganging up. Furthermore, 
nationalist sensitivities, particularly in South Africa, 
could be offended by the presence of British military 
missions and the implication of unitary policy. To help 
counter such m~conceptions Nash proposed using the title 
"liaison officers" rather than service missions. 101 
As well as the decentralisation of defence 
responsibility, the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff also 
suggested the possibility of redistributing the aggregate 
strength and resources of the Commonwealth. An ambitious 
"Dispersal" plan would transfer manpower, industrial 
capacity and armament production from strategically 
vulnerable Britain to the Dominions. 102 The Commonwealth's 
99 pMM (46)8,1 May 1946, EA 153/23/4. 
100 pMM (46) Minutes of 4th Meeting, 25 April 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
101 pMM (46) Minutes of 10th Meeting,2 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
102UK COS Papers 'The Strategic Position of the 
Commonwealth' and 'Responsibilities for Commonwealth Defence' 
20 April 1946,EA 153/23/4. The impact of nuclear weapons 
was a major catalyst for this proposal. 
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war capacity would thus be more evenly spread. This, 
however, implied a unitary defence policy - rejected by the 
Prime Ministers - or at least a tacit understanding of 
solidarity in the event of war. The proposal therefore 
contradicted the sovereignty and individual defence 
responsibility of the Dominions. The Australian response 
103 
was favourable, though this was essentially because the 
proposal corresponded with the nation's own development 
policies. As Prime Minister Chifley told the House of 
Representatives on his return from London, the government 
supported the decentralisation of the Commonwealth's 
productive capacity. Australia, he said, wanted to increase 
its population, expand its industrial base and develop a 
.. d d f . d t 104 munltlons an e ence ln us rYe In contrast, Nash 
regarded the socio-economic consequences of dispersal as 
potentially destabilising for the Commonwealth, and saw the 
1 h h · 1 d' t . 1 105 proposa as ypot etlca an lmprac lca . Nash's view 
was ultimately vindicated as the dispersal plan was not 
106 
taken any further. 
The New Zealand delegation was somewhat alarmed by 
Britain's pessimistic assumptions in defence planning: that 
the United Nations would be unable to prevent war between 
the great powers and that the Soviet Union " is our most 
107 probable potential enemy". The British government 
maintained a strong anti-Soviet stance during the meeting, 
103 pMM (46) Minutes of 4th Meeting,25 April 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
104chifley's Report to House of Representatives, 
19 June 1946,EA 156/1/1 pt. 2. 
105 pMM (46) Minute s of 4th Meeting,25 April 1946, 
EA 153/23/3; Nash to Fraser,26 April, EA 153/23/1 pt. 1 . 
106 Bartlett, p.ll. 
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a consequence of t h e growing East/West rift in Europe. 
considering New Zealand's high expectations for positive 
post-war international co-operation, this was a disillusioning 
approach. The Australians strongly criticised this "war 
mentality", arguing it would only increase the possibility 
of fl ' t 108 con lC. Corner quoted Evatt as remarking: "Just 
as well we came or they'd have declared war.,,109 New 
Zeala nd had of course warned that the Security Council vet o 
ensured that the great powers would not be constrained 
(Britain was now vindicating New Zealand's strong opposition 
in London and San Francisco ) and Nash agreed that the 
embryonic United Nations would be severely tested in t h e 
. . l' 110 lnternatlona envlronment. However, both the New Zea l and 
and Au stralian de leg ations could not accept the premise of 
an impotent United Nations: "We must work on the assumption tha 
the United Nations has the fullest authority and that 
everything must be done to secure this and make it effective. ,,1 
Britain's ( and the Common we alth's) best option, Nash regarded, 
was to fully support the United Nations and to ensure it 
achieved the desired ends. 11 2 
In terms of wider inter-Commonwealth consultation, 
Lord Addison inquired if there were any desired improvements. 
He affirmed the basic tenets of consultation as formalised in 
1930 - governments would inform and consult if other members' 
interests were in volv ed; and that governments would not take 
107N h' as s 
EA 153/23/5. 
Report on P.M. ' s Meeting, 22 July 1946, 
108 pMM (46) Minutes of first meeting, 23 April 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
109 Corner to McIntosh, 27 May 1946, EA 153/23/1 pt. 1. 
110 . f h . Mlnutes 0 4t Meetlng,25 April 1946, EA 153/23/3. 
111 Nash's Report, 22 July 1946; EA 153/23/5. 
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actions which might involve other members without their 
definite consent. Noting the masses of telegrams despatched 
daily from the Dominions' Office to Commonwealth capitals, 
Addison concluded that the present system was effective, 
and had been successfully put to the test in war. This 
view was backed up by MacKenzie King, who emphasised that 
constant communication between governments was the only 
appropriate method of consultation. While not demeaning 
the importance of Prime Ministers' meetings, MacKenzie 
King stated he was hesitant to express opinions in this 
context, as he did not have formal cabinet backing. This 
was contrasted by the "continuing conference of cabinets", 
· d d b t t . t t· t· 113 provl e y cons an In er-governmen communlca Ion. 
It was thus agreed that the existing form of 
Commonwealth consultation remained appropriate. There 
were, however, minor details, of which Nash raised four 
points. Firstly, he differentiated between information and 
consultation, expressing concern that Britain sometimes 
(usually in emergencies) took actions without prior 
consultation, subsequently informing the Dominions at late 
. 114 " 
notIce. The obvious example here was the resented Cairo 
Conference of 1943. As Fraser emphasised to Nash by 
telegraph, frequent consultation was essential "in view of 
115 the added liabilities we may be called to carry". 
112 Ibid . 
113 pMM (46) Minutes of 19th Meeting,23 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/3. 
114Ibid • 
115 Fraser to Nash,30 April 194~ EA 156/10/1 pt. 1. 
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This showed that New Zealand remained committed to 
supporting Britain, albeit as a sovereign nation. Secondly, 
Nash advocated extending the practice of repeating to 
other Commonwealth governments bi - lateral exchanges. 
Thirdly, he advanced increased inter-Dominion consultation, 
highlighting the example of the Canberra Pact. And finally, 
there was the suggestion that all governments should continue 
to circulate any relevant information from their 
representatives in foreign capitals to their Commonwealth 
partners. Such proposals highlighted New Zealand's 
continued commitment to an integrated, co-operative 
Commonwealth. 
In fact, New Zealand was somewhat concerned that 
Commonwealth consultation was becoming too decentralised, 
concentrating on the regional interests of members rather 
than joint issues. For example, Nash regretted that Canada 
showed a lack of interest in matters outside North America. 116 
New Zealand still retained an imperial perspective, despite 
a proudly held independence. This viewpoint was evident 
when New Zealand was the only delegation to regard Egypt 
as an area of joint Commonwealth concern rather than 
Britain's sole responsibility. As Nash stated: 
If this is so I question whether there is any area 
towards which the members of the Commonwealth would 
accept the position that there must be a joint policy 
and we are therefore in the situation that each 
member of the Commonwealth will take a primary 
responsi9ttity in its own region, but will go no 
further. 
This was a logical development given the structure of the 
Commonwealth, but New Zealand still believed in a more 
cohesive association. 
116 N h' as s Report,22 July 1946, EA 153/23/5. 
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Given the nature of the Commonwealth, the Prime 
Ministers' Meeting provided few concrete results. However, 
it provided a frank appraisal of post-war reality: 
Britain's decline as a major power and the consequent 
devolution of defence responsibility to a regional -
Dominion context. This was confirmed by the United Kingdom's 
White Paper on Defence, released in 1946: 
The natural starting point for future progress in 
Commonwealth defence has been the idea of regional 
association. Geography largely decides which 
problems most directly concern the separate members 
of the Commonwealth and it is the aim of the various 
governments to recognise and take advantage of this 
fact by arranging that regional questions shall in 
the firrfsplace be studied in the appropriate regional 
centre. 
Consequently, the British government did not 
revive the Committee of Imperial Defence. Instead, a 
new Cabinet defence committee was created, specifically 
concerned with the United Kingdom's security.119 The 
Dominions were not represented here, nor was the Dominions' 
secretary a permanent member. This apparent abandonment 
of the imperial connection railed some Conservative 
1 . t" 120 po l lClans. However, a more localised defence 
perspective reflected contemporary reality. The Dominions 
were sovereign nations with their own regional interests, 
while secondly and more importantly, the Commonwealth was 
no longer a self-sufficient bloc. Member nations now needed 
to develop regional security arrangements with their non-
Commonwealth neighbours. New Zealand (despite special 
11SU• K• White Paper, 'Central Organisation for 
Defence' October 1946, p.11 EA 156/1/1, pt. 2. 
119 Ibid ., p.6. 
120 Mansergh, Docum e nts and Speeches, House of Lords, 
16 October 1946, pp.1199 - 1203. 
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emotional and economic bonds with Britain) appreciated 
the new balance of power, hence the ultimate willingne s s 
to give the United States base rights in Western Samoa. 
The very concept of i mperial defence had become outdated, 
replaced by the wider Western alliance. 
The new international order provided a major 
challenge for the Commonwealth; as Frank Corner commented, 
it "showed the wooliness of much past talk about 
Commonwealth relations".12~ But the removal of imperial 
illusions only confirmed the essential structure of the 
Commonwealth - a free association of independent, albeit 
closely linked, states. As the final communique of the 
Prime Ministers' Meeting emphasised, the British Commonwealth 
was a peculiar institution , not based on an organic 
structure: 
Centralised machinery would not facilitate, and 
might even hamper the combination of autonomy and 
unity which is . characteristic of the British 
Commonwealth. 12 2 
Yet it seemed that despite an expressed independence, New 
Zealand would have preferred a more cohesive association. 
flAutonomy and unity" - these paradoxical 
features of the Commonwealth relationship were encapsulated 
by New Zealand's position in the immediate post-war 
environment. On one hand, the status of an independent 
nation was manifest in the regional assertion of the Canberra 
1?1Corner to McIntosh c;tnd Wilson,27 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/1 pt. 1. 
1 ~ ~From text of final communique of 1946 Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, issued to the press 23 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/8. 
48 
Pact, defence negotiations with the United States 
and ardent support for an effective international 
security system (even at the cost of opposing Great 
Britain). Further, a weakened United Kingdom ensured 
that New Zealand had to take an increased initiative 
to maintain its own security and interests. Here, 
then, was the phenomenon of the "small power rampant". 
But, concurrently, New Zealand was an adamantly 
British nation, emotionally and economically bound to 
the Mother Country, actively supporting the maintenance 
of a strong and unified Commonwealth. Certainly, 
compared to some of the more assertive Dominions, 
New Zealand maintained a distinct imperial perspective. 
The independent small state and the loyal Oominion 
thus coexisted. Could they be successfully balanced? 
49 
CHAPTER II 
"AID TO BRITAIN": 
THE CONTINUITY OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY 
If Britain goes down ... New Zealand will go 
down with Britain. We are tied to her not only 
by ties of blood ... but inextricably by ties 
of trade. 
J. Watts, NZPD, 11 July 1947, Vol. 276, p.456. 
The immediate post-war years saw the continuity 
of New Zealand's wartime policy of economic support for 
Britain. Victory had severely weakened the British 
economy, with the loss of half the nation's foreign 
investments. 1 This necessitated the arduous task of 
rehabilitation. Sympathy and solidarity with the 
beleaguered Mother Country ensured that New Zealand's 
assistance would be forthcoming. National feeling was 
aptly expressed in the words of the Leader of the 
Opposition, Sidney Holland: 
Who were the people who submitted to and suffered 
a seven day bombing week so that we in New Zealand 
should enjoy a five day working week? ... the 
first thing that we should decide is that everything 
we can spare is Britain's whether she can payor 
not. 2 
Charity and sentiment were strong motivating 
factors, but New Zealand's concern primarily reflected 
the reality of economic dependency. Britain was the 
nation's predominant trading partner (in 1946 the market 
1 Bartlett, p . ll. 
2NZPD , 26 August 1947, Vol. 277, p . 595. 
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for 70% of exports and 48% of imports)3 and was the 
banker of our international exchange reserves, through 
the Sterling Area. The preservation and recovery of 
the British economy was thus vital to New Zea land's long 
term prosperity. As the Minister of Finance, Walter Nash, 
admitted to parliament 21 August 1947, the country's 
"material interests" were irrevocably "bound up with our 
4 people in the homeland". In economic terms, New Zealand 
remained a British colony. 
To help Bri tain ''Win the peace It, New Zealand 
maintained a war economy: sterling reserves were 
conserved - highlighted by the "gift" of £12.5 million in 
1947; restrictions on dollar expenditure were maintained; 
and bulk purchasing arrangements renewed - whereby all 
surplus meat and dairy products were sold to Britain at 
below market prices. These policies necessitated 
continued sacrifices. For example, import needs were 
curtailed, the nation's terms of trade suffered, and 
rationing continued. Alternatively, the government was 
able to control New Zealand's balance of payments and 
stabilise the economy, but this was at the cost of reduced 
economic returns. In the longer term, New Zealand served 
to tighten its economic dependency with Britain, precluding 
the possibility of increased diversification. However, 
established ties of trade and sentiment, coupled with 
economic crisis, committed New Zea land to its course of 
action. 
3 N. Z . Official Year Book 1951 -52 (Wellington, 1952) 
pp.235, 257. 
4 NZPD,21 August 1947, Vol. 277, p.536. 
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I. STERLING AREA SOLIDARITY 
The Sterling Area comprised those nations 
using sterling as a common international currency, 
pooling their foreign reserves in London and drawing 
from this to finance external payments. All Commonwealth 
countries with the exception of Canada were members, as 
5 
were Ireland, Iceland, Burma and Iraq. Beginning as an 
informal association, the Sterling Bloc was formalised 
into a distinct monetary unit in the Second World War, 
whereby members agreed to conser ve reserves to support 
the war effort. Exchange controls were thus enforced on 
hard currency expenditure, ensuring that the pool of 
valuable dollar earnings was maintained. By this 
austerity policy, members were able to extend extensive 
credit to Britain which accumulated as sterling balances. 
By December 1945, total sterling balances amounted to 
£3,700 million, compared to actual reserves of £610 million.6 
New Zealand's own balances had increased from £9million in 
1939 to £102 million in August 1947. 7 
An indebted Britain was, however, unable to honour 
this immense post-war liability. It was, therefore, 
hoped that members would be prepared to write off some of 
their credits. 8 John Maynard Keynes reflected Whitehall's 
viewpoint when stating that Britain had weathered the 
immense cost of war only to: 
5For details of Ireland's anomalous position in 
the Commonwealth see Chapter IV. 
6 P.C. Gordon Walker, The Commonwealth (London, 1962), 
p.259. 
7'New Zea land and the Dollar Crisis', Round Table 
December 1947, Vol. 38, No. 149, p.512. 
8This was expressed in Britain's loan agreement with 
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end up owing vast sums, not to neutrals and 
bystanders, but to our own allies, Dominions 
and associates who ought to figure in the eyes 
of history as our mercenaries unless the balance 
is redressed. 9 
In discussions with both Fraser and Nash in February and 
May of 1946 respectively, the British government strongly 
pressed New Zealand to reduce its sterling balances. 
It was particularly hoped that such an action would set 
an example to major sterling holders like India and 
10 Egypt, who were pressing the Treasury. 
Despite an avowed willingness to support the 
Mother Country, New Zealand was not prepared to passively 
scale down its sterling balances. Nash maintained that 
New Zealand had not amassed large balances by exploiting 
Britain. By contrast, financial sacrifice had been 
incurred by the constant supply of foodstuffs at below 
market prices. In turn, wartime restraint had produced 
a backlog of vital capital imports. 11 Sterling balances 
were, therefore, essential resources that New Zealand 
could use, not imperial tribute. However, as Britain's 
financial standing deteriorated and American loans proved 
insufficient, New Zealand proved more amenable. In 
March 1947, Fraser announced the "gift" of £10 million 
(ultimately £12.5 million) to the United Kingdom; in 
effect, a reduction in the nation's sterling balances 
12 
amounting to 10% of New Zealand's overseas funds. This 
was a significant surrender of resources, but Fraser 
publicly justified the grant as recognising "the enormous 
burden that the United KingdDm has carried and is bearing 
the United States, December 1945. 
9Quoted M.A. Mcl<innon, 'The Impact of War: A 
Diplom?-_tic _HJ.storv . of New zeal"and' s E~.onomic_Re la tion"~ 
with Britain 1939 - 54'(Ph.D. Thesis, Victoria University, 
- . - . . 
5 3 
during the post - war period".13 
The major problem facing the Sterling Area in the 
post - war environment was the scarcity of hard currency, 
particularly United States dollars. The demand for 
dollars was high; wartime constraint meant that members 
now required extensive capital imports, with the United 
States being the major source of supply. However, 
London's massive balance of payments deficit meant that 
reserves were not available "to furnish dollars as required 
by the rest of the Sterling Area".14 Continued exchange 
controls were therefore necessary to maintain stability. 
Washington opposed such discriminatory practices 
and in the negotiations for emergency American loans to 
Britain in December 1945, it was made conditional that 
sterling earned in current transactions would become 
freely convertible. 15 Exchange controls were ultimately 
relaxed on 15 July 1947, but this produced a major run 
on reserves as members rushed to purchase dollars. The 
graph on the following page shows the sudden drop in 
hard currency reserves in the last quarter of 1947. The 
1981), p.187. 
10 In 1945 Egypt's sterling balances amounted to 
£400 million and India's £1,000 million. Quoted Nash, 
NZPO ,20 September 1949, Vol. 287, p. 2231. 
11McKinnon, p.189 - 191. 
12New Zealand Herald, 6 March 1947; K. Sinclair, 
Walter Nash (Auckland, 1976), pp.271 - 272. 
13 New Zealand Herald, ibid. 
140ominions' Secretary to Minister of External 
Aff airs, 3 February 1947 EA 58/2 / 2 /1, pt.l. 
15Gordon Walker, p.260. Loan of $3,750 million. 
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Sterling Area 
Gold and Dollar Reserves 
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1944 45 46 47 48 49 50 
Date 
31.12.45 
30.06.46 
31.12.46 
31.03.47 
30.06.47 
30.09.47 
31.12.47 
31.03.48 
30.06.48 
30.09.48 
31.12.48 
31.03.49 
30.06.49 
30.09.49 
31.12.49 
GOLD AND DOLLAR RESERVES 
"k 
OF THE STERLING AREA 
In terms of 
U.S. Million 
Dollars 
2,476 
2,310 
2,696 
2,380 
2,410 
2,383 
2,079 
2,241 
1,920 
1,777 
1,856 
1,912 
1 , 651 
1 ,425 
1,688 
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- EA 154/7/3, pt. 3 
In terms of 
£ Million 
610 
567 
664 
586 
593 
587 
512 
552 
473 
437 
457 
471 
406 
351 (509)a 
416 (603)a 
Immediately before the beginning of the European 
Recovery Programme. 
a After the devaluation of sterling to £1 = U.S.$2.80. 
5 6 
Sterling Area' s gold and dollar deficit for 1947 
subsequently increased substantially. In the face 
of mounting financial crisis, exchange controls were 
restored on 20 August, blocking the bulk of the dollar 
16 pool. 
Attlee spelt out the urgency of the currency 
crisis in a personal telegram to Fraser, 12 August 1947, 
urging New Zealand's support. To help maintain the 
sterling balances it was requested that New Zealand 
restrict its imports to within the limits of current 
income. The conservation of dollars was particularly 
important and further economies in areas of major dollar 
expenditure such as petrol (Britain's recent 10% cut in 
consumption was highlighted) and capital works programmes 
were suggested. New Zealand was also asked to accept 
delays in the supply of import needs such as steel, 
agricultural machinery and superphosphate, rather than 
purchase readily available quantities from dollar sources. 17 
To monitor the dollar situation, the Sterling Area 
Statistical Committee was subsequently established -
evidence of the increasing institutionalisation of the 
Sterling Area at a time of crisis. 
Consequent action showed New Zealand's willingness 
to support Britain's proposals. In late August and 
16Gordon Walker, pp.260- 61. 
17Attlee to Fraser, 12 August 1947, EA 58/2/2/1, pt.2. 
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September 1947, the Aid for Britain Conference was held 
in parliament, bringing all the major sector groups 
together to determine strategies of economic assistance. 18 
A National Council was subsequently established and it wa s 
agreed to limit dollar expenditure as far as practicable. 
To help achieve this aim an extensive government funded 
publicity campaign was mounted. An example of the 
ensuing publicity is shown in the petrol saving advertisement 
19 
on the following page. Reducing petrol consumption was 
one of the main targets identified by the British 
government and New Zealand took further action here by 
reintroducing petrol rationing in 1948. To ensure dollar 
imports were controlled, in October 1947 the government 
recalled and cut the 1948 import licensing schedule, 
restricting dollar expenditure to essentials unobtainable 
elsewhere. Business circles expressed concern at such 
measures, but as Nash told a delegation of traders in 
April 1948: "if we let the lid off there will be no more 
money in the United Kingdom next 20 year". Domestic 
wheat and coal production were also encouraged to limit 
hard currency imports and transport costs. 21 
The results of these policies were marked. New 
Zealand's imports from the Dollar Area dropped from 
$117 million in 1947 to $75 million in 1948. 22 In turn, 
18 Nash to Fraser, 31 August 1947, EA 59/2/102, pt.l; 
Round Table,December 1947, Vol. 38, No. 149, p.511. 
19 The Press, 3 October 1947. 
20The Evening Post, 24 April 1948. 
21M K' c lnnon, pp.199-200. 
22Minister of Finance to Minister of External 
Affairs, 14 July 1949, T61/3/5, pt.l. 
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imports from Britain for the same period increased 
by 10% and by 1950 amounted to 60% of New Zealand's 
total imports 23 - a significant increase on pre-war 
figures. The table on page 68 illustrates these 
developments. This action was taken at a time when demand 
for American imports was high, while British supplies 
were subject to shortages and delays. New Zealand, however, 
chose to balance its own interests with a wider economic 
commitment. 
While import and exchange controls were primarily 
invoked to support the wider Sterling Area, the New 
Zealand government was also able to serve its own 
interests by controlling the balance of payments and 
stabilising the economy. Britain's plight provided the 
justification for continued austerity, a fact recognised 
by Whitehall: 
Our request that New Zealand should live within 
her income, enables the New Zealand government 
to answer criticism by blaming us for restrictions, 
and in some cases may enable them to get away with 
excessive restrictions. 24 
Wellington could hardly be accused of mercenary 
tactics, but there was a degree of mutual interest 
involved. And certainly, the government could restrict 
opposition attacks on a "socialist economy" by the appeal 
of aid to Britain. However, public resentment in the 
f . .. dId· d . 25 ace of contlnued restrlctlons an contro s 1 lncrease. 
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in 
October 1948 provided the opportunity to assess recent 
23 N. Z . Official Year Book 1951 - 52, p.257. 
24British Treasury Memo, 25 March 1948, quoted 
McKinnon, p.226. 
25 S · I· lnc alr, Walter Nash,p.273. 
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economic developments. A greater degree of confidence 
was evident, largely a result of the onset of the 
European Recovery Programme. Marshall Aid had helped 
stabilise the Sterling Area's reserves, but as the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, 
emphasised, continued exchange control was essential. 
The Sterling Area's dollar deficit remained high and it 
was, therefore, necessary to try and maintain reserves 
of gold and dollars at about £500 million - not an easy 
26 task. It was agreed that restrictive measures were 
essentially negative and that the ultimate solution was 
a return to open multi-lateral trading. But until 
Sterling Area finances were consolidated, full convertability 
t t · 27 was no an op lon. Given the difficult economic climate, 
the meeting was particuarly concerned to ensure effective 
inter-Commonwealth consultation. Towards this end, it was 
proposed that Finance Ministers should meet periodically 
and that a "Commonwealth Economic Information Committee" 
should be established in London to serve as a " clearing 
28 house". 
The Sterling Area's dollar deficit for 1948 
d ']1' 29 b t b' t ' f M h 11 amounte to £438 ml. _ lon, u a com lna lon 0 ars a 
Aid, continued austerity and increased exports to the 
United States allowed res~rves to stabilise. However, 
in the second financial quarter of 1949, the deficit 
dramatically deteriorated to reach £157 million - an annual 
26 pMM (48) Minutes of second meeting, 11 October 1948 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
27 pMM (48) Minutes of 6th meeting, 13 October 1948, ibid. 
28 pMM (48) Minutes of 7th meeting, 18 October 1948, ibid. 
29 pMM (48) Annex: Commonwealth Consultation ibid.; 
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basis of £628 million. 30 This was largely a consequence 
of recession in the United States' economy and a subsequent 
decrease in sterling imports. Rumours of an imminent 
sterling devaluation also fostered underhand currency 
transactions and encouraged American buyers to delay 
the purchase of sterling goods. As this mounting debt 
was unable to be covered by the European Recovery 
Programme, there was a further drain on gold and dollar 
reserves, which fell from £552 million in March 1948 to 
31 £406 million by 30 June 1949. The graph on page 54 
shows this dramatic decline. Urgent action was needed 
to halt the momentum of diminishing reserves, prompting 
the British government to call an emergency meeting of 
32 Commonwealth Finance Ministers in July. Canada's 
presence meant that this would not be an exclusive Sterling 
Area affair, allowing a wider perspective. 
A marked conflict of interest between an 
indebted Britain and its Commonwealth partners prevailed 
at the meeting. The British propounded that a further 
cut in dollar expenditure was essential if economic 
disaster was to be averted. As Cripps stressed, dollar 
reserves had now fallen to £385 million, compared to an 
annual dollar deficit of over £600 million; if the present 
33 drain continued reserves would soon be exhausted. 
Nash, NZPD,20 September 1949, Vol. 287, p.2227. 
30Ibid . 
31Sterling Area Gold and Dollar Reserves, 
14 January 1950, EA 154/7/3, pt . 3. 
32Attlee to Fraser,18 June 1949; Cripps to Nash, 
28 June 1949; Cripps to Nash,3 July 1949, EA 154/7/3, pt.l. 
33 EMM (49) Minutes of 7th meeting,15 July 1949; 
Minutes of 10th meeting,16 July 1949, T61/3/5, pt . l. 
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Britain, therefore, declared its intention of reducing 
dollar imports for 1949 - 50 by a further 25% and recommended 
its Sterling Area partners take similar action. 34 Given 
the existing crisis, this was "a negative but indispensable 
operation".35 
Despite an inherent commitment to Britain, 
the New Zealand delegation showed little enthusiasm 
for further dollar economies. Nash maintained that 
various factors meant that New Zealand would be unable 
to achieve the desired level of reduction. Firstly, the 
existing import licensing regime had to be honoured; 
no cuts could be made until 1950. 36 Secondly, New Zealand 
had already substantially reduced dollar imports; 
existing requirements were for essential capital imports 
such as steel, tinplate and agricultural machinery. 
£40 million had been drawn from the dollar pool to pay for 
these imports in 1948, but this expenditure was vital if 
agricultural production was to be increased, thereby 
. f d . f B' . 37 ensurlng 00 supplles or rltaln. Thirdly, Nash 
voiced concern that a reduction in American imports could 
aggravate international recession by increasing U.S. 
. . . I 38 
unemployment and encouraglng economlC reprlsa s. 
Alternatively, New Zealand raised the more positive 
proposal 39 of increasing its exports to the Dollar Area. 
34EMM (49) Minutes of 7th meeting; Nash to Minister 
of External Affairs, 15 July 1949, T61/3/5, pt.l. 
35 . Crlpps to Nash,3 Ju ly 1949, EA 154/7/3, pt.l. 
36 EMM (49) Minutes of 7th meeting,15 July 1949; 
Minutes of 12th meeting,18 July 1949, T61/3/5, pt.l. 
37EMM (49) Minutes of 5th meeting,14 July; 
Minutes of 6th meeting,14 July, T61/3/5, pt.l; Nordmeyer 
to P.M. 29 August 1949, EA 59/2 /1 02, Rt.l - emphasised 
that N.Z. 's annual requirement of 16,000 tons of fencing 
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However, this was a difficult prospect, given bulk 
purchasing contracts and intense public support for 
"Aid to Britain" - any diversion of exports to the 
United States would be at Britain's expense. It was also 
recognised that the North American market for butter and 
frozen meat was limited. 40 However, New Zealand maintained 
that increased dollar earnings was the most effective 
contribution it could make in the present crisis. A 
further possibility was to increase exports to other hard 
currency countries, such as Belgium and Switzerland. The 
borrowing of dollars was also considered. 41 
The meeting agreed that the fundamental objective 
was for the Sterling Area to trade its way out of difficulty 
by expanding dollar earnings. 42 This required increased 
efficiency and productivity, ensuring that Sterling Area 
goods would be competitive in dollar markets. 43 The 
ultimate aim was, therefore, the establishment of a single 
multi-lateral system of free trade. It was hoped that the 
wire was primarily sourced from the U.S. 
38Nash to Minister of External Affairs,14 July 1949, 
T 61/3/5, pt.l. 
39 EMM (49) Minutes of 10th meeting, 16 July, 
T 61/3 / 5, pt.l. 
40 EMM (49) Minutes of 16th meeting, 21 July, 
T 61 / 3 / 5, pt.l. 
41 Ibid . 
42 EMM (49) 20 Final Text of Recommendations to 
Governments, 18 July 1949, EA 154/7/3, pt.l; Nash to 
Minister of External Affairs,19 July 1949, T61 / 3/5, pt .1. 
43The Economist blamed inefficient and uncompetitive 
British industries rather than U.S. recession for the 
exchange crisis, quoted The Dominion 12 July 1949. 
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forthcoming Tripartite Economic Discussions between 
Britain, the United States and Canada would make some 
progress towards an improving balance of trade with 
the Dollar Area. Immediate exigencies, however, 
precluded the ideal of a free trading system. Sterling 
Area reserves were declining at a dramatic rate, 
threatening financial collapse unless attrition was 
checked. Further short term dislocations seemed 
necessary if long term economic survival was to be 
assured. The delegations, therefore, agreed (albeit 
unenthusiastically) to recommend further dollar economies, 
comparable to the United Kingdom. 44 Existing import 
licences and essential import needs limited New Zealand's 
immediate capabilities, but it was resolved to review 
American imports for 1950. 45 
Surprisingly, the option of devaluation was not 
discussed by the Finance Ministers, despite widespread 
presumptions that such a measure was inevitable. Rumours 
of an imminent devaluation of sterling had, in fact, 
exacerbated the dollar crisis. However, at the first day 
of the Washington Economic Summit between the United 
States, Canada and Britain (7-12 September), Cripps 
privately revealed that London was intending to alter the 
46 
sterling exchange rate. The British had come to 
recognise that the prescribed 25% cut in dollar imports 
could not be achieved within 12 months, thereby requiring 
47 
an alternative strategy. Despite a commitment to 
44 fMM (49) Minutes of 12th meeting,18 July 1949, 
T61/3/5; EMM(49)20 Final Text of Recommendations to 
Governments, op.cit. 
45 EMM (49) Minutes of 12th meeting, 18 July 1949, 
T61/3/5, pt.l; NZPD,18 August 1949, Vol. 286, pp.1395 - 1397. 
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maximum consultation on economic matters, Britain did 
not concurrently inform its Commonwealth and Sterling 
Area partners of this proposal. The Dominions were 
not notified of London's decision to devalue the pound 
sterling by 30% until 17 September, one day before the 
official announcement. The British government recognised 
the short notice, but maintained that the final decision 
48 had only been taken. But the disregard of the vested 
interests of others, seemingly contravened the precepts 
of Commonwealth consultation. Accordingly, there was 
some resentment, particularly from the Indian Finance 
Minister, who protested that Britain had "exceeded the 
brief" of the London conference. 49 
Certainly, Britain's action affected the rest of 
the Sterling Area, and with the exception of Pakistan, 
all members subsequently devalued their currencies by the 
same margin. In August 1948, the New Zealand pound had 
been revalued to parity with sterling and it was desired 
to retain this relationship. When announcing New Zealand's 
decision, Nash declared that: 
Having regard to the fact that nearly all our 
exports go to the United Kingdom and a large 
proportion of our imports are obtained from 
Britain, it is undoubtedly in the best interests 
of New Zealand to make no alteration in our 
existing rates with sterling. 50 
As the bulk of New Zealand's trade was confined to the 
Sterling Area the domestic impact of devaluation was 
46 I . Secretary of State for Commonwealth Re atlons to 
Minister of External Affairs, 2 October 1949, EA 154/7/3, pt.2. 
47cripps to Nash, 24 October 1949, EA 154/7/3, pt.2. 
48Attlee to Fraser, 17 September 1949,EA 154/7/2, pt.1. 
49 The Statesman ,6 October 1949 - News clippings 
EA 154/7/2, pt.1. 
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limited. However, for the Sterling Area as a whole, 
the immediate results were marked. Currency 
stabilisation and more competitively priced exports saw 
the Sterling Area dollar deficit drop in the fourth 
quarter of 1949 to $31 million (£11 million) compared to 
51 $539 million (£134 million) in the previous quarter. 
Gold and dollar reserves subsequently rose from a low 
of £330 million to £603 million (£416 million at the old 
52 
rate of exchange). A large proportion of this 
dramatic improvement was necessarily non-recurring, but 
the incentive to improve the Sterling Area's balance of 
trade had been made. For New Zealand's part, sales to 
the United States rose to 10% of total exports in 1950 
compared to only 3.7% in 1949 53 - here was the positive 
approach to the dollar crisis in action. 
II. TRADE TIES 
New Zealand's principal form of economic support 
for Britain was the continued bulk supply of essential 
primary products at comparatively low prices. Bulk 
purchasing began as a wartime measure, whereby the 
British government became the sole purchaser of New 
Zealand's surplus foodstuffs. In turn, Britain's post-war 
shortage of both food and hard currency necessitated the 
provision of maximum supplies from the Sterling Area. 
50 Statement broadcast by Nash 19 September 1949, 
AJHR ,B - 18 ,Session 1949, Vol. 1, p.13. 
51 Pre s s Con fer e n c e by C rip p s, 4 Jan u a r y 1 950 ; 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to U.K. High 
Commissioner, Wellington , 4 January 1950, EA 154/7/3, pt.3. 
52 Ibid. 
53 N. Z . Official Year Book 1951 - 52, p.235. 
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Contracts for meat and dairy produce were thus 
renewed in 1944 and 1948, ultimately extending to 1955. 
A concerted effort was made to meet Britain's food 
demand; by the end of 1947 , the volume of New Zealand's 
exports to the United Kingdom had increased 19% over 
54 pre - war levels. As the ta bl e on page 68 shows, 
Britain remained New Zealand's near monopoly market, with 
the high point of 76.6% of total exports sent there in 
1947. 55 While New Zealand received a stable and 
guaranteed market, costs were incurred - prices received 
were substantially below world rates, causing a 
deterioration in terms of trade, and rationing was 
maintained. Trade dependency was thus willingly reinforced. 
Britain expressly requested New Zealand's support 
in providing maximum quantities of foodstuffs. The High 
Commissioner in Wellington, Sir Patrick Duff, played an 
effective role here by emphasising Britain's austerities 
56 to responsive audiences throughout the country . In 
response to such publicity the voluntary "Food for 
Britain" organisation was established in 1946. As the 
dollar crisis mounted, Britain's reliance on New Zealand 
food supplies increased. Attlee emphasised this need 
in a personal telegram to Fraser, 12 August 1947: 
The level of foodstuffs in this country depends 
primarily upon the degree to which we are able 
to obtain supplies from other than hard currency 
sources ••• Any steps which can be taken to 
increase and accelerate these supplies of meat, 
dairy produce and animal fats would be a 
contribution of the highest importance to the 
present crisis. 57 
54'New Zealand's Contribution to Economic Recovery 
in E u r 0 p e' , 8 S e pte m b e r 1 948, E A 1 53/ 26/5, pt. 1 . 
55 N. Z . Official Year Book 1951 - 52, p.235. 
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NEW ZEALAND'S EXPORTS: PRINCIPAL 
MARKETS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES 
Year U. K. Other U.S. Other 
Commonwealth Foreign 
Countries Countries 
1944 71.75 13.14 6.55 8 . 56 
1945 72.28 13.29 9.84 4.59 
1946 70.35 11 .46 9.64 8.55 
1947 76.66 7.52 6.35 9.47 
1948 73.30 6.60 4.94 15.16 
1949 73.39 6.05 3.75 16.81 
1950 66.44 6.27 10 . 04 17.25 
- N.Z. Official Year Book 1951 - 52, p.235 
NEW ZEALAND'S IMPORTS: PRINCIPAL 
SOURCES EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES 
Year U. K. Other U.S. Other 
Commonwealth Foreign 
Countries Countries 
1944 40.38 23.79 32.23 3.06 
1945 36.02 33.24 23.72 7.02 
1946 47.77 29.10 16.41 6.72 
1947 42.76 29.70 18.12 9.42 
1948 52.33 26.36 10.78 10.53 
1949 55.13 24.74 9.62 10.51 
1950 60.10 21 . 47 7.26 11.17 
- N. Z. Official Year Book 1951 - 52, p.257 
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New Zealand was also asked to keep its prices as low 
obI 58 as POSSl e. The further possibility of contributing 
to greater Sterling Area self-sufficiency by developing 
timber and hydroelectric power resources was also 
odd 59 conSl ere • However, the major capital expenditure 
involved, at a time of austerity, restricted this option 
to the long term. 
Established trade dependency, coupled with strong 
emotional ties to the Mother Country, ensured New Zealand's 
active response to Britain's plight. To maximise food 
exports to Britain, rationing was maintained and still 
applied to dairy products at the time of the 1949 general 
1 0 60 e ectlon. Peacetime austerity was unpopular but there 
was some solace in the knowledge that "our Kith and Kin" 
were the beneficiaries. The commitment to Britain was 
further highlighted by the National Aid for Britain 
Conference in August and September 1947. This brought 
300 representatives of key sector groups (farmers, 
m an ufactu rers, trade un ions, sh ipp ing 1 ines) toge ther, 
to formulate ways of improving New Zealand ' s economic 
f B Ot 0 61 support or rl aln. The event can be compared to the 
fourth Labour Government's National Economic Summit, 
except that the focus was on another nation, albeit 
relative to New Zealand's own economic interests. 
The conference agreed on the need to increase 
food production and to improve the efficiency of its 
56EVening Post, 18 October 1946 - News clipping, 
EA 156/1/1, pt.2; McKinnon,p.210. 
57Attlee to Fraser, 12 August 1947 EA 58/2/2/1, pt.2. 
58 Ibid . 
59Sterling Area Development Working Party, 'New 
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despatch. A National Council was subsequently created 
(supported by regional organisations) and embarked upon 
a major publicity campaign, financed by a government 
62 grant of £20,000. All New Zealand was called on to 
help Britain win the peace. The response was impressive: 
watersiders agreed to work longer hours to clear export 
backlogs; ration coupons were sa ved and communities 
made extensive food gifts; while numerous collections, 
bottle drives and cake stalls were held. 63 Charity in 
this case, did not begin at home. 
Bulk purchasing was initially invoked as a wartime 
expediency, guaranteeing urgent sUpplies of primary 
products at prices relative to the costs of production. 
This, however, produced a severe deterioration in 
New Zealand's terms of trade as import prices rose rapidly, 
while domestic prices were contained and stabilised. 
When contracts were renewed in 1944 and 1946, some 
retrospective payments were made and price increases 
secured. But New Zealand ' s returns remained substantially 
below the prices paid to other suppliers. This disparity 
is shown in the following figures comparing Danish and 
New Zealand butter prices: 
U.K. Price for Butter N.Z. f.o.b. 
Pre-war (1935-39) 
1944-45-46 average 
1946- 47 
1947-48 
Sterling 
per cwt. 
110/5d. 
150/6d. 
175/-d. 
205/ - d. 
Denmark f.o.b. 
Sterling 
per cwt. 
126/8d. 
236/-d. 
242/-d. 
321 / 6d. 
(1947) 
(1948) 64 
Zealand Development Projects',28 September 1948, T61/3/4/2. 
60M .. d . S t b 1948 eat ratlonlng was remove ln ep em er . 
61'New Zealand and the Dollar Crisis ' , Round Table 
December 1947, Vol. 38, No. 149, p.511; NZPD,19 August 1948, 
Vol. 282, p.1608. --
62 Nash to Fraser,31 August 1947, EA 59 / 2 /102 , pt.l. 
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Compared to the small difference in returns between 
Denmark and New Zealand in the pre - war period, a marked 
price disparity had been achieved by 1948. Britain also 
purchased meat at higher prices from Argentina, Eire and 
Denmark. New Zealand, however, chose not to press for 
higher returns, aiming to help Britain at a time of 
crisis, in return for securing a stable and more 
prosperous long term market. As Fraser stated: 
I say that it was and is the right policy that 
we should not squeeze our Mother Country to the 
full extent that we might have done ..• we do 
not regard what Britain pays to Denmark, the 
Argentine, or any other country, as the amount 
which we should demand. 65 
Negotiations to extend meat contracts for a 
further 7 years were concluded in July 1947 and for dairy 
produce in 1948. 66 In these contracts New Zealand agreed 
to increase overall dairy production by 20% and raise 
meat production by 50,000 tons by 1955. 67 The main 
reason for inserting these clauses (reminiscent of 
Soviet production quotas) was for publicity and it was 
hoped that New Zealand's example would encourage 
Australia to make similar arrangements. New Zealand 
officials privately conceded that it was unlikely that 
the targets would be reached, although increased production 
would still be achieved. 68 To give New ZGaland greater 
parity with the world market, dairy and meat prices were 
increased for the 1948-49 season and thereafter subject 
to an annual review of 7.5%. In turn, New Zealand 
63 Ibid ; McKinnon, p.211. 
64'New Zealand's Contribution to Economic Recovery 
in Europe' ,8 September 1948, EA 153/26/5, pt.l. 
65 NZPD,28 September 1948, Vol. 283, p.2595. 
66The Dairy Products Marketing Commission was 
72 
received the right to reserve a percentage of its 
dairy surplus for sale elsewhere. In August 1948, 
wellington also revalued the New Zealand pound to parity 
. t h 1 . 69 t h b . f f Wl ster lng, ere y compensatlng or the un avourable 
terms of trade - the alternative, Nash maintained, was 
to demand Britain pay higher prices. 70 
These developments showed that, despite a strong 
commitment to the United Kingdom, New Zealand was 
concerned to ensure a reasonable return for its exports; 
Aid to Britain had its limits. Certainly, given the 
higher returns available from dollar markets, there was 
d h A . 71 some pressure to sen more exports to Nort merlca -
a condition provided for in the 1948 dairy products 
contract. This would serve to earn valuable dollars and 
develop new markets, in anticipation of the end of bulk 
purchasing. But New Zealand made little serious effort 
in trade diversification, despite official recognition 
of the resulting benefits. 
Various factors accounted for this reticence. 
Firstly, the continued primacy of the British market was 
undisputed. A report by the Aid forBritain National 
Council emphasised that there was no comparable market 
for New Zealand's cheese, butter or meat and that demand 
in North America was limited. 72 Secondly, there was 
established in 1947 to conduct the negotiations. 
67Sterling Area Development Working Party (48) 31, 
'New Zealand Development Projects', 28 September 1948, 
T61/3/4/2. 
68Talks between U.K. and N.Z. Officials on 
Economic Matters,20 February 1950, EA 50/2/214, pt.l. 
69 In 1933 the N.Z.£ had been devalued by 25% in 
relation to Sterling. 
70. 1· W 1 t N h 273 Slnc alr, a er as ,p. . 
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con c ern with the va ga rie s of the wider int e rn a tion a l 
market, contrasted by the reliability of Britain . 
Thirdly, New Zeal a nd wa s c ommitted to providing maximum 
assistance to the beleaguered Mother Country, particularly 
as the dollar crisis mounted in 1949; any diversion of 
exports to other markets would be at Britain's e xpense . 
Finally, public opinion was unsympathetic to trad e 
diversification. For example, considerable hostility 
resulted in 1946, when it was agreed (with Britain's 
approval) to divert a small amount of butter to American 
troops in the North Pacific - watersiders even refu s ed 
73 to load the goods. 
The continuance of bulk purchasing and the driv e 
to increase food supplies to the United Kingdom also 
worked against the greater diversification of the New 
Zealand economy. In effect, the immediate post - war 
years saw the nation's traditional role as Britain's 
overseas farm reinforced . There was some concern 
that potential economic progress was being impeded . At 
the Prime Ministers' Meeting in 1948, Fraser asserted 
that New Zealand's prosperity could not be maint a ined by 
primary production alone. Con s iderable industrialisation 
had been achieved before the war and this, Fraser 
maintained, must continue. 74 Parallel development in 
both agriculture and industry was required. This did 
not correspond to Britain's interests - the continued 
71Central Economic Planning Staff 'Export Policy 
in Relaticn to Potential Dollar Earners', 1 October 1948, 
T61/3/4/2. 
72M K" c lnnon, 
73M K" c J.n n on, 
p.274 . 
pp . 270- 271. 
74 pMM (48) Minutes of 5th me e ting, 1 3 Oc tober 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
74 
supply of bulk, cheap foodstuffs and the conservation 
of Sterling Area reserves. The opportunity for greater 
economic diversification was thus reduced. 
III. BRITAIN AND EUROPE 
A marked feature of the post - war environment 
was the increased economic co - operation between Britain 
and its European neighbours, paralleling closer defence 
ties. This was highlighted by the formation of the 
Organisation for European Economic Co - operation in 1948 
to administer Marshall Plan aid. Britain played a 
leading role in the OEEC, contributing 30% of the budget 
75 
and advocating proposals to liberalise European trade. 
The United States also pushed for closer European economic 
integration as an essential part of the recovery programme. 
New Zealand welcomed efforts to promote European recovery 
and prosperity, recognising that this would be to its own 
economl"c benefl"t.76 H th t owever, ere was concurren 
concern that the tlWestern Union" would conflict with the 
established economic ties of the Commonwealth and 
Sterling Area. The spectre of a European Customs Union 
was of particular concern. New Zealand's sensitivities 
were expressed in the Speech from the Throne, 22 June 1948: 
My government are confident that a closer economic, 
defensive and spiritual union of the United Kingdom 
75External Affairs Paper, 'The Commonweal th and the 
European Union',1949 , EA 153/28/5, pt.l. 
76Annual Report of Department of External Affairs 
1947- 48 , AJHR, 1948, A- 1, p. 28. 
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and Europe, which they regard as ne c essary 
and desirable, can be achieved without prejudicing 
the historic unity of the nations of the British 
Commonwealth. 77 
Britain was, therefore, expected to balance its 
responsibilities. 
New Zealand was forthright in defending its 
economic interests against perceived European competition . 
For example, at the 1948 Prime Ministers' Meeting, Fraser 
expressed concern that Britain was sending large 
quantities of capital goods to Europe at New Zealand's 
78 
expense. There was also concern that the development 
needs of the new Commonwealth members in Asia would be 
neglected if Britain's economic interests became too 
European-centred. This could threaten the "dissolution 
of the Commonwealth relationship".79 Alarm was also 
raised at the proposal of an Intra-European payments 
system, pooling European reserves under a similar 
arrangement to the Sterling Area. New Zealand balked 
at the prospect of its sterling reserves being 
80 incorporated into such a system. It was argued that 
New Zealand had already made a major contribution to 
Europe's economic rehabilitation - £12.5 million had been 
granted to Britain in reduced sterling balances; 
£5 million had been given to France as a wool credit; 
and the continuance of bulk purchasing helped to ease 
Britain's huge balance of payments deficit. Further 
77NZPO ,22 June 1948, Vol. 280, p.2. 
78 pMM (48) Minutes of 5th meeting,13 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l; Treasury Paper, 'Bilateral Agreements', 
15 October 1948, T61/3/4/2. 
79External Affairs Paper ,'The Commonwealth and the 
European Union', 1949 ,EA 153/28/5, pt.l. 
80 Treasury Papers ,'Economic Aspects of Western 
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contributions to a wider European fund were seen as 
. . 81 
an excesslve st raln. 
The area of major concern was the question of 
a European Customs Union and the consequent threat to 
imperial preference . Britain reassured the New Zealand 
delegation at the 1948 Prime Ministers' Meeting that 
this was not a practical possibility in the foresee ab le 
82 future. Britain actively relied on the economic 
support provided by Commonwealth nations like New Zea land, 
while trade with the Commonwealth more than doubled that 
with 83 Europe. London subsequently rejected proposals 
in 1949 that res t ricted priva te import licensing to 
OEEC countries. 84 While Britain increasingly recognised 
its role as a European country, imperial economic links 
remained decisive. As Cripps stated at the OEEC Meeting 
in Paris, November 1949: 
We could not integrate our economy into that of 
Europe in any manner that would prejudice the 
full discharge of these other responsibilities 
(i.e. the Commonwealth and Sterling Area) 
Yet, at the same time, we regard ourselves as 
bound up with Western Europe ..• 85 
However, this bal a nce sti ll tipped in the Commonwealth's 
f a vour, ensuring that any moves by Britain towards 
greater economic co-operation with Europe would be 
substantially qualified. 
Union', 'Con tributions to Intra-European Payments Plan', 
'Europe an Recovery Programme: N.Z. 's Attitude' 1948, 
T61/3/4/2. 
81 Ibid . 
82 pMM (48) Minutes of 6th Meeting, 13 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.1. 
83External Affairs Paper, 'The Commonwealth and 
the European Union' 1 1949, EA 153/28/5, pt.l. 
84External Affairs Paper, 'The U.K.'s Interest in 
Europe and the Commonwe a l t h', 1949, EA 153/28/5, pt.l. 
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With the assurance that its own economic 
interests were secure, New Zealand was able to endorse 
Britain's increased European ties. The rehabilitation 
of a stable and prosperous continent would provide 
New Zealand with more export markets and foster a more 
balanced international trading environment. It was also 
recognised that Britain provided war-ravaged Europe 
with effective leadership and direction, without 
Britain's involvement the potential for further instability 
was seen to increase. 86 The fate of Europe and the 
Commonwealth had long been intertwined and in the 
uncertainty of the post-war world, this symbiosis was 
increasingly apparent. New Zealand thus supported: 
any sound schemes for European economic 
co-operation and of working concurrently for 
the rapid economic development of the Commonwealth, 
it being recognised that both these courses should 
concentrate to the solution of our economic 
difficulties with the Dollar Area. 87 
Established economic dependency and a strong 
commitment to help the Mother Country win the peace 
saw New Zealand give active economic support to Britain 
in the post-war period. The trading relationship and 
membership of the Sterling Area meant that New Zealand's 
economic interests were bound up with Britain. New 
Zealand thus maintained a war economy whereby the 
exigencies of exchange control, consumption restrictions, 
bulk purchasing and rationing continued. 
85 Ibid • 
86 Ibid • 
87 Ibid • 
These policies 
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incurred continued austerities and sacrifices, 
though New Zealand made clear that there were limits 
to its contribution; national prosperity and development 
needs had to be considered. New Zealand was ultimately, 
of course, helping Britain to help itself. However, by 
1950, New Zealand's actions had served to reinforce and 
strengthen economic dependency, maintaining a colonial 
economy. 
CHAPTER III 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLEAN UPS AND INNOVATIONS: 
THE PARADOX OF DEFINING NEW ZEALAND'S 
STATUS IN THE INTERESTS OF COMMONWEALTH UNITY 
Without our Mother Country and without the 
strength that unity means among our countries, 
our sovereignty would count for little. 
Peter Fraser NZPD~ 28 September 1948. 
Vol. 283, p.2592. 
New Zealand's adoption of the Statute of 
79 
Westminster in 1947 and the introduction of New Zealand 
citizenship in 1948 would, on first assumption, be 
regarded as assertions of a greater national identity. 
However, despite long term and symbolic implications, 
this was not the case in the contemporary context. 
Instead, these " innovations in constitutional status were 
essentially aimed at fostering Commonwealth unity rather 
than nationalist aspirations. While proud of its 
independent nationhood, New Zealand equally cherished the 
ties of the British Commonwealth. Unlike Canada or 
South Africa, there was less concern with explicitly 
advertising the legalistic and technical fine points of 
sovereignty. 
Both developments have to be seen in the wider 
context of inter-Commonwealth relations. In the case of the 
adoption of the Statute of Westminster, New Zealand 
belatedly achieved official parity of status with the other 
members of the Commonwealth. This gave full legislative 
80 
competency, removing certain technical anomalies and 
bringing legal status into line with convention . In turn, 
New Zealand citizenship was part of a Commonwealth - wide 
formula of maintaining the common status of the British 
subject, while allowing individual Dominions the right to 
define their own citizenships. But, while both of these 
actions were significant, there was no fundamental change 
to the established fact of New Zealand's sovereignty, rather 
the legal confirmation of accepted practice. Consequently, 
there was little accompanying publicity. Clearly, to New 
Zealand, the practicalities of independence were more 
important than embellishments. 
I. THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER 
The adoption of the operative sections of the 
Statute of Westminster in November 19471 (16 years after 
its initial passage through the British parliament) and 
the subsequent passing of the New Zealand Constitution 
(Amendment) Act by the United Kingdom,2 officially gave 
New Zealand full leg ~ slative sovereignty. In practical 
significance, this was not a constitutional landmark, but a 
much delayed denouement of convenience. New Zealand had 
long enjoyed the actual status of independent nationhood. 
However, through the quirks of the British constitutional 
system, legal forms lagged behind convention. Thus, certain 
restrictions (largely outdated but still legally functional) 
remained in the General Assembly's legislative competency. 
1 N.Z. Statutes, 1947, 11 Geo. VI, No . 38, pp.347- 51 . 
2 II Geo. VI,Ch.4. 
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The removal of this residual imperial prerogative was 
a logical step to clarify and enlarge independence. 
Previous conservative governments had opposed the Statute 
of Westminster's adoption, arguing it would be a prelude to 
the Empire's disintegration. But that a reformist Labour 
government waited 12 years before enactment is seemingly 
puzzling. However, the complexities of circumstance atone 
for this. Essentially, the Statute of Westminster was a 
pre-war matter that for various reasons New Zea land 
deferred to a post-war resolution. But in doing so, by 
1947 the Statute had itself become anachronistic, superseded 
by new developments in the post-war Commonwealth. 
As passed in 1931, the Statute of Westminster was a 
product of the "inter-war Commonwealth", the period of the 
clarification of "Dominion status". Essentially, it gave 
legal form to the confirmed sovereignty of the Dominions 
as enshrined in the "Balfour Report" of 1926: 
They are autonomous communities within the British 
Empire equal in status, in no way subordinate one 
to another in any aspect of their domestic and 
external affairs, though united by a common 
allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. 3 
Inconsistencies in Dominion legislative ability compared 
to this formula were made apparent at the 1929 Conference on 
the Operation of Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping 
Legislation. 
In response, the final draft of the Statute of 
Westminster, as approved at the 1930 Imperial Conference, 
gave the Dominions full legislative power in areas still 
nominally subject to the United Kingdom's prerogative. 
3Quoted N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience 
(London, 1969), p.232. 
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Firstly, the restrictions of repugnancy that invalidated 
Dominion laws contrary to or already covered by United 
Kingdom legislation were removed, as were the largely 
obsolete laws of reservation that allowed Britain to stall 
certain areas of Dominion legislation, notably merchant 
shipping. Secondly, it was declared that Dominion 
parliaments had full power to legislate extra-territorially. 
The inability to extend jurisdiction outside Dominion 
territory was contentious, but had been upheld in New 
Zealand by the Court of Appeal. The courts could argue 
that under section 53 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 
1852, the General Assembly only had the competency "to make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of New 
4 Zealand" . Hen ce, the cou rt shad r u I ed agai n st New Zealand 
5 laws applying to the mandated territory of Western Samoa 
and to crimes committed outside the Dominion. 6 Thirdly, it 
was stipulated that United Kingdom legislation would only 
extend to the Dominions on their specific request and 
consent. These legal clarifications made clear the actual 
divisibility of the Crown and the existence of independent 
nations - albeit in a special relationship. 
The Forbes government regarded this development as 
unnecessary and even dangerous, threatening the cherished 
ideal of imperial unity. The prospect of "a loose 
alliance of 6 nations under one titular head" was an 
7 
anathema. While New Zealand had adopted the official title 
415 and 16 Vict., C.72. 
5 Tagaloa v. The Inspector of Police 1927 - a special 
Imperial Order in Council was necessary to enforce New 
Zealand jurisdiction in Western Samoa. 
6 For example, R. v. Lander 1929, bigamy committed in 
Britain was ruled not punishable in New Zealand. 
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of Dominion in 1907, governments showed no enthusiasm 
for the finer points of independence within the British 
commonwealth. After all, New Zealand had effective control 
over its own affairs while also having the security of a 
place within the Empire. Dominion status could thus be 
enjoyed without making an issue of remnants of i mperial 
authority. New Zealand, therefore, (in league with Australi a 
and New Foundland) added a clause to the Statute of 
westminster ensuring that its provisions would not apply 
until domestic parliamentary adoption (section 10). In 
turn, New Zealand's capacity to alter its constitution 
remained under the limits of existing legislation (section 8). 
While the General Assembly approved the Statute 
of Westminster on 23 July 1931 (thereby allowing its passage 
through the British parliament), New Zealand remained 
outside its application - though by implication accepting 
the preamble and non-operative sections. Prime Minister 
Forbes made clear his policy was "rather to deprecate than 
assist in the crystallizing of the powers and duties 
involved in what is known as Dominion status".8 In fact, 
Forbes threatened to sabotage the Statute's final passage 
through the British parliament in November 1931, over last 
minute objections to wording that alluded to New Zealand's 
9 
support for the enactment. The Labour opposition resoundly 
criticised the government's stance as ignoring the reality 
7N. Z . Report on the Conference on the Operation of 
Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation 
1930, p.17 EA 159/1/5 Pt. 1. 
8 NZPD , 22 July 1931, Vol. 228, pp.548-49. 
9 For documentary detail of the ensuing controversy 
see EA 159/1/5 Pt. 2. 
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of Commonwealth development and languishing in inferiority 
status. Here was clearly the "reluctant Dominion" as 
eloquently described by J.C. Beaglehole: 
New Zea l and got responsible government .•. became 
a titular Dominion, was dragged into Dominion status, 
stood by and saw the Stat ute of Westminster passed. 
But once it had got essential control of its own 
affairs, it was not really interested in co nstitutional 
e volution; or rather its interest was that of rigid 10 disapproval. It is a 'Dominion' in spite of itself. 
Labour's victory at the 1935 election heralded a 
government sympathetic to achieving complete parliamentary 
sovereignty. There was expectation, given past statements, 
of positive action being taken here. In a private letter 
to Savage 11 May 1936, Herbert Evatt (still a High Court 
judge though a leading Australian Labour Party official) 
urg ed the n ew government to set an example and adopt the 
Statute. He forcefully a rgued that this was necessary to 
fulfil Dominion sovereignty. Evatt was scathing of New 
Zealand's past attitude: 
New Zealand has been regarded as being 'more 
imperial than the imperialists'. Why this should 
be in the country of Seddo n and also of Savage and 
Nash I fail to understand. 11 
Yet the Statute of Westminster's operative sections 
were not to be invoked until November 1947. This reticence 
was attributable to the problems of circumstance and 
technicality, rather than reactio nary policy. The government' s 
priorities o f action were domestic social and economic 
10J . C . Beaglehole, 'New Zea land a nd the Commonwealth: 
An Attempt at Objectivity ' , Contemporary New Zeala nd 
(Wellington, 1938) pp.2-3. 
11EA 159 /1/ 5, pt.2. 
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reform rather than constitutional fine points. Thus, 
despite certain limitations on legislative capacity, 
practical disadvantages were minimal and could be surmounted 
by British legislation authorising the New Zealand 
parliament specific rights. In turn, it was recognised 
that the symbolic effect of adopting the Statute would 
give the opposition scope for accusations of Commonwealth 
12 disloyalty and reforming with undue haste. Adoption 
was a matter that would be dealt with, but in due course. 
Peter Fraser later stated that without the outbreak of 
war, legislation would have been invoked no later than 
1940. 13 
The Second World War certainly provided a major 
contributing factor to the Statute's hibernation in official 
channels. The government was undisposed to take any 
legislative action that could be misconstrued as weakening . 
14 Commonwealth cohesion and aiding enemy propaganda. Yet, 
concurrently, the war also highlighted the legislative 
limitations resulting from remnants of colonial subordination. 
The apparent inability to legislate for extra-territorial 
effect meant that New Zealand laws did not officially apply 
to those serving overseas. Consequently, special United 
15 Kingdom legislation allowing this had to be requested. 
That such an inconvenient and complicated process was 
required , - especially in the emergency of war - gave credence 
to the proponents of adoption. 
12 A. Ross, 
The First British 
Mansergh (London. 
'New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster' 
Commonwealth: Essays in Honour of Nicholas 
1980), p.151. 
13NZPD1 7 November 1947, Vol. 279, p.533. 
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The Australian government used this issue of 
wartime expediency to justify adopting the Statute of 
westminster in October 1942. This provided the obvious 
impetus for New Zealand to follow suit. Evatt had turned 
the tables around from 1936, he now expected New Zealand 
16 to follow Australia's example. In response, the 
Parliamentary Law Draftsman, Dartrey Adams, inquired if a 
similar New Zealand bill was desired. 17 The government 
were aware of the advantages but were less disposed to 
take action at a serious juncture of the war than the 
aggressive Evatt. 
Paradoxically, New Zealand's failure to adopt the 
Statute restricted areas of domestic sovereignty, while 
independence in external affairs was unaffected. This was 
a consequence of the Crown's personal prerogative in 
international relations, free from the constraints of 
statutory law. Thus the Labour government had declared war 
against the Axis powers, enjoyed the right to conclude 
treaties, sent and received diplomatic legations and had 
pursued a conspicuously independent pre-war foreign policy. 
But without the Statute's grant of official sovereignty, 
New Zealand's independence could be misunderstood and 
challenged in the wider international environment. For 
14 Attorney General to Law Draftsman H.D.C. Adams, 
30 November 1943, EA 159/1/5 pt. 2. 
15section 5,Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939; 
Section 187c,The Army and Airforce Act 1940. 
16 Evatt apparently strongly pressed Fraser on the 
matter at the Canberra Conference 1944. 
17 Memo,H.D.C. Adams to Permanent Head P.M. ' s 
Department,25 November 1942, EA 159/1/5 pt. 2. 
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example, in the United States Senate debate on the 
proposed post-war security organisation, 25 October 1943 ~ 
New Zealand's status as a "free and sovereign nation" (a 
prerequisite for membership) was questioned because of 
the non-ratification of the Statute of Westminster. 18 In 
the wake of such controversy, an official report concluded 
that foreign misconceptions would be clarified "by the 
removal of that unnecessary source of misunderstanding, the 
19 
bogey of New Zealand's adoption of the Statute of Westminster." 
Ironically, it seemed there was as much concern in rectifying 
mi s understanding of Ne w Zealand's international status 
(technically unaffected by the Statute) as with removing 
the actual legal restrictions. 
Government resolve was apparent by late November 1943, 
with Adams instructed to prepare legislation, largely for 
"matters of convenience".20 An adoption bill was ready by 
the 1944 parliamentary session and the Vice - Regal Speech 
from the Throne announced the intention to proceed with 
the Statute's enactment . 21 The Governor - General presented 
three essential justifications: ensuring Commonwealth 
uniformitY i removing foreign doubts over New Zealand's 
sovereign status; and eliminating administrative complication s. 
Academic viewpoints added further weight to the cause of 
adoption, with a series of lectures at Victoria University 
18Charge d'Affaires New Zealand Delegation, Washington 
to Minister of External Affairs,27 October 1943,EA 159/1/5 pt.2 . 
19Memorandum: 'The Internation a l and Constitutional 
S tat u s 0 f New Z e a 1 and " C. C. A i k man, 1 943 , P . 6 E A 1 59 11 1 5 P t. 2 . 
20 Attorney General to Law Draftsman,30 November 1943, 
EA 159/1/5 pt. 2. 
21 NZPD , 22 February 1944 , Vol. 264, p.7. 
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College April - May 1944 . 22 The continuing reality of 
unnecessary legislative restriction was emphasised here: 
these examples of extra- territoriality and 
repugnancy pr es ent a picture of 18gislative muddle 
and confusion. Since it has been agreed that New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom are equal in status, 
the legislative incapacity of N8W Zealand has been 
illogically, even perversely, persisted in. 23 
Even the popular press showed an increasing awareness, 
with a Truth headline December 1943 - "N.Z. Still Clings 
M h' '" 24 to ot er s Strlngs . 
However, despite the Crown's forthright statement 
of impending legislative action, the Statute remained in 
cold storage. This resulted from the further complicating 
factor that mere adoption would not remOV8 all the New 
Zealand parliament's legislative incapacities. Most 
significantly, the power to repeal or amend certain 
entrenched sections of the 1852 New Zealand Constitution 
Act 25 was prevented by the 1857 Amendment Act. 26 Section 8 
of the Statute of Westminster upheld that adoption would 
not remove this restriction. Thus, parallel to invoking 
the Statute, a request for United Kingdom legislation 
conferring the New Zealand parliament's full power of 
constitutional amendment would be required. 27 Arguably, 
22 . . t Wrltten transcrlp s 
the Statute of Westminster, 
{Wellington, 1944) . 
published as New Zealand and 
J • C. Be a 9 I e hoI e ( e d. -) -
23 R • O • McGeehan 'Status and Legislative Inability ' in 
Ibid., p.97. 
24New Zealand Truth, December 29, 1943. 
25 15 and 16 Vict. C.72. 
26 20 and 21 Vict. C.53 . 
27Emphasised by Adams in Memo to P.M., 8 February 1944 , 
EA 159/1/5 pt . 2. 
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unlike federal Canada and Australia, New Zealand's 
unitary constitution did not need the safeguard of 
westminster residual power to ensure state or provincial 
. ht 28 r 19 s. While Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act 1865 stated that "representative legislatures may 
alter their constitutions", this was not seen to override 
the restrictions of the 1857 Act. In any case, Section 2 
of the Statute of Westminster repealed this legislation. 
To dispel any controversy, it was deemed necessary to 
have parliamentary powers of constitutional amendment 
confirmed in clear and absolute terms by Britain. 
Interestingly, there was also some concern raised 
over the possible effect of the Statute of Westminster's 
adoption on the Treaty of Waitangi and jurisdiction over 
the Maori people. In response, the Crown Solicitor, 
A. E. Currie, declared that while the Treaty was symbolically 
important, it was not in itself part of New Zealand law and 
therefore 29 unaffected by constitutional changes. It was 
noted that Section 71 of the 1852 Constitution Act enabled 
the Crown by letters patent to create a system of "indirect 
rule" in areas of established Maori lands and customs. But 
no such system had been applied and would, in any case, be 
28Ironically, Canada, " the premier Dominion", 
did not domicile its constitution until 1982, over 30 
years after "the most reluctant Dominion". New Zealand 
was spared the greater constitutional complexities of 
federalism. 
29 ~ Currie to Permanent Head P.M.'s Dept, 
24 February 1944, "'The Treaty of Waitangi and the Statute 
of Westminster', EA 159 / 1/5, pt.2. 
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repugnant to New Zealand law. Maoris were clearly not 
distinct subjects of the British monarch, but under the 
sovereignty of the New Zealand government. Given recent 
attempts by Maori activists to give the Treaty of Waitangi 
some legal standing, this is an interesting area. 
Awareness that the unilateral adoption of the 
statute of Westminster would not provide the panacea of 
legislative autonomy, complicated th~ situation for New 
Zealand. As the Attorney General Re~ Mason declared "If 
the adoption of the Statute does not bring us full 
constitutional power, there is the possibility, even the 
likelihood, that the result will be a definite loss of 
30 
constitutional power". An agreement with Britain for 
dual legislative action was therefore required. Fraser 
resolved to raise this matter personally when in London 
31 for the Prime Ministers' Meeting, May 1944. It appeared 
that simple ends could only be achieved by complex means. 
New Zealand's case was clearly put to the British 
government, supported by a large corpus of memoranda and 
Adams' draft constitution amendment bill. Fraser emphasised 
in discussions with Dominions Secretary Lord Cranborne 
that here "was a matter which should have been cleared up 
much earlier".32 British officials were sympathetic and 
"surprised and interested to learn that Section 8 took 
away with one hand what it gave 33 in the other". However, 
for Britain the vital issue was the "matter of timing,,34 and 
30Attorney General to P.M., 5 April 1944, EA 159/1/5 pt.3. 
31 Report on meeting in P.M. 's Office, 9 March 1944, 
EA 159/1/5 pt. 3. 
32 Report, Sir Eric Machtig to Sir Harry Batterbee, 
June 1944, 0 - 0 35 1245/C235/3. 29 
33McIntosh to Shanahan, 24 May 1944, EA 159/1/5 pt.3. 
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it was deemed undesirable to legislate for New Zealand in 
the existing circumstances. The Dominions Office presented 
two mitigating factors. Firstly, the well used contention 
that enemy propaganda would present New Zealand as cutting 
Commonwealth ties, especially in the wake of an important 
Prime Ministers' meeting. Such an argument was not 
particularly credible given Australian actions in 1942. 
But, secondly, and of decisive importance, was the 
fact that the British government did not wish to raise New 
Zealand's constitutional status in parliament, thereby 
provoking debate on wider inter-Commonwealth relations. 35 
Adams' draft bill included reference to the need for 
Commonwealth uniformity over the laws of royal succession 
and titles, and the oath of allegiance. These matters 
would be particularly embarrassing to Britain in regard to 
Eire's tenuous status in the Commonwealth - an area "best 
36 
allowed to slumber". Concern was also expressed over 
legislating in a matter of potential controversy in New 
Zealand. Thus, while both governments agreed to the form 
of action required, it was resolved to postpone legislation 
until a more convivial date. Had Fraser forced the issue, 
Britain would have had to comply, but Commonwealth goodwill 
prevailed. 
Essentially a pre-war issue, with the official 
groundwork concluded during the war, New Zealand's official 
achievement of full sovereignty had to wait for a post-war 
34Machtig to Batterbee, op. cit. 
35 Memo, C.W. Dixon, 1 June 1944, DO 35 1245/C235/3. 
36 Ibid . 
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resolve. New Zealand's status as a sovereign and 
independent nation had been illustrated beyond doubt in 
the war and the desirability of formally capping this 
with c omplete legislative competence was apparent. It 
was also evident that post - war responsibilities in the 
Pacific (as envisaged by the Canberra Pact) necessitated 
full extra- territorial jurisdiction. Trusteeship 
obligations in Western Samoa (administrative authority still 
derived from the United Kingdom Foreign Jurisdiction Act) 
also needed a firmer base. In fact, while the apparent 
limitations on extra- territoriality remained, New Zealand's 
ability to legislate in a whole gamut of areas was in 
doubt - shipping, fishing, air navigation, smuggling, 
deportation, dependent territories , et al. 37 
But British recalcitrance was still evident. When 
Fraser arrived in London, January 1946, for the first 
General Assembly of the United Nations, Lord Addison, the 
Dominions Secretary, was advised that a full legislative 
programme left no room to act on New Zealand's behalf. The 
Dominions Office further argued that they were "by no 
means convinced that the complementary United Kingdom 
Legislation which Mr Fraser seeks is really essential in 
38 
order to enable New Zealand to achieve their purpose". 
This view was directly contnary to the agreement of 1944. 
Continued concern at fuelling controversy over inter -
Commonwealth relations accounted for this unenthusiasm. 
37 
'Summary of Reasons for which New Zealand Should 
Adopt the Statute of Westminster', 28 June 1946, 
EA 159/1/5 pt.3. 
38Memo , Sir Eric Machtig , 21 February 1946 , 
DO 35 1245/C235/3. 
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However, the New Zealand government had no wish 
to further delay legislation. Officials were busy behind 
the scenes compiling the well established arguments in 
f f d t . 39 avour 0 a op lon. Fraser announced to the House 
16 August 1946, the intention of setting up a select 
committee to report on the whole constitutional process 
. 1 d 40 lnvo ve • This body was not, in the event, established, 
although the Statutes Revision Committee examined the 
matter. Adams and Foss Shanahan appeared before the 
Committee to advance the case for legislative action. They 
stressed the logic of removing outdated restrictions. For 
example, Adams pointed out the ridiculous situation that 
murders committed when travelling to New Zealand would be 
outside the jurisdiction of the courts, through extra-
. . 1 .. 41 terrltorla restrlctlon. Surprisingly, Opposition 
members of the Committee were cool towards such arguments. 
In fact, the National Party's 1946 election manifesto 
expressly stated the desire "to retain all links binding 
the Empire together and therefore does not propose adopting 
the Statute of Westminster at the present juncture".42 
Yet, paradoxically, another of National's election platforms -
the abolition of the Legislative Council - could not be 
achieved without amending an entrenched section of the 1852 
Constitution Act. Shanahan and Adams were aware of this, 
but diplomatic tact restrained them from pointing out 
. 1" . 43 Natlona s lnconslstency. 
39 McIntosh to Crow,27 May 1946, EA 159/1/5 pt.3. 
40 NZPD,16 August 1946, Vol. 274, p.293. 
41 Shanahan to McIntosh, 3 October 1946, EA 159/1/5 pt.3. 
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The ongoing problem of finding accord with Brit a in 
over the New Zealand Constitution was largely re s olved during 
Adams' visit to London for the Conference on Nationality 
and Citizenship, March 1947. 44 Discussions with British 
officials resulted in Adams' draft United Kingdom 
amendment bill being revised and concluded to the 
satisfaction of both parties. The British wanted the 
legislation to be concise and uncontroversial and suggested 
replacing the broad declaratory statement that the New 
Zealand parliament had the power to make any constitutional 
change, with the simple repeal of the 1857 amendment act, 
thereby allowing full amending power. The British 
government now agreed to legislate on New Zealand's behalf 
when parliament convened in October 1947. 45 Fraser could 
at last proceed. 
The National opposition unwittingly played into 
the government's hands here ,; with Sidney Holland reviving 
his hobby horse - the abolition of the Legislative Council. 46 
The Opposition had not done their legal homework and gave 
the government the perfect opportunity to finally resolve 
, 
the whole drawn out issue, without the implication of 
42 N. Z . National Party Policy - General Election 1946 
EA 159/1/5 pt.3. 
43 h. Shanahan to McIntos , op. Clt. 
44The prospect of enacting individual citizenships 
within the Commonwealth, further necessitated the removal 
of extra-territorial constraint and repugnancy. 
45 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Fraser, 
28 March 1947,EA 159/1/5, pt.3. 
46Legislative Council Abolition Bill NZPD, 
5 August 1947, Vol. 277, pp.123- 29. 
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Commonwealth disloyalty. As Attorney General Mason 
clearly argued, New Zealand's bi -cameral parliament was 
entrenched in the 1852 Constitution Act and could not be 
altered by domestic statute. 47 Amending the constitution 
act did not necessarily require adopting the Statute of 
westminster (Britain could legislate for New Zealand's 
right to do so), but as Fraser convincingly argued, a full 
attainment of legislative authority was preferable to 
. 1 t' 48 plecemea ac lons. Otherwise, New Zealand would be 
continually going back to the British parliament when other 
restrictions needed overcoming. Holland's motion was thus 
amended that before any change was made to the legislature 
"the Statute of Westminster be extended to this Dominion, 
and that a bill ... be introduced during the present session 
of parliament". Fraser could not have stage-managed the 
situation better. 
Subsequently, dual legislation - adopting the 
Statute of Westminster and requesting Britain's repeal of 
the 1857 Constitution Amendment Act - was introduced to 
the House,19 September 1947. In the second reading, 
7 November, Fraser strongly presented the previously stalled 
1 . 49 po lCy. New Zealand's sovereign nationhood, he argued, 
was an established fact, necessitating the removal of 
anomalous legislative incapacities. Such restrictions were 
anachronistic legacies and contentious or already redundant 
in their oontinued application - "Why keep the deadweight 
47 NZPD ,6 August 1947, Vol. 277, pp.202- 03. 
48 Ibid ., p.212. 
49 NZPD ,7 November 1947, Vol. 279, pp.531-36. 
96 
and unnecessary formula?" The present situation also 
created difficulties in certain areas of legislation and 
needed rectifying. Fraser was at pains to emphasise there 
could be no lessening of New Zealand's ties to Britain and 
the Commonwealth - in fact, New Zealand would cease to be 
the "odd Dominion out" and be brought into line with the 
other members. 
Opposition response was a curious mixture of 
uncompromising imperialism (as represented by External 
Affairs spokesman Frederick Doidge) and a more reasoned 
approach (as shown by T.C. Webb and R.M. Algie). Doidge, 
National's arch-imperialist ("with us loyalty to the 
Motherland is an instinct as deep as religion,,)50 basically 
recycled the conservative arguments put forward since 1930, 
though by 1947 such contentions were clearly reactionary. 
He opposed adoption "largely on grounds of sentiment", still 
maintaining that the Statute provided "a legal bill of 
d . 51 lvorcement". New Zealand, he further contended, 
suffered few disadvantages or constraints without the 
Statute and had little to gain practically. However, it 
appeared that Doidge was playacting the role of the 
hardline imperialist for his own satisfaction. His 
colleagues did not endorse his views and there was no 
parliamentary division. Other National members, while 
unenthusiastic, showed a realistic acceptance - "the case 
for the adoption of the Statute is stronger than the case 
against it".52 R.M. Algie actually refuted Doidge's claims, 
50 NZPD,7 November 1947, Vol. 279, p.538. 
51 Ibid ., pp.535-38. 
52 T.C. Webb, Ibid., p.543. 
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rather than "cutting the painter ... it was the Old 
Land herself who handed us the weapons to do the cutting.,,53 
It was realistically recognised that Commonwealth unity 
derived from the willingness of the independent members 
not laws. Both bills were duly passed without division 
25 November 1947. The New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) 
Bill subsequently sailed through the United Kingdom 
parliament with New Zealand receiving uniform praise and 
goodwill. 54 
New Zealand's final achievement of official sovereign 
status was accepted without controversy or reaction. Protests 
were limited to the lunatic fringe and extreme imperialists. 
An example of this was a letter declaiming that the 
Statute's adoption would tear New Zealand away from the 
divine protection of the British constitution as derived 
from the God-given "rock of 55 ages". To most New Zealanders 
there was no tangible change in the country's status and 
complex constitutional matters were not of concern. In 
contrast to the indignation of 1931, in 1947 there was near 
universal consensus that as an independent nation, New 
Zealand deserved full sovereign status. Thus, the final 
adoption of the Statute of Westminster was primarily 
important in confirming and symbolising New Zealand's 
proudly held independence in the post - war world. At the 
53 Ibid ., p.551. 
54The Third Labour Government in 1973 further amended 
the N.Z. Constitution Act removing remaining anachronisms and 
making absolutely clear that New Zealand laws had extra-
territorial effect by replacing the words in Section 53 -
"to make laws for the peace, order and good government of New 
Zealand" with "power to make laws having effect in, or in 
respect of, New Zealand or any other part thereof and laws 
having effect outside New Zealand". N.Z. Statutes, 1973 
No. 114. 
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same time, interdependence within the British Commonwealth 
was accepted without question. New Zeala nd enjoyed the 
symbiosis of independence and Commonwealth ties without 
contradiction. But ironically, due to New Zealand's 
delayed adoption, by 1947 "the Statute of Westminster Era" 
of the Commonwealth was over. New Zealand achieved official 
"Dominion Status" to find the term an anachronism, 
subsequently replaced as the Commonwealth's composition and 
focus changed. 
II. NEW ZEALAND CITIZENSHIP 
In contrast to the drawn out process of adopting 
the Statute of Westminster, the introduction of a specific 
New Zealand citizenship in 1948 was a quickly resolved 
matter. While a logical derivative of full sovereign status, 
this was not a self-conscious declaration of natio nal identity. 
Instead, it was part of a concerted inter-Commonwealth 
formula to retain the uniformity of the status of British 
subject, while recognising the individual citizenship 
of member nations. Unlike the uncompromising stance of 
earlier administrations to the Statute of Westminster, the 
Labour government agreed to support Commonwealth consensus 
here. As a result, the basis of nationality shifted from 
the "common code" of the universality of being a British 
subject to the precedence of individual national 
citizenship. This was a significant change in principle and 
was received in New Zeala nd with a degree of relu ctance. 
However, the practical consequences were minimal - New 
55David Whyte , submission to the Government 
9 Augu st 1947 EA 159/1/ 5 pt. 3. 
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zealanders remained British subjects, while also having 
the practical fact of indigenous citizenship legally 
confirmed. As with the Statute of Westminster, convention 
and legalism were brought into unison. 
Until Canada's initiative in legislating for a 
distinct national citizenship in 1946, a uniform Commonwealth 
nationality was provided by the status of British subject -
"Civis Britannicus sum". This did not mean a subject of 
Great Britain, but derived from common allegiance to the 
Crown. The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914 
and subsequent parallel Dominion legislation (New Zealand 
finally adopted all provisions in 1928)56 gave this legal 
standing, creating an homogeneous "common code", defining 
who qualified as British subjects and the conditions for 
achieving or losing this status. Any desired change to 
these universal laws of nationality required the consultation 
and agreement of all member states. However, common status 
did not necessarily entail uniform rights and privileges 
as governments maintained their own immigration and electoral 
laws. For e x am pIe, inN e w Z e a I and, the Kin g 's As ian 
'. 
subjects did not enjoy the same rights of entry as Caucasians. 
In fact, it was only in the United Kingdom that all British 
subjects enjoyed the same full rights as those born or 
domiciled there. 57 
In practical terms, the viability of the common 
code had been long undermined. A single national status 
56British Nationality and Status of Aliens (in New 
Zealand) Act. N.Z. Statutes 1928 19 Geo. V. No. 58. 
57H• J • Harvey, Consultation and Co-operation in the 
Commonwealth (London, 1952), p.57. 
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increasingly conflicted with the individual needs of 
the Dominions and in view of the Statute of Westminster's 
confirmation of full Dominion sovereignty, was something 
of an anomaly. This was particularly evident in regard to 
international relations, where treaties and membership of 
international organisations necessitated the differentiation 
of individual nations. The 1937 Imperial Conference had 
in fact confirmed the right of member states to legally 
define their own community within the superstructure of 
B . t ' h t . I . 58 rl lS na lona lty. It was also recognised that in 
practice all Commonwealth countries distinguished between 
their own nation a ls and other British subjects, whether 
legally defined or not. Thus, distinct subnationalities 
were present within the supposedly common code and were 
increasingly apparent by the Second World War. Clearly, 
while New Zealanders were defined as British subjects, this 
was according to the law of New Zealand. 
But while the common code .was increasingly 
strained, it was not officially breached until the 
introduction of a specific Canadian citizenship in 1946. 
Under this formula, local citizenship became the essential 
determinant of nationality, defined according to its own 
criteria . The common status of British subject was retained 
but was relegated to secondary importance, deriving from the 
prima cy of indigenous citizenship as based on allegiance to 
the King - but in his distinct capacity as sovereign of 
Canada. The continuity of a common status was thus a 
58Imperial Conference, 1937 - Extract from Section XIV 
of the Report, Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth 
Affairs 1931 - 52 (London, 1953) pp. 930- 933. New Zealand 
opposed this recognition, bu t Canada and South Africa had 
defined their own nationals in 1921 and 1927, respectively. 
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concession to the ideal of a cohesive Commonwealth . 
Arguably, the new citizenship was a declaratory confirmation 
of what had emerged through convention. In reality, there 
was no unitary empire providing a single nationality, but 
a special association of sovereign nations, and rather than 
a single crown, the monarch's role was divisible. The 
principle that "loyalty begins at home" had been long 
confirmed in custom (especially in Canada and South Africa) 
if not in law. Nationality, therefore, needed to reflect 
this rather than pay lip service to an outmoded imperial 
unity. 
Canada's action had obvious implications for the 
rest of the Commonwealth. If some form of common status 
was to be retained, it would be necessary to follow the 
Canadian model. Fraser informed Nash (who was in London for 
the Prime Ministers' Conference) 20 May 1946, that while he 
regretted Canada's lack of preliminary consultation, he 
was not particularly opposed to the prospect of parallel 
1 d .. h· 59 New Zea an cltlzens lp. Though he also emphasised the 
government's primary desire to retain the status of British 
subject and expressed the need for a uniform Commonwealth 
approach on the matter. This stance was reiterated by the 
New Zealand delegates at the exploratory nationality talks 
that accompanied the Prime Ministers' Meeting. 60 New 
Zealand valued British nationality both for reasons of 
sentiment and practicality. With regard to sentiment, it 
59Fraser to Nash,No. 13, 20 May 1946,159/2/1 pt.2 -
Fraser in fact took a progressive view to nationality as 
earlier shown by his championing of the rights of women 
married " to aliens. 
60prime Ministers' Meeting, May 1946 , Minutes of 
Meeting of Committee of Officials on Nationality Questions 
EA 53/23/9. 
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provided a cherished common identity based on loyalty 
to the monarchy and ethnic origin. As Fraser claimed 
"we are people of the same race ... merged into the one 
British".61 In practical terms, British nationality 
provided a small nation with a more tangible international 
identity. If New Zealand was unknown to many in the outside 
world, the status of British subject was. Independence was 
thus buttressed and enhanced. 
Yet, ironically, despite New Zealand's continued 
acceptance of the common code, it was also New Zealand who 
further breached the supposedly uniform system in 1946 by 
unilaterally legislating in regard to the status of married 
women. Fraser had consistently opposed the discriminatory 
law depriving British nationality to women married to aliens, 
introducing a private :members btll to repeal it in 1932. 
Finally, in 1935 the General Assembly legislated that 
within New Zealand marriage had no effect on nationality -
a significant domestic divergence within the common code. 62 
When the new Canadian Citizenship Act removed all such 
discrimination, it was resolved that the other Commonwealth 
members (still officially bound to the common code) follow 
suit. 63 Fraser was eager to invoke immediate legislation 
and a draft bill was prepared by 22 August 1946. However, 
the Dominions' Secretary, in an effort to ensure Commonwealth 
uniformity, requested that New Zealand delay enactment until 
any technical difficulties were resolved at the proposed 
61 NZPD ,7 November 1947, p.533. 
62British Nationality and Status of Aliens (in New 
Zealand) Amendment Act 10 Geo. VI 1946, No. 20. 
63 p . M.'s Committee of Officials on Nationality 
Questions, Minutes of Second Meeting, 31 May 1946 EA 153/23/9. 
Subsequent official statement in New Zealand parliament 
1 August 1946. 
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64 Nationality Conference of legal experts. Such 
suggestions were not followed and New Zealand - not normally 
in the Commonwealth vanguard - subsequentlY , passed the 
desired legislation 9 October 1946, giving all British 
subjects personal autonomy regardless of sex. This contravened 
the supposed commitment to consensus action over changes to 
nationality laws, further highlighting the impracticability 
of the common code. 
In the wider context, by late 1946 New Zealand 
officials were advocating new citizenship laws -
"admini stratively such a concept is undoubtedly necessary; 
culturally, it is desirable; politically, it is in rapid 
65 growth". As the forthcoming conference of experts was 
based on the assumption of developing a new formula for 
Commonwealth nationality, New Zealand would have no choice 
but to go along with such proposals. But a commitment to 
retaining a common status was paramount: 
New Zealand delegates should ... put emphasis 
less on the traits that differentiate the nationalities 
of the Commonwealth than on the common traits that bind 
them together ... there is everything to be gained and 
nothing to be lost by preserving the concept of British 
nationality ... this is important to a small isolated 
country as far away from Europe as New Zealand. 66 
Any New Zealand citizenship would thus be placed within a 
wider Commonwealth framework. 
The Nationality and Citizenship Conference eventually 
met in London February 1947 with legal experts from all the 
Dominions, Ceylon, Burma, Southern Rhodesia and, significantly, 
64 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Fraser, 
12 September 1946, EA 159/2/1 pt. 3. 
65 Memo for Secretary, External Affairs from 
J.M. Sheenan,24 December 1946, EA 159/2/1, pt.3. 
66 Memo for Secretary, External Affairs from 
J.M. Sheenan, ibid . 
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Eire, in attendance. 67 New Zealand was represented by 
the Law Draftsman, Dartrey Adams, and Colin Aikman. A 
new Commonwealth-wide formula was produced, based on the 
Canadian model. The somewhat inflexible and moribund 
common code was to be replaced by individual citizenship 
laws, reflecting local requirements and conditions. The 
common status of being a British subject was retained, but 
this derived only from a shared allegiance to the same 
sovereign who, in practice, was many kings. This new scheme 
attempted to synthesise two contradictory elements: a 
distinct national citizenship as espoused by the conscious 
nationalism of Canada and South Africa; and a cohesive 
unitary Commonwealth, as supported by New Zealand - "th e best 
of both worlds". The former clearly took precedence, the 
latter being more a concession to sentiment. As Adams 
stated in his report to Fraser, the status of British subject 
would have little meaning if every Commonwealth nation placed 
h · h . . . h' 68 most emp aSlS on t elr own cltlzens lpS. 
The very term "British subject" became increasingly 
contentious in the changing post -wa r Commonwealth. While 
New Zealanders regarded themselves as essentially "British", 
the more nationally conscious Canadians and South Africans 
did not see this adjective as particularly appropriate, 
hence their citizenship laws made conspicuously little 
referen ce to it. More importantly, following the dramatic 
67 Eire had not taken part in any Commonwealth 
ministerial meetings since 1932. The Eire Citizenship Act 1935 
had repudiated common status by denying British nationality to 
Irish citizens, though they still enjoyed the practical status 
of British subjects. 
68 H.D.C . Adams, Report on the Conference on 
Nationality and Citizenship,27 June 1947, EA 159/2/1, pt.3. 
105 
change in the Commonwealth's composition after 1947 -
with independent India, Pakistan and Ceylon as free and 
equal members - the title "British subject" was 
rendered glaringly inappropriate as was the name "British 
Commonwealth" . In response, the Indian government 
requested the use of the alternative title "Commonwealth 
citizen" . The United Kingdom government desired to 
accommodate India and proposed using bot h British subject 
and Commonwealth citizen as alternati v e stylings for the 
same status, thereby appeasing both the new Asi an members 
and the Old Dominions • It was further suggested that 
all members use the dual nomenclature in their citizenship 
69 laws. 
The New Zealand government did not v iew this 
compromise favourably, seeing it as further demeaning 
common status and allegiance to the Crown, though ultimately 
acceded on the understanding that New Zealand's emphasis 
would remain on the traditional title. 70 Not all New 
Zealand officials took a conservative line though, Frank 
Corner (again showing a radical stance) rationally espoused 
the reality of the contemporary Commonwealth: 
Commonwealth citizen is an excellent term to express 
the position of a member of a state in the modern 
British Common we alth of Nations ••• If we seriously 
intend to make an attempt to keep India and Pakistan 
in the Commonwealth we must not oppose change, just 
because it is change, as the New Zealand government 
did at the time of the Statute of Westminster ••. 
In any case, the term 'British subject' is inaccurate 
since we are not subjects of Britain, we are subjects 
of the King. 71 
69 Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to 
Minister of External Affairs, 13 Apr il 1948 , EA 159/2/1, pt.5. 
70Minister of External Affairs to Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations, 12 May 1948,EA 159/2/1, pt.5. 
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The United Kingdom set the example for 
Commonwealth-wide legislation by passing the British 
Nationality Act 1948, providing for a specific citizenship 
of the United Kingdom and colonies. But, unlike the 
Canadian Act, most emphasis was placed on the common status 
of British subject; this was a clear model for New Zealand 
to follow. An interesting feature of the bills' long and 
controversial passage through the Westminster parliament, 
was the use of New Zealand by the ardently conservative 
House of Lords to protest against the changes to nationality. 
Vi scount Simon declared that New Zealanders preferred to 
remain British subjects and should not be forced to change 
their status under pressure · from an "anti-imperial" 
72 
socialist government. It was even suggested that New 
Zealand might sabotage the new formula by refusing to invoke 
new citizenship laws. 
Fraser's government did not fulfil the expectations 
of the conser vative peers, with a subsequent New Zealand 
bill - directly based on the United Kingdom legislation -
introduced 17 August 1948. 73 A distinct New Zealand 
citizenship was thus created, attained by either birth or 
naturalisation within New Zealand or one year's residence by 
a British subject (compared to five years in Canada and 
Australia) . This was a new precedent for New Zealand, for, 
as Minister of Internal Affairs, William Parry, stated, 
allegiance to the sovereign was now officially: 
71 Frank Corner to Foss Shanahan, 7 May 1948, 
EA 159/2/1, pt.5. 
72 Hansard, House of Lords, Vol. 156, No. 89, 
21 June 1948, p.1009, EA 159/2/1, pt.5. 
73 N. Z . Statutes, 1948, 12 Geo. VI, No. 15. 
107 
by virtue of our citizenship of New Zealand, and 
we in New Zealand are taking over r the sole right of 
deciding what persons in New Zealand should bear 
that allegiance. The change in principle is great; 
the change in practice will be very slight. 74 
Parry emphasised that the government had not forced the 
issue - "if we had had any option in the matter, we would 
have retained the common cOde".75 But the deciding factor 
was the resolve for Commonwealth consensus - "we intend to 
follow New Zealand's traditional policy of supporting the 
76 Imperial connection to the utmost". It still 
seemed that in some areas, things had not changed since 
Massey's day. 
Due to this resilient Commonwealth devotion, the 
status of British subject - while officially deriving from 
the primacy of indigenous citizenship - retained precedence. 
In contrast to the specific "Canadian Citizenship Act", the 
"British Nationality and New Zealand Citizens~ip Act" gave 
evident priority to the former title. Parry was adamant -
"that is the order in which we think of them we all 
prefer to be spoken of as British sUbjects".77 Thus, New 
Zealand passports, while carrying the New Zealand Coat of 
Arms, were stamped "British passport - New Zealand", a 
symbolic affirmation of the duality of sovereignty and 
Commonwealth devotion. Despite a lack of enthusiasm, the 
government also admitted that the new citizenship laws had 
certain benefits, notably in clearly defining New Zealanders 
in the international context; this had been unclear under 
the common code. 
74 NZPD, 17 August 1948, Vol. 281, pp.1523 - 24. 
75 Ibid ., p.1520. 
76 Ibid ., p.1520. 
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But, while the new legislation's scope was 
extensive, the status of some New Zealanders was still 
vague. An interesting case in kind was that of 
Sir Carl Berendsen, the New Zealand Minister in Washington. 
He cabled the government expressing concern that the new 
laws could deprive him of automatic New Zealand citizenship.78 
While a British subject domiciled in New Zealand for 50 years, 
Berendsen did not meet any of the qualifications for 
immediate citizenship under Section 16(1). He was neither 
born or naturalised in New Zealand (an Australian by birth) 
and had necessarily been outside the country for the 
12 month period preceding the Act's commencement. However, 
his perceived statelessness was officially rectified by 
the fact that as a diplomat he was deemed ordinarily resident 
in New zealand. 79 Such anomalies inevitably followed the 
replacement of a uniform system by individual status. 
Certain technical complexities regarding New 
Zealand's Pacific Island dependencies were also raised. 
The Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelaus were effectively 
domestic territory and the inhabitants would automatically 
qualify as citizens and British subjects. However, by an 
interesting legal quirk, the Tokelau Islands technically 
had their administration delegated to New Zealand from 
Britain, who still enjoyed residual authority.80 It was 
therefore necessary to take action to formally include the 
77IblOd., 1520 21 P . -. 
78 Berendsen to Minister of External Affairs, No. 268 
25 August 1948, EA 159/2/1, pt.6. 
79 External Affairs Memorandum, 31 August 1948, 
EA 159/2/1, pt.6. 
80 h 0 1 0 0 0 Emp aSlsed by Crown So lCltor, A.E. Currle to Prime 
Minister's Department, 16 March 1948, EA 159/2/1, pt.4. 
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miniscule islands within New Zealand's boundaries. 
With the adoption of the Statute of Westminster, the 
General Assembly could enact the necessary legislation, 
though parallel United Kingdom confirmation by Order in 
81 Council was requested. Western Samoa by contrast was a 
trusteeship territory and its people were not British 
subjects. Fraser's government desired that all such British 
protected peoples should enjoy a special common status 
within the Commonwealth, and was instrumental in achieving 
82 
recognition of an intermediary non-alien status. 
Despite New Zealand's emphasis on the unitary 
aspects of the new citizenship legislation, in the wider 
Commonwealth context, differentiation was a more important 
factor than concessions to common status. A commitment to 
the primac y of the status of British subject proved to be 
at variance with the more nationally assertive Commonwealth 
partners. In fact, the South African Citizenship Act 1949 
made no reference to any uniform Commonwealth nationality. 
Interior Minister Donges realistically claimed that 
"constitutionally it is no longer possible to talk of a 
83 
common status". The Commonwealth, he argued, was not a 
super ·state and that common allegiance had now ceased to be 
an essential condition for membership.84 Given this 
situation, the Nationalist government concluded "there are ... 
81 . I d Unlon Is an s (Revocation) Order in Council 
13 September 1948. 
82 W.E. Parr~ NZPD,17 August 1948, Vol. 281, p . 1523. 
83 . 
quoted H.J. Harvey, Consultation and Co - operation 
in the Commonwealth (Oxford, 1952), p.73. 
84This latter innovation had been agreed to at the 
Prime Ministers' Meeting April 1949 but was confined 
specifically to India with the status of other members 
unchanged. South Africa was thus acting arbitrarily in 
refuting c ommon allegiance. 
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only citizens of Commonwealth countries enjoying 
preferences within that community of states . " While this 
may have been the case in convention, New Zealand chose to 
retain a more tangible sense of unity with the Mother 
Country. 
In retrospect, the advent of a specific New 
Zealand citizenship was an important milestone, but the 
essential determinant was a commitment to Commonwealth 
consensus rather than increasing national consciousness. 
While certain practical and technical advantages were 
apparent, the government would not have invoked citizenship 
legislation on its own initiative. When given no alternative 
but to do so, it was the rationale of maintaining the common 
status of the British subject that prevailed. New Zealand 
was a sovereign state, but its people were also content to 
be British subjects and remained so. British nationality 
was not regarded as an obstacle to nationru identity, rather 
an affirmation of endemic loyalty to the monarchy and the 
belief in a united Commonwealth. The wider scope of 
British nationality was also seen to give practical benefits 
to a small and isolated nation. 
III. REMOVAL OF THE TITLE "DOMINION" 
A significant corollary of the changes in New 
Zealand's constitutional and national status was the phasing 
out of the official title "Dominion of New Zealand".85 
In the myriad of legislation it is significant that New 
Zealand is listed without any formal prefix. 86 Ironically, 
850fficial title proclaimed 26 September 1907. 
86 H . D. C . Adams to A. D. McIntosh,11 March 1947, 
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it seemed that by finally achieving official Dominion 
status, New Zealand ceased to be a Dominion. As with the 
adoption of the Statute of Westminster and the new 
citizenship laws, this was essentially a technical matter 
(despite symbolic importance) and followed unison 
Commonwealth practice. There was no discernable change to 
the status quo and little consequent publicity. 
The term Dominion (originally "the British Dominions 
beyond the seas") was somewhat nebulous and its meaning had 
changed as the Commonwealth evolved. The Balfour Report 
of 1926 described Dominion status as it had emerged -
independent statehood within the Commonwealth. Full 
sovereign status was in turn achieved by the Statute of 
Westminster, though the term Dominion continued in usage. 
However, not all the Dominions were officially styled as 
such, South Africa was a "Union" and Australia a 
"Commonwealth". By the post-war period, the term Dominion 
had become something of an anachronism, implying or at least 
recollecting an inferior status to Britain. 87 The United 
Kingdom was not a Dominion and it was seemingly anomalous in 
an association of f~ee and equal members for one member to 
be outside the basic nomenclature. It was more appropriate 
to use universal terms like "member of the Commonwealth". 
Canada had actually phased out the formal prefix "Dominion of" 
from its official title in the 1930's. With the independence 
of the Indian subcontinent, the inappropriateness of the 
EA 159/1/5, pt.3. Adams advocated using just 'New Zealand' 
in the Statute of Westminste~ legislation. 
87 G.A. Wood, 'The Former Dominion of New Zealand', 
Political Science, Vol. 26, No.1, 1974 p.5. 
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title became increasingly apparent. Thus, on 2 July 1947 
the British government renamed the Dominions Office the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, declaring that the old name 
was "liable to convey a misleading impression of the 
relations between the United Kingdom and the other members 
88 
of the Commonwealth." 
The New Zealand government certainly felt no 
inferiority to Britain. The sacrifice of the war confirmed 
the country's independence and fostered an increased 
national identity (though by no means as strong as in other 
Commonwealth countries). While remaining devoted to the 
Commonwealth, New Zealand did so as a sovereign state and 
was also involved in wider international affairs. It 
was therefore seen as increasingly anomalous that New 
Zealand remained the only officially styled Dominion. The 
External Affairs Department consequently advised Fraser to 
drop the title at the end of the war. Significantly, at 
the Commonwealth Meeting April 1945, both Canada and New 
Zealand announced their intention to omit the words" Dominion 
of" when signing the United Nations Charter. 89 It was also 
agreed that the Commonwealth members would sign as individual 
nations along with the rest of the international community, 
in alphabetical order. Thus, at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 , 
Fraser signed the Charter not as part of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations but for the distinct nation of New 
Zealand, in between the Netherlands and Nicaragua. In the 
88 Secretary of S tate for Dominion Affairs to Minister 
of External Affairs, 1 July 1947, EA 151/1/1, pt.3. 
89 Note of Meeting of Commonwealth Officials 
12 April 1945, British Commonwealth Meeting April 1945, 
Bound Volume National Archives. 
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post - war world, New Zealand had clearly transcended 
Dominion status. 
Within New Zealand, government departments were 
instructed 7 January 1946 to omit the official prefix in 
90 documents and statements. It was asserted that: 
In view of the developments of the Nations of the 
Commonwealth it is felt that 'Dominion of' is now an 
obsolete and confusing description, the retention of 
which may cause us some embarrassment in the conduct 
of our interests and affairs. 91 
However, this action was purely administrative and confined 
to official channels. There was no formal announcement of 
any change to the country's official title. 92 The government 
had no intention of creating constitutional controversy and 
provoking the ardently pro-British opposition. Instead, 
the prefix Dominion was discreetly removed from official 
usage and left to ~ither away , although it remained in 
certain formal instruments of administration like letters 
patent. 
The government's cautious and informal approach to 
the whole matter was shown by Fraser's statement to the 
House,4 July 1947: 
I noticed something in the press about changing 
the official title of our country, the Dominion of 
New Zealand. That matter has not come up as far as 
New Zealand is concerned .•• before anything of that 
nature is agreed to, the House will have ample 
opportunity of discussing it. 93 
In view of existing policy, this was a misleading statement 
and certainly Fraser did not raise the issue in parliament 
90,91Memorandum Prime Minister's Department (by 
Foss Shanahan) 7 January 1946,. EA 25/1/2. 
92 The Dominion of New Zealand was officially 
pronounced by royal proclamation 9 September 1907. 
93 NZPD 4 July 1947, Vol. 276, p.233. 
---- , 
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again. Even the British government was not officially 
informed of New Zealand's action. Rather than the norm of 
consultation, the High Commissioner in Wellington, 
Sir Patrick Duff, received leaked documents "by devious 
94 
channels". However, Britain was untroubled by this 
development: 
One has seen manifestations such as this in Canada 
and elsewhere and one cannot be surprised at New 
Zealand following suit. 95 
But in following suit, New Zealand acted quietly, even 
covertly. Once again, it seemed that the government found 
it easier to make changes in status than to admit to them. 
A further symbolic affirmation of New Zealand's 
full statehood within the Commonwealth was the removal of 
the Royal coat of arms from government documents and its 
replacement by New Zealand heraldry. The Government 
Printer was directed by the Prime Minister's Department, 
4 April 1946, that the New Zealand coat of arms (in use 
since 1911) be thereafter used on all government stationery 
d bl " " 96 an pu lcatlons. The New Zealand coat of arms with 
indigenous motifs surmounted by a royal lion and union jack 
thus provided an apt symbol of New Zealand's perceived 
position in the post-war Commonwealth. 
94sir Patrick Duff to Sir Eric Machtig, 13 April 1946, 
DO 35/1112 C255/1/1. 
95 Ibid • 
96 G.A. Wood,'The Former Dominion of New Zealand', p.6. 
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(1) The British Nationality and Status of 
Aliens (in New Zealand) Amendment Act 1946 
retains the royal coat of arms. 
(2) By 1948, the British Nationality and New 
Zealand Citizenship Act portrayed the New 
Zealand coat of arms. 
(3) A revised version of the New Zealand coat 
of arms was issued in 1956 and continues in 
use today. This gave further emphasis to 
New Zealand's independence by replacing the 
royal lion and union jack with St. Edward's 
Crown, thereby emphasising "the fact that 
Her Majesty is Queen of New Zealand". 
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In the period 1945- 50, New Zealand's long - established 
independent status was confirmed and e x tended. Full 
legislative sovereignty was obtained and an indigenous 
citizenship was legalised. While significant domestically, 
these developments were not meant to be viewed in isolation, 
but in the context of a united British Commonwealth. 
Adoption of the Statute of Westminster brought New Zealand 
into line with other Commonwealth members, as did the 
removal of the title Dominion. In turn, New Zealand 
citizenship was invoked in the interests of maintaining a 
common national status. New Zealand was increasingly aware 
of its own identity and self- determination, but chose to 
enjoy this in parallel with an intense commitment to the 
British Commonwealth. 
and interdependence. 
Here was the juncture of independence 
CHAPTER IV 
THE COMMONWEALTH TRANSFORMED: 
NEW ZEALAND'S ATTITUDE TO THE 
CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POST - WAR 
COMMONWEALTH 
The British Empire, I am happy to say, is in 
liquidation .. . But we now have the British 
Commonwealth, a far finer institution of free 
peoples co - operating together. 
Ormond Wilson NZPD,15 August 1947, 
---- Vol . 277, p.405. 
The belated adoption of the Statute of 
Westminster in 1947 gave New Zealand official parity 
11 8 
with the other Dominions, but in the wider Commonwealth 
context this achievement was an anachronism . New 
Zealand formally clarified i t s status within the 
Commonwealth only to find the Commonwealth itself under -
going a further transformation in the wake of the 
independence of the Indian subcontinent . The intimate 
European family of nations that New Zealand was so 
familiar with, was enlarged by the admission of three 
1 
new Asian nations - India, Pakistan and Ceylon . These 
countries proudly asserted their own cultural and political 
independence, precluding the notion of a " British" 
1India and Pakistan were formally declared 
independent 15 August 1947 and Ceylon on 4 Fe bruary 1948 . 
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Commonwealth . As th e Labour backbencher , Martyn Finlay , 
emphasised in 1949 : 
I somet i mes wonder how much people generally 
realise the Commonwealth has changed over the 
last few years . Before the war it consisted of 
seven self governing Dominions 2 ... It was 
predominantly wh i te, Christian and Occidental in 
character, culture and background . .. Look at 
the changes that have occurred •.• coloured people 
ou t number the whites about four to one . 3 
While the New Zealand government welcomed the 
fellowship of the new Asian Dominions, there was also 
concern about the effect on the Commonwealth's future 
viability . Could non - European nations fit into the 
established relationship? New Zealand's scepticism 
related to the Indian gover~ment's avowed policies of 
republicanism and non - alignment , which were regarded 
as incompatible with Commonwealth principles . Fraser 
remained devoted to the ideal of a royalist collective 
Commonwealth and was reluctant to accept any new 
constitutional formula reconciling an Indian republic 
with continued membership . It was feared that such 
developments would condemn the British Commonwealth to 
becoming the new "Holy Roman Empire,,4 - an impressive 
name that had lost formal substance . New Zealand thus 
played the role of the last bastion of the old 
Commonwealth, advocating a cohesive association cemented 
by common allegiance to the Crown . Republican membership 
2Finlay includes the United Kingdom, New Foundland 
and Eire in this number . 
3NZPQ , 12 July 1949 , Vol . 285, p . 326 . 
4 N. Mansergh , Survey of British Commonwealth 
Relations: Problems of Wartime Co - operation and Post - war 
Change 1939 - 1952 (London , 1958) p . 255 . 
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was ultimately accepted, but only with reluctance, in 
the interests of Commonwealth consensus . 
However, in practical terms , the acceptance of 
republicanism and non - alignmen t only made explicit what 
was implicit in the Commonwealth - a free association of 
independent states . The assertive independence of 
Canada and Suuth Africa had long shown that this was not 
a rigid association of binding commitments . Certainly , 
the removal of the precon d ition of allegiance to the 
Crown (though only initially applying to the special 
case of India) was a major innovation to the Balfour 
Declaration , but that in itself did not alter the basis 
of Commonwealth relations . India remained a Westminster -
style democracy, exchanging a governor - general for a 
non - executive president . The "'continuing conference of 
cabinets " - the essence of inter - Commonwealth relations -
thus remained unaltered . As Fraser himself declared in 
November 1948, New Zealand was "really a republic with 
5 the King as our head" . 
From New Zealand's perspective, the entry of 
India , Pakistan and Ceylon, did not alter its position 
in the Commonwealth . The government ensured that its 
con s t i tutional status was unchanged, while bi - lateral 
ties with the United Kingdom remained the principal 
determinant of Commonwealth -relations . Contact with 
Asian members was minimal, largely confined to intermittent 
conferences . New Zealand therefore consciously maintained 
a traditional Commonwealth outlook, even at the cost of 
5Fraser speaking in Belfast 23 November 1948 , 
reported The Dominion 24 November 1948 . 
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disregarding developments in the wider context . 
If the post - war Commonwealth was enlarged by 
Asian membership, the same period also saw Eire officially 
end its association with the declaration of a republic . 
This was seemingly ironic, though both cases were distinct . 
India expressly desired to retain membership and 
received inter- Commonwealth approval in 1949 before 
adopting a new constitution. By contrast, Eire's links 
with the ·Commonweal th had long been tenuous . The Dublin 
government had not taken part in ministerial conferences 
since 19326 , while an unofficial republican constitution 
had been in force since 1937. Irish leaders maintained 
that their country retained only external association with 
the British Commonwealth, through the use of the King's 
signature in diplomatic accreditation. Consequently, the 
Irish government's decision in 1948 to formally declare 
a republic and leave the Commonwealth resolved a major 
anomaly. However, the Irish Republic retained a special 
non-foreign status and New Zealand followed Commonwealth 
consensus by recognising this . In contrast to the 
hard - line policy towards India, Wellington showed a greater 
appreciation of political realities here. 
I. THE "NEW COMMONWEALTH" IN ASIA 
The New Zealand government viewed with interest 
the impact of Asian independence on the Commonwealth. 
Wellington welcomed a final solution to the protracted 
6ManSergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 
p . 299 . However, Irish officials did attend various 
meetings of Commonwealth officials between 1945 and 1949 . 
1
2
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question of India ' s self - dete r mination (notwithstand i ng 
an awareness of the immense problems of partition) and 
regarded the granting of independence within the 
Commonwealth as ideal . 7 However, the entry of India 
and Pakistan and later, Ceylon, into the " charmed circle " 
of the Dominions was also viewed with some trepidation. 
New Zealand greatly valued the intimacy of the existing 
Commonwealth . But this established and select group of 
" British" nations was now to · be joined by newly 
independent non - European states - an unprecedented 
development . Fraser was therefore cautious about future 
prospects : 
Just as it was felt in the past in almost every 
significant development of British Commonwealth 
relations , that risks were being taken, so on this 
occasion I hope that we are likely to be justified 
in our faith that the Commonwealth has the capacity 
to grow into a free association of self governing 
peoples of diverse colours and races . 8 
New Zealand officials were not under any 
misconceptions about the existing form of the Commonwealth . 
Frank Corner wrote in May 1947 that "most of the 
philosophising and speech - making about the Commonwealth 
is based on wish p ~ ojection , not on present actuality" . 9 
Members were primarily independent states committed to 
their own national interest . But, despite its loose 
structure, the Commonwealth maintained a distinctive 
solidarity, based on kinship and common outlook (French 
Canadians and Afrikaners notwithstanding) . The addition 
of non - European states seemed to threaten to weaken this 
7Minister of External Affairs to Secretary of 
S tat e for Do min ion ReI a t ion s, 26M ay 1 94 7, E A 2051 31 4, pt . 7 . 
8 Ibid • 
9'Dominion Status and Independence within the 
Commonwealth ', 19 May 1 947, EA 205/3/4 , pt . 7 . 
special relationship. Would Asian mem~e~s have: 
the mental and emotional outlook for sharing 
this very subtle and emotionally based 
relationship? .. True, the theory has always 
been that all the races and colours of the whole 
Empire are joined •.. in the project of an 
association of self-governing peoples ... But 
it is still only a project. 10 
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New Zealand necessarily had little identification with 
the Asian Commonwealth. While a Pacific country, New 
Zealand was avowedly "British", strongly linked 
ethnically, economically and emotionally to the United 
Kingdom. This special intimacy with the Mother Country 
was the basic feature of New Zealand's Commonwealth 
relationship. The importance of Asia was recognised, 
but only really in thenegative sense of , a potential 
threat, especially after the Japanese advance of 1941. 
Fear of the "eastern hordes" remained ingrained in the 
national psyche. In its isolation, New Zealand therefore 
consciously maintained a distinct British identity. 
Significant ties with India, Pakistan and Ceylon were 
not envisaged or desired. The official External Affairs 
Report for 1948 emphasised that the government had not 
found '. it possible to establish the same close 
consultative relationship with India or Pakistan as was 
11 
enjoyed with other Commonwealth governments. However, 
cordial (if not close) relations were desirable and 
External Affairs advised the government to foster goodwill 
as a small progressive country known for social reform 
and a sympathy for colonial ruled peoples (as shown by 
Fraser's chairmanship of the , Trusteeship Committee). 
10Ibid . 
11 Annual Report of Department of External Affairs 
1947-48 , AJHR,1948,A - 1, p.13. 
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The government was further advised to avoid supporting 
the less progressive colonial powers and to prevent any 
misunderstandings over New Zealand's restrictive non -
European immigration pOlicy . 12 
The issue of Asian immigration was, in fact, a 
major contention regarding the admittance of Asian 
nations as free and equal members of the Commonwealth . 
New Z e a I and and the 0 the r 1·1 w hit e Do min ion s " we r e 
concerned that the Indian government might use the 
common status of Commonwealth citizenship to challenge 
their restrictive immigration pOlicies . 13 In New Zealand, 
while there was no legislative ban on the entry of 
Asians, all non - European British subjects required special 
permits to enter the country . Only in Britain did all 
British subjects/Comnlonwealth citizens have equal right 
of entry . Asian immigration remained a sensitive issue 
in New Zealand and the gover ~ment (while not following 
as hard a line as Canberra's "White Australia Policy") 
was committed to maintaining the existing system . As 
Fraser emphasised to the British government 26 May 1947 : 
By accepting India as a full member of the 
Commonwealth, we do not include amongst our 
obligations that of giving favoured treatment 
in regard to immigration . 14 
While the New Zealand government was not 
prepared to treat the citizens of India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon in the same way as those of the older Dominions, 
Wellington still hoped that the new members would maintain 
the Commonwealth relationship . Their secession would 
12External Affairs Paper , 'Asian Affairs' , 1948 , 
EA 153/26/5, pt . 1 . 
13 J . G. Eayr~ In Defence of Canada : Peacemaking 
and Deterrence (Toronto , 1972~ p . 241 - 42 . 
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clearly damage the Commonwe a lth ' s st r ength and prestige . 
Fraser , therefore , strongly endorsed the merits of 
Commonwealth membership in a message to India's future 
leaders on 4 June 1947 : 
the people of the British Dominions do not regard 
dominion status as an imperfect kind of independence . 
On the contrary , it is independence with something 
added and not independence with something taken away . 
It carries with it membership of a free and powerful 
association ... but on e in which a way has been 
found for the practice of mutual confidence and 
co - operation in the full respect of the independence, 
sovereignty and individuality of each member . 15 
This statement aptly described New Zealand's complementary 
independent foreign policy and Commonwealth commitment . 
Fraser's enthusiasm, however, overlooked the fact that 
the Indian Nationalist movement had not struggled for 
independence to retain the symbolism of the continued 
sovereignty of the British monarch . Nevertheless, his 
statement was very well received in London and was given 
wide publicity . 
be most helpful 
Attlee telegraphed Fraser : "This will 
. .. and 16 is exactly what was needed . " 
The whole matter of Indian independence and the 
consequences for the Commonwealth was first officially 
raised in the New Zealand parliament in August 1947 , in 
relation to the Royal Titles Bill . The removal of 
- Emperor of India ' from the sovereign's titles necessitated 
14Minister of External Affairs to Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs , 26 May 1947, EA 205/3/4, pt . 7 . 
15Statement by Fraser, 4 June 1947, EA 205/3/4 , pt . 7 . 
16 Attlee to Fraser, 5 June 1947, EA 205/3/4, pt . 7 . 
Attlee also referred to Fraser's statement in the reading 
of the Indian Independence Bill , 10 July 1947 . Mansergh , 
Documents II p . 689 . 
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the assent of all dominion parliaments (as prescribed 
by the Statute of Westminster) . 17 Thus , once again, 
New Zealand leg i slated in the interests of Commonwealth 
consensus . In the resulting debate , Fraser re - emphasised 
the merits of independence within the Commonwealth and 
expressed the hope that India's association would be 
lasting . While praising the achievement of independence, 
Fraser also soberly reflected on the vast problems facing 
India and Pakistan; both the immediate trauma of 
partition and long term socio - economic development . 
Commonwealth membership, he argued, would help overcome 
h d . ff . . 18 t ese 1 lcultles. Some Labour back benchers were 
more effusive in their praise of recent developments . 
For example, Ormond Wilson (Member for Palmerston North) 
expressed pleasure that the British Empire . "is in 
liquidation ••. we now have the British Commonwealth, a 
far finer institution ... of free peoples co - operating 
19 together." 
Such comments were to the chagrin of the National 
opposition. While supporting the government's legislation, 
National speakers were decidedly less enthusiastic or 
sympathetic to developments in India. Doidge claimed that 
the endemic problems of race and religion would worsen 
under independence, and raised the spectre of immigration 
by postulating that India might use the Commonwealth to 
offload her surplus population, "which would swamp 
17Interestingly, New Zealand had hot yet adopted 
the Statute, but was covered · by the universal application 
of the preamble . 
18 NZPD ~ 15 August 1947, Vol . 277, pp . 389 - 91 . 
19 Ibid , p . 405 . 
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countries like Australia and New Zealand".20 In 
contrast to Fraser's hope that the new Dominions would 
maintain the Commonwealth link, Doidge quoted from 
The Statesman (18 July 1947) - "it is absurd to assume 
that either India or Pakistan regard Dominion status as 
anything more than an ingenious temporary constitutional 
device".21 The reality of National's thinking (and 
probably that of mainstream New Zealand) was shown in 
the comments of Tom Shand, the Member for Marlborough: 
The sit uation in India has developed to a state 
which I think we could only describe as a 
holocaust ••• we view with alarm the effects of 
the so - called liberties of people who are not 
ready to receive them . 22 
New Zealand's first formal contact with the new 
Asian members came at the Canberra Conference on the 
Japanese Peace Treaty, 26 August - 1 September 1947. As 
well as being the first major Commonwealth meeting held 
outside London since Ottawa in 1932, this was the first 
attended by independent India and Pakistan. Burma , in 
the throes of independence, was also represented - as 
a de facto dominion. Fraser was the only visiting premier 
present and he warmly welcomed the new delegations, 
paying tribute to Nehru and Jinnah for maintaining the 
Commonwealth link. 23 New Zealand hoped that early 
exposure to the frank and informal nature of such 
20 NZPD , 15 August 1947 V I 277 394 95 , o. ,pp. - . 
21 Ibid , p.395. 
22~ZPD, 29 August 1947, Vol. 277, pp.723 - 24. 
23Minutes of the first meeting of the Conference 
on the Japanese Peace Settlement, Canberra, 26 August 1947 
EA 102/9/24. 
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discussions would show th e viability of membership . 
The conference seemed to indicate optimism for the 
future; the New ' Zealand report noted the value of the 
contributio n s of th e Asian r epresentatives and the 
24 friendly atmosphere . 
But , despite Fraser ' s endorsement of Dominion 
status, the Indian government did not regard this as a 
p erm.anent arrangement . It was rather a "transitional 
25 formula" , accepted as the means of achieving immediate 
independence . After grappling with the initial problems 
of partition and consolidation , the Indian government 
could turn to the fine details of formulating a definite 
constitutional status . The Indian Constituent Assembly 
had already affirmed in December 1946 and January 1947 that 
this was to be the establishment of a "sovereign democratic 
republic" . Congress had long struggled in the aim of 
purna swaraj - complete independence ; this was clearly 
not fulfilled by remaining a dominion of the one- t i me 
king - emperor . As an ancient civilisation, India's dignity 
was seen to demand absolute domestic sovereignty . 
Fraser failed to appreciate this . 
However , a republic implied independence outside 
the Commonwealth . Common allegiance was the essential 
condition for membership and was enshrined in the Balfour 
Declaration and Statute of Westminster . Consequently , 
24External Affairs Report j The British Commonwealth 
Conference, Canberra EA 102/9/3 , pt . 1 . 
25M• Brecher, 'India's Decision to Remain in the 
Commonwealth' Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics, Vol . 12, No . 1 1974 , p . 62 . 
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Burma seceded from the Commonwealth on achieving 
independence as a republic in June 1947 . As Clement Attlee 
stated, "we do not desire to retain within the Commonwealth ... 
26 
any unwilling peoples" . Logically ~ an Indian government 
unwilling to recognise the sovereignty of the Crown (at 
least in some form) would also have to relinquish membership . 
There was, of course, the anomaly of Eire - an effective 
republic retaining Commonwealth association by recognising 
certain nominal prerogatives ' of the Crown in external 
relations - which Nehru had noted in 1946 . 27 But Eire 
was an exceptional case, a nebulous situation which the 
British government saw best to leave unresolved . 
Both New Delhi and London hoped that some way 
could be found for India to maintain the Commonwealth 
link, despite the obstacle of a commitment to a republican 
constitution . India's conciliatory stance related to 
various factors: goodwill resulting from the transfer of 
power; awareness that independence within the Commonwealth 
did not limit India's freedom of action; shared democratic 
values; a lack of military self- sufficiency; concern at 
instability in Asia; the fear of isolation; and concern 
that Pakistan's commitment to the Commonwealth would be 
to India's detriment should she secede . 28 The British 
government also had strong political, economic and 
strategic reasons for keeping India 'in', not the least, the 
26 20 December 1946, quoted Mansergh, Survey of 
British Commonwealth Affairs,pp . 244- 45 . 
27Addressing the Constituent Assembly 13 December 1946 
Nehru stated "even in the British Commonwealth of Nations 
today Eire is a republic ... so it is a conceivable thing . " 
28 Brecher, p . 71 . 
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desire to maintain the Commonwealth's (and Britain's) 
strength and prestige . Thus , as early as May 1947, the 
Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth relations had been 
formed under Attlee's chairmanship, to explore ways of 
allowing countries to retain Commonwealth membership 
"without excessive uniformity in their internal 
: t . ,,29 constltu lons • This was an unenviably difficult task 
as a Commonwealth not centred around the monarchy seemed 
unthinkable, while the Indian government was adamant 
that it would only accept full and equal membership; not 
an Irish style associate status . India was thus the 
test case for the Commonwealth's future evolution. 
The prospect of the issue of future constitutional 
developments being raised at the 1948 Prime Ministers' 
conference, prompted the British government to consult 
with the Old Dominions . Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to 
the British Cabinet, was subsequently despatched as a 
special emissary to Wellington, Canberra and Ottawa in 
August and September 1948. The New Zealand government 
suggested that the other member nations be included, but 
Britain affirmed its desire for intimate discussions with 
30 
established partners . This suggested an already 
practical division of Commonwealth members into inner and 
outer circles. In discussions with Fraser (31 August -
1 September), Brook emphasised that India was not prepared 
29 J • W. Wheeler - Bennett, King George VI: His Life 
and Reign (London, 1958), p . 721 . 
30sir Patrick Duff to ' Fraser, 6 August 1948 , 
EA 59/3/344, pt.1 . 
13 2 
to maintain the doctrine of allegiance and that the 
constituent assembly was already drawing up a republican 
constitution . The Attlee administration was anxious to 
accommodate India , but this posed the problem of finding 
31 
an acceptable new constitutional arrangement . 
Brook emphasised that any such arrangement 
required the maintenance of some tie with the Crown - the 
essential lowest common denominator of membership . This 
had both sentimental and practical purposes . As Brook 
declared, without such a minimum link it would be 
difficult to justify the special Commonwealth 
relationship to outsiders . A possible solution was to 
follow the Irish model with the King retaining a nominal 
role in diplomatic relations or , alternatively, the 
Indian president could act as the King's delegated 
representative . But it was unclear if the Indian 
government would accept such a compromise and Fraser was 
. I I h' t . 32 not partlcu ar y ent USlas IC . Here was the contradictory 
dilemma of wanting to maintain full Commonwealth membership 
while not weakening the structure . Brook openly admitted 
that a ny new formula "would be so feeble and watered 
d . 33 own as to be meanIngless" . Fraser was adamant that he 
could not support any action affecting the existing 
Commonwealth relationship; any changes would not be at the 
expense of New Zealand's cherished ties with the Crown and 
the Mother Country . 
31Notes on discussion in Prime Minister's office , 
31 August 1948 , EA 59/3/344, . pt . l . 
32Notes on discussion in Prime Minister's office , 
1 September 1948 , EA 59/3/344 , pt . l . 
33 Ibid , 31 August 1948 . 
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Despite the British government ' s commitment to 
a united Commonwealth , Brook also highlighted the existence 
of a distinct division in membership . On one hand , he 
presented the close relationship of the United Kingdom , 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand - the O ld Dominions . 
These were nations of primarily British descent who 
consulted and co - operated with complete confidence . Then 
there was the "outer circle" comprising the new Asian 
nations and South Africa , whose newly elected Nationalist 
government was decidedly cool towards the Commonwealth . 
In response, Fraser emphasised his opposition to any 
34 
concept of a "two tiered" Commonwealth; this was seen 
as unviable and counter - productive . Yet, in practice , an 
inner and outer circle was already evident as the confidential 
negotiations showed . Also , by asserting that New Zealand, 
Australia and Canada would not accept any change in their 
Commonwealth relationship , Fraser himself showed a 
distinction amongst members . 
The London Prime Ministers' Meeting of October 1948 
did, in fact, give the appearance of a united association, 
although a new epoch in the Commonwealth's development 
was evident . The leaders of India , Pakistan and Ceylon 
were now present at the highest level of consultation as 
co - equals . Pakistani Prime Minister , Liaquat Ali Khan , 
aptly described how the Commonwealth's "complexion had 
changed", it was now an association of "free nations who 
believe in the same way of life and in the same democracy . 
To my mind , these ideas are even stronger than racial 
34 Ibid . 
t " ,,35 leS e Arguably, this also extended to common 
1 34 
allegiance . Fraser endorsed the enlarged Commonwealth, 
hoping it would playa major role in fostering inter -
36 
national harmony. New Zealand consciously strove at the 
conference to create a good impression among the Asian 
nations (External Affairs briefs had urged the government 
to make use of the opportunity) . 37 Fraser, therefore, 
paid tribute to "peoples who had for so long been 
struggling to achieve their independent destinY",38 and 
criticised Dutch policy in Indonesia . 39 However, New 
Zealand's focus remained essentially European and suspicion 
of Asia continued to permeate . External Affairs had thus 
advised that: "if India comes forward with Nehru's oft -
repeated remark that Australia and New Zealand are part 
40 
of Asia, you might set the geographers to work." 
To ensure a harmonious meeting, it was tacitly 
agreed to leave the contentious issue of India's future 
constitutional status off the agenda a Discussions were 
concentrated on the wider questions of finance, defence 
and international relations . This would, hopefully, 
convince the new members of the practical value and benefits 
of Commonwealth membership . An External Affairs report 
before the meeting suggested that there should be: 
35 Quo ted Man s erg h, Sur v e y 0 f B r i tis h Com m 0 n we a 1 t h 
Affairs, p . 250 . 
36 pMM (48) Minutes of first meeting , 10 October 1948 , 
EA 153/26/4, pt . 1 . 
37External Affairs Paper , ' ·Asian Relations~ 1948 , 
EA 153/26/5 , pt . 1 . 
38 pMM (48) Minutes of 15th meeting , 22 October 1948 , 
EA 153/26/4, pt . 1 . 
39 pMM (48) Minutes of 4th meeting , 12 October 1948 , i bid . 
40Notes on Issues Likely to Arise a t 1948 P . M. 's 
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a real attempt made to bring the new Dominions 
within this inner circle by the development of 
methods of consultation which will give them 
assurance that they are trusted and accepted as 
equals . Co- operation will increase as confidence 
increases . 41 
At the conference, Fraser (clearly speaking to the new 
Dominions) emphasised the advantages of consultation , 
allowing members to freely exchange views and air 
differences "without fear of denunciations".42 
Certainly, some of India's policies were in 
sharp contrast to New Zealand's . For example, while 
denouncing Soviet aggression, Nehru strongly opposed any 
unitary defence policy based on confrontation with the 
Soviet Union . Instead , he supported longer term 
objectives of decreasing international tension and 
encouraging peaceful relations . 43 This was contrasted by 
Fraser's cold war ~ advocacy of Commonwealth unity in 
44 defence. Widening differences in members' perception 
of the Commonwealth were thus apparent . While New Zealand 
regarded this with concern, Fraser was still impressed by 
the frien d ly and co - operative attitude of the Asian 
. " 45 F h' leaders, whlch he saw as "qulte genulne" . rom t lS 
optimistic start, he hoped it would be possible "to 
transform the spirit of the meeting into action and 
to find some form of words which will assist the Indians 
46 to remain within the Commonwealth . " 
meeting, 27 May 1948 - for A. D. MCIntosh , EA 153/26/1, pt . l . 
41External Affairs Memorandum , 'Constitutional 
Questions' , 12 October 1948, EA 207/4/2/1, pt . 6 . 
42Notes on Fraser's Opening Speech, P . M. 's Conference , 
1948, EA 153/26/1, pt . 1 . 
43 pMM (48) Minutes of 10th meeting , 19 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt . l . 
44pMM (48) Minutes of 11th meeting, 20 October 1948, 
i b id . 
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Back in New Zealand , the National opposition 
viewed certain developments at the Prime Ministers' 
Meeting with alarm . Sidney Holland strongly protested 
against the use of the word " Commonwealth" in official 
communiques rather than the traditional "British 
47 Commonwealth" . In fact, a secret communique released in 
London had recommended that, while no formal change was 
intended, it would be desirable in practice to describe 
the Commonwealth of Nations without the prefix " British" . 48 
But such a change in nomenclature was seen to offend the 
sentiments of a loyal ' British people. This was a 
cherished term of identity and Holland categorically 
refused to drop it . Holland also attacked, by implication, 
the new Asian membership, expressing concern about 
"breaking up the Empire and dividing it into small, 
. d d d . ,,49 In epen ent an separate natlons • A looser multi -
cultural Commonwealth clearly had no appeal to a party 
standing "true blue for a solid, loyal, united British 
Empire .•• bound by ties of blood, of tradition, of history 
50 
and language". Fraser, while more sympathetic to recent 
45 Frase r to Nash , 23 October 1948, EA 153/26/1, pt . 1 . 
46 Ibid . 
47EVening Post , 27 October 1948 . 
4~The Commonwealth Relationship - Statement of 
General principles', London, 15 October 1948, EA 205/3/4, pt.9 . 
49,50Holland, quoted Evening Post, 27 October 1948 . 
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changes, was equally committed to a " British Commonwealth ". 
He replied from London that New Zealand ' s position : 
as a British nation of the Commonwealth will be 
in no way affected, whatever designation may be 
used to describe the future relationship of the 
nations which at present form the British 
Commonwealth . 51 
Despite the Prime Ministers' deliberate 
avoidance of the question of India's constitutional status 
(putting off the inevitable) , this remained an underlying 
factor and the subject of much informal discussion . To 
clarify the situation , immediately after the conference , 
Nehru, in consultation with Sir Stafford Cripps (a key 
advocate of India in the Attlee government), issued a 
ten point memorandum (later reduced to eight points) 
outlining India's proposals for continued Commonwealth 
b h · 52 mem ers lp . On becoming a republic , Nehru declared, 
India would continue Commonwealth membership on the basis 
of the reciprocal common status of Commonwealth citizenship 
and would not treat Commonwealth countries as foreign 
states . India was also prepared to acknowledge the King 
as the honorary "first citizen of the Commonwealth" and 
"the fountain of honour" . 
These proposals sparked further inter - Commonwealth 
discussions . During the United Nations fourth General 
Assembly in Paris, November 1948, Fraser, Evatt and the 
new Canadian Secretary of External Affairs, Lester Pearson, 
51Domlnion, 29 October 1948 . 
52pandit Nehru's '10 Points', 28 October 1948 
EA 205/3/4, pt . 9; Nehru's '8 · Points' , 11 December 1948 
EA 205/3/4, pt . 10 - note this made no reference to the 
King at all and was even less acceptable than the first 
memorandum . 
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met with British leaders to d i scuss the issue (the 
concurrent problem of Eire was also considered) . Thi s 
was a further example of the " inner circle " at work . 
Fraser expressed his desire to accommodate India but not 
at the cost of altering the existing association . Complex 
constitutional problems were involved and , if insurmountable, 
Fraser felt it would be better for India to gradually 
disassociate itself . 53 The British Law Office had 
reported that Nehru's proposals were insufficient to 
maintain India's Commonwealth membership . The meeting 
agreed, there had to be something more concrete than the 
nominal linkages of common citizenship (this had little 
practical meaning as the Dominions' restrictive 
immigration policies, in effect, denied mutual citizenship 
rights to Asians) and some vague honorific title for the 
King . 54 Consequently, the leaders informed the Indian 
government that Nehru's formula was unsatisfactory , 
urging the retention of some link with the monarchy . The 
Crown, it was agreed, remained the only possible basis for 
continued legal membership of the Commonwealth . Further, 
the Dominion ministers saw it as unlikely that they could 
convince their parliaments and citizens to accept a 
Commonwealth not based around the Crown . It was, therefore, 
suggested that India should at the minimum use the Irish 
formula of the King appointing diplomatic missions by 
. . d 55 delegation to the Indlan presl ent . The Commonwealth 
53Discussions Between Commonwealth Ministers 
concerning Ireland and India ; 14 November 1948 , EA 151/1/1, 
pt . 3 . 
54 . P ' t M . . t f E t I N. Z . Delegatlon , arlS 0 lnlS ry 0 x erna 
Affairs, 21 November 1948 , EA 207/4/2/1, pt . 6 . 
55 N. Z . Delegation , Paris to Ministry of External 
Affairs , 21 November 1948 , EA 207/4/2/1, pt . 6 . 
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could clearly be flexible, but there had to be face -
saving for the Crown to legally justify the relationship . 
Despite legal complexities, . the Indian 
government emphasised that this was primarily a political 
issue needing a practical, realistic resolve . 56 Events 
vindicated this view . On December ~18 , in the Jaipur 
Resolution, Nehru officially secured Congress' approval 
of an Indian republic's continued Commonwealth membership, 
in the interests of "the commonweal and the promotion of 
world peace" . It was also emphasised that India would 
accept no military or political commitments impeding her 
"freedom of action and independence" . 57 This policy 
clearly was the antithesis of New Zealand's (or, indeed, 
Britain's) view of the Commonwealth . Nevertheless, the 
Attlee government's ·desire to retain India's membership 
finally overrode legalism and conservatism . 58 The benefits 
of India to staying in f ' were seen to strongly outweigh the 
disadvantages . Britain's large commercial , communication 
and strategic interests would clearly be affected if 
New Delhi's expressed wish to continue the Commonwealth· 
relationship was rebuffed . Just as important was the 
desire to maintain : 
in the eyes of the world ..• the size and power of 
the Commonwealth .•. Confidence in the future of 
the Commonwealth might be shaken if India followed 
the path chosen by Burma and Eire . Conversely, the 
strength and prestige of the Commonwealth would be 
greatly enhanced if the whole of the Indian 
sub - continent, after ~ei~g freed ~rom 'British rule', 59 
elected .• . to throw In Its lot wIth the Commonwealth . 
56Aide Memoire to British government, 11 December 1948 , 
quoted J . G. Eayrs In Defence of Canada, p . 240 . 
57The Jaipur Resolution , 18 December 1948 , 
EA 205/3/4 , pt . IO . 
58 W. O. McIntyre , ' Peter Fraser's Commonwealth' , 
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Appreciation of these factors was decisive in the 
British cabinet's agreement 3 March 1949, that a 
republican India, owing no allegiance to th~ Crown, 
60 
should be accommodated within the Commonwealth's structure . 
London now had to gain the consensus of the rest 
of the Commonwealth in this matter . Even before cabinet's 
formal approval, At.tlee had informed Fraser that the 
existing basis of the Commonwealth would likely have to 
be modified to accommodate Ihdia . 61 As this was an issue 
of fundamental concern to all Commonwealth members, 
Attlee considered a special Prime Ministers' Meeting, to 
reach a uniform agreement as essential . Obviously , it 
was inconvenient to convene a further meeting so soon 
after the previous one (where the problem had been put 
aside), but the imminent adoption of a new Indian 
constitution and a greater understanding of the issues 
involved necessitated a solution to the unresolved problem . 
Once again, British emissaries were despatched for 
preliminary consultation with Commonwealth governments . 
Lord Listowel, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 
was sent to Australia and New Zealand - the two most 
New Zealand in World Affairs, Vol. 1 (Wellington, 1977) -
emphasises the division between the hard line of the Law and 
Foreign Offices and the conciliatory policy of the 
Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices . 
59 Commonwealth Relations Office Paper , 'Irldia's 
Future Relations with the Commonwealth', 28 February 1949, 
EA 205/3/4, pt.10 . 
60 Wheeler - Bennett, p . 724 . 
61 Attlee to Fraser, 28 February 1949 , EA 153/27/1, 
pt . 1 . 
141 
conservative Commonwealth count r ies . Lon d on did not 
want the delicate issue of the Crown's position to become 
the subject of public controversy and reque~ted Listowel's 
visit receive no publicity . 52 Inevitably , press 
speculation was aroused, though many reports wrongly 
interpreted the strict secrecy as reflecting military 
discussions on Communist penetration in Asia . 53 
Fraser and the External Affairs Department, in 
their discussions with Listowel , took a hard line against 
reconciling an Indian republic - that was not prepared to 
give the Crown even a nominal role in external relations -
with continued Commonwealth membership . This intransigence 
derived from two factors . Firstly , there was New Zealand's 
entrenched loyalty to the monarchy . Fraser emphasised 
that any change to the King's role in the wider Commonwealth 
was "a big revolution for our people and particularly the 
people of New Zealand, whose devotion to the Crown was 
traditional and real" . 54 Any new formula to replace the 
Balfour Declaration, it was argued, would only denigrate 
the monarchy , encourage more republics and make the 
Commonwealth a less than tangible association - "cheapening 
the link and weakening the bond" . 55 McIntosh went as far 
as concluding that the existing monarchic Commonwealth 
52 H. Smedley to A. R. McIntosh, 8 March 1949, 
EA 59/3/381, pt . l . 
53 D . . omlnlon , 15 March 1949 . 
54second meeting between Fraser and Listowel, 
22 March 1949 , EA 205/3/4, pt . lO . 
55First meeting between Fraser and Listowel , 
21 March 1949, Ibid . 
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derived from a dist i nct Eu r opean outlook of common 
traditions and institutions and that the new Asian 
b d . . b 1 . h h . 66 mem ers seeme 1ncompat1 e W1t t 1S structure . In 
any case, New Zealan d was adamant that its loyalty to 
the sovereign would not change . 
Secondly (and more importantly) Fraser was 
concerned that Nehru seemed to be espousing a policy 
of non - alignment, rather than the traditional commitment 
to Commonwealth colle6tive security . Fraser directly 
asked Listowel : 
What is India's contribution to the Commonwealth 
to be? ••• What are the other countries of the 
Commonwealth to get in return if they alter the 
Commonwealth as an association to admit India as 
a republic?67 
It was all very well, Fraser exclaimed, for Nehru to 
talk in the Jaipur Resolution of promoting world peace 
through Commonwealth membership, but it appeared this 
co - operation did not extend to war . Such a stance was 
regarded as wholly incompatible with the security needs 
of the post - war era . To Fraser, India was retaining 
the benefits of membership without providing a tangible 
contribution . Surely, a minimum defence commitment was 
required, otherwise the prospect was a "flabby Commonwealth" 
68 
reduced to"nebulous goodwill and endless conferences" . 
McIntosh suggested it would be more satisfa~tory to exclude 
India while retaining some form of treaty relationship : 
66Meeting in McIntosh's office, 22 March 1949 , 
EA 59/3/381 , pt . 1 . 
67second meeting between Fraser and Listowe~ , op . cit . 
68 Ibid • 
"only then would th e re be any assurance of unity and 
confidence in Commonwealth policy" . 69 
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However , this perception of the Commonwealth was 
unduly narrow and ignored practical reality . The 
Commonwealth had evolved as a free association of 
consultation and co - operation , rather than a military 
alliance of distinct obligations ~ Canada's action as 
early as 1922 in the Chanak crisis and the South African 
parliament's narrow majority in declaring war in 1939 had 
long confirmed this . Nehru's policy, while more explicit 
and strident , only followed what was previously implicit . 
It seemed that the New Zealand government ' s dedication to 
the Mother Country and mounting cold war tension roused 
Fraser into giving the Commonwealth qualities it did not, 
in fact , possess . New Zealand's commitment to 'imperial 
defence was not synonomous with the reality of the wider 
Commonwealth . 
While appreciating the United Kingdom's special 
interests in conciliating India, the New Zealand government 
was concerned that the Commonwealth it knew would be 
irrevocably altered, ' both in its emotional and practical 
importance . External Affairs reports in preparation for 
the Prime Ministers' Meeting reiterated an adamant stance : 
New Zealand's relations with the Crown would not change; 
the government stood by the earlier invitation that India 
retain Dominion status; and that the various ingenious 
devices to provide a link between the Crown and India were 
69 . . Meetlng ln McIntosh's office , 22 March 1949 , 
EA 59/3/381, pt . l . 
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70 
unacceptable . New Zealand's instincts were to say 
"the Commonwealth has meant this and you mean something 
quite different . " Certainly, a"Kingless Commonwealth" 
with less substance than the western Union or Atlantic 
Pact would not "stir any responsive chord in the average 
71 New Zealander's breast" . However, it was recognised 
that Britain was determined to keep India in the 
Commonwealth : 
Any other result will appear to her as a serious 
diminution of her own position as a great power ... 
the Indian connection represents for her an immense 
moral capital, the compensation payment for 
empire . 72 
If the wider Commonwealth association was to 
become looser, New Zealand was determined to maintain 
bi - Iateral ties with established Commonwealth partners . 
This was seen to involve the "strengthening and even 
formalisation of ties with , at any rate, Britain and 
Australia" . 73 There was concern that by conciliating the 
Asian members, Britain was neglecting the "special community 
of interest between the 'British Dominions' which is implicit 
74 in New Zealand thought concerning the Commonwealth" . 
Thus, despite Fraser's past criticism of a "two tier 
Commonwealth", New Zealand was already operating in the 
"inner circle" and wanted to strengthen it in the face of 
an enlarged multi - cultural association . Essentially, 
New Zealand was doing nothing new; a special relationship 
with Britain was the essence of its Commonwealth 
relationship . Despite calls for greater contacts between 
the Dominions , 75 New Zealand had never had particularly 
close ties with Canada or South Africa and even less cause 
70~ d' 
'In la and the Commonwealth'~ 4 April 1949 , 
EA 205/3/4, pt . 10 . 
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for significant contacts with India or Pakistan . Even 
the close co - operation with Australia had really only 
developed during the war. New Zealand could, therefore, 
de - emphasise the new developments and stress i ts own 
maintenance of the status quo. The Commonwealth might 
change but New Zealand did not have to follow suit. 
Before the 1949 meeting, the British and Indian 
governments had already tacitly agreed on India's 
continued membership, and an understanding had been 
reached that India would be prepared to recognise the King 
as the Head of the Commonwealth, thereby providing a 
. I I' k 76 nomlna In . With this ground work between the two 
main parties done, the technical detail of formalising 
India's new relationship with the Commonwealth - in 
effect redefining the association - was left to the 
official meeting . Fraser viewed the event with the 
greatest importance: 
The future of the British Commonwealth and Empire 
will, in a large measure, be determined during one 
momentous week ••• Every effort will be made to 
retain India without any weakening of the ties 
which bind the Commonwealth nations. 77 
The National opposition voiced concern about the meeting's 
intention. Doidge, once again playing the role of arch -
imperialist, was particularly strident: "The great and 
71,72 Ibid • 
73,74'India and the Commonwealth' , 4 April 1949, 
EA 205/3/4, pt . IO. 
75commonwealth Relations Office Memorandum , The 
Commonwealth Relationship, 28 February 1949, EA 151/1/1, pt . 3 . 
76 The Under Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, 
Patrick Gordon Walker, was sent as Attlee's emissary to 
New Delhi, the same time as Lord Listowel was in Australasia 
and secured this understanding . 
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glorious British Empire took c e nturies to build . A 
small group of men , three of them socialists ... are 
go ing t d t . th f t f th E · 78 o e ermlne e u ure 0 e mplre" . Do id ge 
warned against accepting republican membership: "it 
would never be tolerated by the people of this Dominion , 
with us •.• loyalty to the Crown is almost a religion" . 79 
Fraser went to the Prime Ministers' Meeting 
prepared to accep t Commonwealth consensus, but was equally 
committed to maintaining New Zealand's established 
relationship . Reconciling Indian republicanism was a 
technical matter but centred on the sensitive area of the 
role of the monarchy . Fraser maintained grave doubts 
about removing the precondition of common allegiance 
and emphasised that constitutional changes to 
accommodate India would have no effect on New Zealand's 
80 
monarchical status . He proudly declared to the meeting 
that · his country was built as "an extension of the 
homeland" and that loyalty to the Crown had only intensified 
h h . I· d d 81 t roug natlona ln epen ence. However , New Zealand's 
emphasis on the monarchy as the Commonwealth's linchpin 
was not supported by other members . The new Nationalist 
Prime Minister of South Africa, Daniel Malan (whose party 
was committed to establishing a republic) maintained that 
the relaxation of common allegiance was a natural 
77Fraser's Press Statement , 13 April 1949 , 
EA 153/27/1, pt . l . 
78,79 0 .. omlnlon, 20 April 1949 . 
80 pMM (49) Minutes of ·second meeting, 25 April 1949 , 
EA 153/27/4, pt . l . 
81pMM (49) Minutes of first meeting , 22 April 1949 , 
EA 153/27/4, pt . 1 . 
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consequence of growing national consciousness . In 
British/Afrikaner divided South Africa , he argued, the 
C t . 1 . f· f 82 r own was no necessarl_ya unl Ylng orce . · New 
Zealand's perception of the Commonwealth was clearly 
being increasingly challenged . 
The drafting of a declaration acceptable to all 
members was a difficult task . 83 The differing perceptions 
of the Commonwealth by the various states ensured 
di s agreement over wording and terminology . Compromise 
was , therefore , necessary, as Fraser admitted "we all 
have to yield something to get an agreed declaration" . 84 
In New Zealand's case this involved accepting a looser 
association of states no longer united by common 
allegiance (though confined to the special case of India) . 
The finally agreed formula, the so - called London 
De cIa rat ion ,of f i cia 11 y pre sen ted 0 n 27 Apr iI , com p r is e d 
of four operative paragraphs . The first stated the 
existing Commonwealth relationship; the second conveyed 
India's decision to adopt a republican constitution 
while retaining full membership; the third expressed 
the other members' recognition of India's action and their 
maintenance of the status quo; and the fourth stated 
85 the members' continued unity of purpose . Initially, 
Attlee had proposed two declarations, one for India and 
another for the rest . But by the second meeting it was 
82 Ibid • 
83Fraser emphasised this in a telegram to Nash 
25 April 1949 , EA 153/27/3 . 
84 Fraser to Nash , 26 April 1949 , EA 153/27/3 . 
85 Approved Text of Final Communiqu~ PMM (49) 
26 April 1949 , EA 153/27/1 , pt . l . 
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resolved to formulate a single declaration , giving 
greater emphasis to Commonwealth solidarity . 
Th e London Declaration was able to reconcile 
a republican India with an otherwise monarchic 
Commonwealth by India's acceptance of the Crown as the 
Head of the Commonwealth and "the symbol of the free 
association" of member states . This titular role was, 
in fact, mentioned in the Statute of Westminster . 86 
While not prepared to maintain the Crown's nominal 
sovereignty in internal or external affairs, India could 
87 
accept the King's position as patron of the Commonwealth . 
This was an ambiguous title placating both royalist and 
republican sentiment. South African Prime Minister Malan 
protested its possible implication of a "»super state" , 
88 
rather than the established divisibility of the Crown . 
This impasse was resolved by the complex wording of the 
final declaration, expressing India's : 
acceptance of the King as the symbol of the free 
association of its (i . e . the Commonwealth's) 
independent member nations and as such the Head 
of the Commonwealth. 
This emphasised that the title was a derivative honour 
and not a constitutional position , and was confirmed by 
f 'd . I' 89 a con l entla mlnute . India's linkage was looser than 
New Zealand and other Commonwealth governments had been 
86 22 G V 4 eo . ,c .• 
87 pMM (49) Minutes of second meeting, 25 April 1949 , 
EA 153/27/4 , pt . l . 
88 Ibid • 
89" ... the designation of the King as Head of the 
Commonwealth does not connote any change in the constitutional 
relations existing between members and , in particular, does 
not imply that the King discharges any constitutional function 
by virtue of that Headship" , EA 153/27/5 . 
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previously p r epared to accept . But it was a satisfactory 
compromise , maintaining the appearance of a cohesive 
Commonwealth linked by the Crown . 
Significantly, the declaration made no reference 
to the common status of Commonwealth citizenship (which 
Nehru had previously advocated as anacceptable link) . 
Other memb9rs (including New Zealand) had vetoed the 
exchange of mutual citizenship rights with non - European 
India as an unsuitable formula . Instead , a further 
confidential minute attached to the London Declaration , 
reiterated that member nations did not regard themselves 
as foreign in relation to each other and that existing 
preferential treatment for citizens and trade would 
continue , although each government was free to determine 
the 90 extent of such preferences . 
The acceptance of a republic within the 
Commonwealth was specifically confined to India, with the 
common allegiance of the other members unaltered . However, 
despite attempts to argue otherwise, this was a decisive 
innovation - common allegiance was no longer the essential 
test for membership . Here was a substantial advance 
from the anomalous situation with Eire . India's example 
obviously set a precedent for similar action by other 
nations . Pakistani Prime Minister , Liaquat Ali Khan , thus 
raised the issue that in the future other members could 
desire to adopt republican constitutions (as Pakistan 
did in 1955) . Would they , he asked , be able to retain 
90confidential Interpretative Minutes, 26 April 1949 , 
EA 153/27/5 
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Commonwealth memberShip?91 The meeting was reluctant 
to admit this, but it was logically assumed that other 
nations would be given similar treatment as India . 92 
This understanding was incorporated into a further 
confidential minute - these appendages, in fact, told 
more about the meeting than the bland official 
declaration . Fraser certainly hoped that the future 
would not see a multiplicity of republican members . 
But subsequent decolonisation in the 1950's and 1960's 
ensured that India could not remain the special exception . 
While Fraser was forced to accept a Commonwealth 
no longer uniformly linked by common allegiance, he 
remained committed to a "basic unity of outlook and 
underlying inclination to help each other in all possible 
ways and circumstances" . 93 In the past , the inherent 
viability of the Commonwealth had been shown by the 
mutual willingness to co - operate militarily . In the 
existing unstable international climate, Fraser saw this 
understanding as crucial . He therefore expressly asked 
his fellow prime ministers if the Commonwealth would in 
the future still "stand together in an emergency in 
support of a just cause?,,94 This was the litmus test for 
a practical and effective association . Interestingly , 
Fraser was supported here by Pakistan (a strategically 
vulnerable nation) in calling for an assurance of mutual 
assistance . 95 By contrast, Nehru was adamant that the 
91pMM (49) Minutes of 3rd meeting , 25 April 1949 , 
EA 153/27/4 , pt . l . 
92pMM (49) Minutes of 4th meeting , 26 April 1949 , 
EA 153/27/4 , pt . l . 
93 pMM (49) Minutes of 3rd meeting , 25 April 1949 , 
EA 153/27/4 , pt . l . 
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Commonwealth (as defin ed by the Statute of Westminster) 
was a free association of sovereign states requiring no 
specific commitments . Rather than negative defence 
co - operation, the Indian government was only prepared 
to engage in peaceful and constructive activities . 
Nehru criticised the notion of a Commonwealth defence 
bloc, advocating instead policies for defueling 
international tensions and fostering peace . He pointed 
to the situation in Asia, where the spread of Communism 
was largely a consequence of poverty and . under - development 
and would not be countered by armed force . 96 
Consequently, Nehru insisted on altering the 
declaration's statement on Commonwealth objectives . 
Rather than affirm a commitment to "peace, security and 
progress", Nehru succeeded in replacing the military 
connotations of "security" with "liberty" . 97 Nehru's 
perception of the Commonwealth as a looser association 
was clearly the antithesis of Fraser's organic brotherhood . 
However, the former view was the way of the future . 
As Nehru emphasised when submitting the London Declaration 
to the Constituent Assembly for ratification , 16 May 1949 : 
Apart from certain friendly approaches to one 
another ••• there is hardly any obligation in 
the nature of commitments . 98 
While Nehru arguably only made explicit what was evident 
in the Commonwealth relationship , New Zealand was not 
94 pMM (49) Minutes of 6th meeting , 27 April 1949, i bid . 
95 Ibid • 
96 Ibid • 
97 Approved text of final communique PMM (49) 
26 April 1949 , EA 153/27/4 , pt . l . 
98 Mansergh , Documents II , p . 848 . 
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pleased to see its view of the Commonwealth rebuked in 
the wider context . Fraser and Nehru thus represented the 
two poles of the post - war Commonwealth - the loyal British 
Dominion and the emergent Asian power - although their 
apparent mutual admiration helped smooth over their sharp 
policy differences . 99 
Fraser's official statement at the conclusion of 
the conference remained consistent with New Zealand's 
conservative line: "we would have preferred to continue 
to accept the ties and form of association existing at 
present" . Nevertheless, Fraser recognised the practical 
reality that the Commonwealth : 
is not and never has been a rigid structure based 
on statutes and treaties . It is, in fact, a free 
association based on common interests, common 
understandings and subject to growth and change ... 
Just as the Statute of Westminster in 1931 registered 
changes that have occurred , so it would be true to 
say does the declaration of 1949 describe the status 
of the Commonwealth at the present time . 100 
New Zealand could take comfort that its own allegiance 
to the Crown was unchanged and that the declaration 
represented the maximum agreement possible . 
The 1949 settlement has been described as "almost 
h . I" f . " 101 . d f h metap YSlca In ltS re lnement, eVl ence 0 t e 
Commonwealth's remarkable ability for evolution and 
compromise . A later comment in the New Zealand parliament 
described the settlement as: 
99 McIntyre , 'Peter Fraser's Commonwealth', pp . 87- 88 . 
Martyn Finlay also described "the strong bond of sympathy 
that exists between him (Fraser) and Mr Nehru" . J;J ZP...Q. , 
12 July 1949, Vol . 285, p . 326 . Allegations of a close 
personal friendship would , however , appear to be exaggerated . 
100 Fraser's Press statement forwarded to Ministry of 
External Affairs 27 April for release 28 April 1949 , 
EA 151/1/1 , pt . 3 . 
101 Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, p . 252 . 
almost Gilbert and Sullivan in character . . 
Although the communique and statement do seem 
to be illogical, they enable a way to be found 
out of a difficult situation. 102 
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Illogical means were meant to achieve practical ends -
retaining India's membership . Certainly, acceptance of 
republican membership was a realistic move for an association 
where equality and self- determination (tempered by 
consultation and co - operation) were the practical features . 
The Commonwealth proved it could successfully adapt from 
a narrow European base and that multi - cultural membership 
was not a short term expedient. The cost, however, was 
a weakening of the symbolic and practical links that New 
Zealand held dear - and adamantly maintained on its own 
103 terms . 
The ~nlarged Commonwealth inevitably complicated 
relationships . The New Zealand government was particularly 
embarrassed when inter-Commonwealth disputes between 
India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and between India and 
South Africa over racial discrimination, were taken outside 
f ·· . d . 104 the . am 1 I Y c 1 r c Ie ' tot h e U n 1 teN a t 1 0 n s . New Zealand 
recognised the importance of India's leadership in Asia 
and sent observers to the Pan Asian Conference on 
Indonesia in New Delhi, January 1949. External Affairs 
was further prompted in late 1949 to consider the 
desirability of establishing a diplomatic post in New Delhi. 
102 D.M. Rae (Member for Parnell) NZPD ,17 August 1950, 
Vol . 290, p.1594. 
103The Republic of India was officially declared 
26 January 1950, after the defeat of the Labour government . 
The New Zealand Republic of India Act was subsequently 
passed 4 September 1950, ensuring that India's new status 
did not differentiate it from the rest of the Commonwealth 
in regard to New Zealand law . 
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It was hoped that full Commonwealth representation 
there would influence Indian policy, while New Zealand 
could ensure that its immigration policy was not 
. d 105 mlsrepresente • By the end of 1949 Wellington was 
also providing some limited financial and technical aid 
to the Asian Commonwealth, particularly to Ceylon. As 
another small island nation, Ceylon was seen as an 
appropriate focus for New Zealand's co-operation with the 
106 New Commonwealth. While such contacts were minimal, 
they foreshadowed the development of the Colombo Plan 
in 1950 and showed New Zealand accepting the enlarged 
Commonwealth relationship. 
II. EIRE AND THE DECLARATION OF A REPUBLIC 
It was seemingly ironic that the promulgation 
of the London Declaration on 27 April 1949 - thereby 
reconciling republican India with Commonwealth membership -
should be preceded on 18 April by the official proclaimation 
of the Republic of Ireland and that country' s formal exit 
from the Commonwealth. Even more so, as the basic formula 
of India's recognition of the King as symbolic Head of the 
Commonwealth hac, in fact, been suggested by 
Eamon de Valera to Lloyd George for the Irish Free State 
in 1921. 107 What had not been possible in the more rigid 
104 Annual Report of Department of External Affairs 
1947- 48, AJHR, 1948, A-1, Vol. 1, p.12. 
105External Affairs memorandum , 'Establishment of 
a New Zealand Diplomatic Post in Asia',23 December 1949, 
EA 153/28/5, pt.l. 
106 Annual Report of Department of External Affairs -
1949 - 50, AJHR,1950, A- 1, Vol. 1, p.23. 
107Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth 
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Briti s h Commonwealth of 1921 was now acceptable in 
the free association of independent nations of 1949. 
But while parallels can be drawn between the concurrent 
issues of Indian and Irish republicanism, they were 
also quite distinct. Resolving India's status within 
the Commonwealth was a reasonably orderly post-war 
proce ss , strongly contrasted by the protracted problem 
of Ireland. By 1945 Eire's formal links with the 
Commonwealth were very tenuous; the full membership 
sought by India had already been forfeited. Consequently, 
the official declaration . of a republic and secession 
from the Commonwealth - while retaining a non - foreign 
status - was the best solutio n possible. The New Zealand 
government was sympathetic to the complexity of Eire's 
position and supported an effective resolution. 
Wellington showed a greater sense of political realism 
here, compared to the hardline attitude to the more 
sensitive issue of Indian republicanism. 
Eire's status in the Commonwealth was a peculiar 
anomaly. The 1937 constitution created an undeclared 
108 
republic with a non-exe c utive president as head of state. 
However, under the Executive Authority (External 
Relations) Act 1936, the Crown retained a nominal role in 
external affairs by the use of the King's signature in 
diplomatic accreditation. This vestige of royal authority 
allowed the British government to maintain that there was 
"no fundamental alteration in the position of the Irish 
Relations, p.294. 
108de Valera later claimed an official republic was 
not declared as this august title was inappropriate while 
the nation was partitioned - 24 November 1948 in Mansergh, 
Documents II, p.808. 
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Free State".109 Eire's status was deliberately left 
unresolved in the hope of avoiding constitutional 
controversy, evidence that flexible pragmatism could 
over-ride legalism when necessary. But the actions of 
the Irish government emphasised that they were not a 
full member of the Commonwealth; Eire was not 
represented at Commonwealth ministerial conferences after 
1932 and remained strictly neutral in the Second World 
War. The Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Eamon de Valera, 
emphasised in 1947 that Eire was an independent republic 
only externally associated with the Commonwealth: 
This is a republican state. As a matter of our 
external policy, we are associated with the 
states of the British Commonwealth. We are not at 
the present time regarded as members of it, but we 
are regarded as associates. 110 
This nebulous relationship was maintained until 
the new premier, John Costello, announced (somewhat 
unexpectedly) at a press conference in Ottawa 7 September 1948, 
the intention of repealing the External Relations Act. 
This, he said, would clarify Eire's republican status and 
remove the unsatisfactory situation of the British monarch 
retaining certain functions in the conduct of external 
relations. For example, it was with much embarrassment 
that Dublin's Ambassador to the Holy See was accredited 
110A 
through the office of the King of England. This action 
committed the Irish government to end all formal ties with 
the Commonwealth, as explicit republicanism was still 
109Quoted Mansergh, 'The Implications of Eire's 
Relationship with the British Commonwealth of Nations', 
International Affairs 1948, p.7. 
110 24 June 1947, Mansergh Documents II, p.797. 
110AM h Sf· . anserg, urvey 0 Brltlsh Commonwealth 
Relations, p.269. 
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incompatible with continued membership. 
Despite the special ties with Britain, the New 
Zealand government also maintained friendly relations 
with Eire. While Fraser regretted Irish neutrality 
111 in the war, he respected the right to do so, receiving 
the thanks of the New Zealand-Eire Association. 112 
Fraser's conciliatory attitude was further shown by the 
hospitality extended to de Valera (now the Leader of the 
Opposition) during his visit to New Zealand in May 1948 -
part of his extensive overseas tour to espouse the cause 
of Irish unity. At a public meeting at the Wellington 
Town Hall, Fraser paid tribute to the nation's honoured 
guest and commented on the long struggle for Irish 
independence. However, the Prime Minister probably felt 
less than comfortable when the meeting's lacklustre 
rendition of "God Save the King" was contrasted by a 
rousing version of "The Soldier's Song".113 While fully 
aware of the importance of Irish nationalism, Fraser 
expressed the hope that Dublin would maintain its friendly 
.. . h h 1 h 114 assoclatlon Wlt t e Commonwea t . 
The Costello government was not, however, 
'. 
prepared to continue this obscure connection. The 1948 
Prime Ministers' Conference thus provided the opportunity 
for the leaders of New Zealand, Australia and Canada 
111 In a telegram to the High Commissioner in London 
25 September 1945,Fraser stated "it is difficult to forget 
that Eire's neutrality was prejudicial to the Allied 
cause", EA 58 / 207/1, pt. 1A. 
112Letter to Fraser from Sec~etary crEire National 
Association, 30 August 1945, EA 58/207/1, pt. 1A. 
113The Evening Post, 26 May 1948. 
114The Dominion, 27 May 1948. 
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(the three Dominions with substantial po pulations 
of Irish descent) to discuss the consequences of the 
repeal of the External Relations Act with British and 
Irish ministers. Meetings were held at Chequers on 
18 October and later in Paris, 16-17 November. British 
policy was initially hard line; by repealing the 
External Relations Act, Eire was cutting its last formal 
links with the Commonwealth and would become a foreign 
country. Consequently, it would be difficult to justify 
maintaining Eire's special preferences in trade and 
citizenship, as other foreign countries enjoying "most 
favoured nation" status could demand similar rights. 115 
Given this difficult situation, the conciliatory influence 
of the Dominion leaders was crucial. Fraser, Evatt and 
St. Laurent refused to be associated with the uncompromising 
legalism of the British cabinet's message to the Irish 
government on 11 November, suggesting instead that some 
116 
compromise was needed. As the Lord Chancellor, 
Viscount Jowitt, later stated: 
If we had taken a different line from the one we 
decided to take, we should have acted in the teeth 
of the advice of the representatives of Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. 117 
At the Paris discussions, the Irish Minister of 
External Affairs, Sean McBride, argued that Eire had, in 
fact, been outside the Commonwealth since 1937, but that 
115Fraser to Nash,18 October 1948, EA 58/207/1, pt.1A. 
116 Fraser to W.J. Jordan, 15 November 1948, 
EA 207/412/1, pt.6. 
117 House of Lords Debate, 15 December 1948, Mansergh, 
Documents II, p.819. 
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special rights in citizenship and trade had been 
retained - Irish goods were not treated as foreign and 
Irish nationals were not deemed aliens. Why, then, 
should this establi3hed arrangement end, when the Irish 
government were simply clarifying the existing situation 
by repealing the External Relations Act? Eire, McBride 
concluded, could not be in the Commonwealth but the 
special relationship should be recognised and maintained. 118 
Extensive Anglo-Irish trade and the large numbers of 
Irish citizens working in Britain ensured that a foreign 
Eire would create great difficulties. The problem was, 
therefore, to find a suitable link to legally justify 
Eire's continued special status with the Commonwealth. 
The exchange of citizenship rights was eventually 
singled out as the suitable focus for lir.kage. Fraser 
pointed out that the new Commonwealth nationality laws gave 
Irish citizens the status of British subjects/Commonwealth 
0t O 119 Cl lzens. Under Irish law there was no official 
reciprocal treatment for Commonwealth nationals, although 
an Order in Council under the Aliens Act ensured that 
British subjects were not treated as aliens. It was, 
therefore, agreed that if the Irish government provided 
the citizens of Commonwealth countries with the same 
legal status as given to Irish nationals in the Commonwealth, 
the Republic would maintain a non-foreign status. 120 As 
with India, this was not the most tidy or logical arrangement 
but it was practical. It was also apparent that, while the 
1180iScussions between Commonwealth and Irish 
Ministers, Paris, 16 November 1948 ~ EA 207/4 / 2 / 1, pt.6. 
119,120Ibid . 
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"White Dominions" were not prepared to forge a new 
Commonwealth relationship with India on the basis of 
mutual citizenship rights (thereby facilitating the 
spectre of mass immigration) there were no such qualms 
with Mother Ireland . On his return to Dublin, 
McBride expressed his satisfaction with the talks, 
particularly praising the constructive contribution from 
the Dominion representatives. Fraser was lauded as 
"an old friend of Ireland who knew many of our national 
and labour leaders in the past".121 
The Republic of Ireland Bill was subsequently 
introduced into the Dailon 24 November. As Prime 
Minister Costello emphasised, this was not a product of 
negative nationalism but the legal confirmation of 
Ireland's previously vague status, which would facilitate 
a clearer and closer relationship with the commonwealth. 122 
On 1 January 1949 the New Zealand Citizens (Irish 
Citizens Rights) Order was issued in Dublin guaranteeing 
h f . . h . . h d .. 1 123 t e exchange 0 cltlzens lP rlg ts an prlvl eges. 
The other Commonwealth members received the same treatment, 
thus confirmi~g - t~e new relationship. Earlier, on 
27 November, the Acting Prime Minister, Walter Nash, 
had issued a statement recognising the continuing non-foreign 
status between the two countries and the desire to 
f · 1 . 124 strengthen rlend y tles. 
121Irish Pres; 20 November 194~ Press Clipping, 
EA 207/4/2/1, pt.6 
122 Manserg~ Documents II, p.806. 
123Minister of External Affairs, Dublin to Minister 
of External Affairs, Wellington, 31 December 1948 
EA 207 /4/ 2/1, pt.7. 
124 Statement by Nash,27 November 1948,EA 207 / 4 / 2 /1 , 
pt.6. 
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The mo s t significant illustration of New 
Zealand's amity with Ireland was Fraser's official 
visit in late December 1948 (while the passage of the 
Republican Bill was still in progress). On his arrival 
in Dublin, when asked what effect the new legislation 
would have on bi-lateral relations, Fraser adamantly 
replied: "What difference could there be? There has 
125 been friendliness always." Fraser's visit was given a 
high profile, including the conferment of an honorary 
Doctorate of Laws from the Na~ional University of 
I~eland and a radio broadcast on New Zealand's social 
services. On the Prime Minister's departure, McBride 
informed Wellington of the strong impression Fraser had 
d d · . 126 . 1 . . . . d h ma e urlng hlS stay. D1P omatlc nlcetles aSl e, t e 
visit had clearly shown New Zealand's approval of the 
new Ireland-Commonwealth relationship. 
Fraser's statesmanship was tested when he went 
on to briefly visit Northern Ireland. While his personal 
127 
sympathies appeared to lie south of the border, he 
tactfully made no reference to the problems of partition 
and declared the new arrangement with the Republic 
"sensible and beneficial".128 However, Fraser maintained 
an ardent belief in the Commonwealth, declaring in Belfast: 
I stand for the British Commonwealth and I would 
like to welcome back into the Commonwealth in 
some form or association the whole of Ireland. 129 
22 December 1948. 
126Minister of External Affairs, Dublin to Mini s ter 
of External Affairs, Wellington, 23 December 1948, 
EA 58 / 207 /1, pt. 1A. 
127 In Paris Fraser stated that he "had never found 
the people of Northern Ireland particularly amenable", 
EA 207 /4/2/1, pt.6. Later, in August 1950 when Opposition 
Leader, he spoke of the "centuries of wrong and injustice" 
and the "tragedy and oppres s ion" endured by Ireland, NZPD, 
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This was a contentious statement, indicating that 
despite his sympathy with Dublin, a commitment to a 
united Commonwealth remained pre-eminent. Certainly, 
Fraser could not accept a rejection of the monarchy in 
New Zealand's context: 
We cannot see any fundamental difference between 
our British Commonwealth and any republic. We 
are really a republic with the King as our head. 
The King is the link and a very good link, I 
would say. 130 
Fraser would not have made this statement in Dublin, 
where a link with the Crown (however, nebulous) was 
unacceptable. 
The official declaration of the Irish Republic 
on Easter Day 1949, was seen to require Commonwealth-wide 
legislation, ensuring that while Ireland was no longer 
one of His Majesty's Dominions, existing laws would 
131 
still recognise its non-foreign status. The opposition 
was less willing to legislate passively in this area. 
Holland strongly informed the government on 21 January 1949 
that any: 
public action, resolution or statement to 
recognise Sou~hern Ireland's abandonment of her 
British associations should be accompanied ... 
by some public demonstration or resolution of 
satisfaction at Northern Ireland's determination 
to remain in the Empire and that we would support 
her in her struggle to resist the movement to 
incorporate her territory against the will of her 
people within Southern Ireland. 132 
The government rightly ignored such a provocative proposal. 
17 August 1950, Vol. 290, pp.1586-88. 
128The Times, 23 December 1948 Clippings 
EA 207/4/2/1, pt.6. 
129 . P t 27 D b 1 48 Evenlng os , ecem er 9 . 
130 Fraser quoted in Belfast, Dominion, 24 December 1948. 
131 p . M.'s Dept. memorandum - Note on Necessity for 
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However, there was outrage in the Irish 
Republic when the British government introduced the 
Ireland Bill on 3 May 1949. While this legislation 
formalised the new relationship, it also confirmed the . 
division of Ireland by affirming "the constitutional 
position and the territorial integrity of Northern 
Ireland".133 Costello vehemently condemned this action,134 
h 0 h dId 11 0 135 w IC was u y recounte to We Ington. While 
sympathetic to Dublin's objec~ions, the government 
maintained a neutral stance, though, significantly, 
consequent New Zealand legislation (while based on the 
B oo h ) d f tOO 136 rItIs Act ma e no re erence to par Itlon. Further, 
this act was passed under the new National government; 
Holland's strident stance in opposition did not carry 
over to the responsibility of the Treasury benches. 
In fact, the Grand Orange Lodge strongly protested that 
Legislative Action in New Zealand .Arising out of 
Constitutional Changes in Ireland and India, 9 April 1949, 
EA 207/4/2/1, ·pt.7. 
132 Holland to Nash, 21 January 1949, 
EA 207/4/2/1, pt.7. 
133 '. The Ireland Act 1949, 12 and 13 Geo. VI, Ch.41 
in Mansergh Documents II, pp.821-25. 
134 11 0 D 01 Coste 0 In aI, 10 May 1949, Mansergh 
Documents II, pp.826-30. 
135Aide Memoire to New Zealand Government from 
High Commissioner for Ireland, London, 20 May 1949, 
EA 207/4/2/1, pt.7. 
136 New Zealand Statutes, Republic of Ireland Act, 
No. 13, 4 September 1950. 
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their objections to the bill were being ignored. 137 
But the fact was that New Zealand had long accepted 
Ireland's estrangement from the Commonwealth and 
welcomed the clarification of a new relationship. 
It was significant that the Republic of India and 
Republic of Ireland Acts were passed simultaneously by 
the New Zealand Parliament on 4 September 1950, thereby 
confirming the post - war changes in the Commonwealth's 
structure. As a committed Commonwealth partner, New 
Zealand had an important stake in these developments 
and played a significant role in their resolutions. 
While Wellington welcomed India's self-determination, 
there was concern that Asian membership would have a 
disruptive and weakening effect on the established 
Commonwealth relationship. In response, a hard-line 
was taken against India's policies of republicanism and 
non-alignment. Such concepts were deemed inconsistent 
with New Zea land's perception of a united Commonwealth. 
However, New Zealand had to eventually bow to consensus 
and accept the changes necessary to accommodate India. 
By co ntrast, Eire had long ceased to be an effective 
member of the Commonwealth and New Zealand supported the 
clarification of a new friendly relationship. In effect, 
republicanism and non-alignment were explicit 
manifestations of the implicit basis of the Commonwealth -
a free association of independent, if familial, nations. 
137secretary of Public Relations Committee of 
the Grand Orange Lodge of New Zealand to Minister of 
External Affairs, 22 August 1950, EA 159/4/3/3, pt.2. 
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But 'New Zealand remained committed to a more concrete 
conception cf the Commonwealth and adamantly maintained 
this. The. wider association of nations might change, 
but New Zea land had no desire to change with it, 
consciously re -emphasising traditional ties. 
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CHAPTER V 
COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE: 
THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The natural starting point for the future progress 
in Commonwealth defence has been the idea of 
regional association. Geography largely decides 
which problems most directly concern the separate 
members of the Commonwealth. 
United Kingdom White Pape~ 'Central 
Organisation for Defence', October 1946, p.ll. 
The 1946 Prime Ministers' Meeting and the 
subsequent White Paper on defence made clear that 
Commonwealth defence was based on a regional context. 
This reflected two factors. Firstly, Dominion sovereignty 
ensured that a unitary imperial strategy was impossible 
and that individual governments were responsible for their 
own defence policy. Each member state had Ita special and 
distinct outlook on world affairs, dependent on its 
geographical positi9n and its political and economic 
. , 1 
enVlronment' . Australia and New Zealand had affirmed 
this in January 1944 in their ambitious manifesto of 
regional defence responsibility, the Canberra Pact. 
Further, the restoration of a national defence organisation -
the Council of Defence - in 1946 showed the government's 
commitment to its own security, following the example of 
Britain and Australia. 2 Co-ordination of individual 
1United Kingdom White Pape~ 'Central Organisation 
for Defence', October 1946, p.10 EA 156/1/1, pt.2. 
2Press statemen~ 19 July 194~ EA 81/14/1, pt.1. 
defence policies would hopefully be achieved by the 
proposed exchange of joint service liaison officers. 
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Secondly, Britain's post-war decline and the 
consequent increased defence responsibility of the 
Dominions heightened the importance of regional defence 
arrangements. This was particularly so in the Pacific, as 
British naval power was no longer the guarantor of 
Australasian security. However, Australia and New Zealand 
were deemed one of the Commonwealth's t'Main Support Areas" 
and the security of the two nations and their surrounding 
strategic zone was thus essential. While the embryonic 
United Nations intended to provide an effective system of 
universal collective security, regional defence arrangements 
were deemed compatible with this objective. 3 Further, the 
United Nations guaranteed that until international peace 
and stability were achieved, nations had "the inherent right 
of individual or collective self defence".4 Australia and 
New Zealand thus markedly increased their defence ties; 
closer trans-Tasman links here had previously been limited 
by the "all encompassing" relationship with Britain. 
However, the special ANZAC relationship reflected a 
distinct rivalry, evident in Wellington's concern at a 
perceived Australian desire for regional leadership rather 
than partnership. Defence co-operation between the two 
regional Commonwealth partners was by no means plain sailing. 
Despite the pretensions of the Canberra Pact, the 
two Tasman neighbours fully appreciated American pre-eminence 
in the Pacific and the fact that Australasian security could 
3Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. 
4Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
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not be confined to a solely Commonwealth context. The 
United States was, however, unwilling to formalise a 
Pacific defence agreement with members of the Commonwealth. 
But regardless of a formal pact, American power implicitly 
guaranteed New Zealand's security. The Pacific was in 
effect an American lake, dominated by the United States 
Navy,5while American control of the former Japanese 
island territories in the north provided an effective 
barrier to Australasia. Further, there was no apparent 
Pacific threat: Japan was defeated, occupied and 
demilitarised; the Soviet Union was not a significant 
Pacific power, with limited naval resources; and China was 
internally racked with civil war. 6 New Zealand's regional 
defence concerns were therefore not pressing, they focused 
instead on the long term - ensuring against a revival of 
Japanese militarism and strategic planning with 
Commonwealth partners. The ultimate achievement of a 
concrete defence arrangement with Washington remained a 
desired end, but New Zealand was prepared to wait. 
New Zealand's vital strategic zone was deemed to 
run in the~ne: Samoa - Fiji- New Hebrides New Guinea, 
integrating with the interests of Australia and Britain. 
Enemy penetration beyond this line would seriously threaten 
essential communication links and national security.7 
It was therefore envisaged that in the event of war, New 
5The American Navy was larger than the fleets of 
the rest of the world put together - Bartlett, p.34. 
6MaCGibbOn, 'The Defence of New Zealand 1945- 57' ,p.151. 
7N. Z . C.O.S. Committee, Report on the Composition of 
the Armed Forces, 12 February 1947, EA 81/4/3, pt.6. 
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Zealand's naval and air forces would be concentrated her e. 
However, command of the sea and air could only be maintained 
against a limited scale of attack, such as itinerant raiding. 
In the face of a major attack ir. the Pacific, the 
assistance of the United States was essential. The key 
to ensuring New Zealand's regional security was the 
maintenance of bases in the Pacific Islands. Fiji was 
of particular strategic importance. During the Second 
World War New Zealand had aGsumed responsibility for the 
colony's defence (evidence of the devolution of 
Commonwealth defence responsibility) and after the war 
maintained the use of naval and air facilities there. 
This situation was formalised in tne ayreem8nt of January 
1949, whereby the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff were to act 
as defence advisors to the Governor of Fiji. 8 New Zealand 
also agreed to finance Fiji's 'air defence and pay for 
excess expenditure on military and naval requirements. In 
a stable and secure Pacific this was not an onerous 
responsibility. 
While taking an increased role in Pacific security, 
the New Zealand government was not, in fact, committed to 
the priority of regional defence. The ideal of universal 
collective security remained the ultimate aim, while the 
ongoing commitment to the wider British Commonwealth was 
also present. Regional defence arrangements, while 
necessary precautions, were ultimately seen as part of a 
broader system. As Fraser emphasised after concluding the 
8 N.Z. Cabinet Meeting,28 January 194~ CAB 1/1/1 - 1/7/1. 
9 P.M. to U.S. Charge d'Affaires, 25 February 1944, 
quoted Wood,The New Zealand People at War, p.319. 
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Canberra Pact, peace could only be preserved by "a 
world system of security and not under a number of 
systems of regional security".9 Subsequently, at the 
1944 Prime Ministers' Meeting, Fraser adamantly opposed 
Churchill's proposal of basing post-war collective security 
on regional councils. Such a division was seen as a 
disincentive to attaining universal peace, while also 
k "C 1 h l"d " 10 wea enlng ommonwea t so 1 arlty. 
Wellington regarded the creation of any 
inclusive Asian/Pacific security system as an "unreal 
conception". As a small "British" nation, New Zealand 
was not prepared to partake in an association where there 
was no cultural homogeneity or "special community of 
11 interest and confidence in one another". It was rather 
the British Commonwealth that provided these requirements. 
And, significantly, with the failure of the United Nations 
to achieve effective collective security by the late 
1940's, New Zealand re -emphasised the familiarity of 
Commonwealth defence rather than develop new regional 
security arrangements. This did not, however, prevent 
continued overtures to the United States, which eventually 
culminated in the signing of the ANZUS Pact in 1951. In 
this case, the essential condition of "community of interest" 
was present, not to mention strategic necessity. 
10 B.K. Gordon,New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power 
(Chicago, 1960), pp.224-26. 
11 p . M• to Acting Minister of External Affairs, 
19 May 1946, The Australian-New Zealand Agreement 
(ed. )Robin Kay, (Wellington, 1977), pp.215-16. 
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I . JAPAN: FOCUS FOR REGIONAL CONCERN 
The Japanese onslaught of 1941 - 42 created the 
most serious threat that New Zealand had faced. The 
Imperial defence strategy dramatically collapsed and 
Australia and New Zealand were left isolated and vulnerable. 
Both nation s were determined to ensure there was no future 
revival of Japanese militarism and advocated a harsh 
peace settlement involving full disarmament and strict 
limitations on industrial capacity. Only by such a policy 
would the Pacific Dominions feel secure. 
However, it was not the British Commonwealth but 
the United States that controlled the fate of Japan. 
General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers, enjoyed a "maximum of discretionary 
power",12 virtually administering the country as his 
personal satrapy. Commonwealth and other allied nations 
were relegated to the role of junior, even token, partners. 
This was evident in the limited influence of the Far 
Eastern Commission (nominally responsible for the 
administration of Japan) and the Allied Council in Japan 
vis-a-vis the Supreme Commander. Carl Berendsen aptly 
described New Zealand's participation here as "window 
dressing".13 The Canberra Pact's desire to see Australia 
and New Zealand play an active part in the post-war 
settlement in the Pacific appeared to be denied. In 
response to American dominance in Japan, the two Dominions 
attempted to assert maximum influence by unitary Commonwealth 
12 wood , 'New Zealand Foreign Policy 1945-51', p.97. 
13 Gordon, p.239. 
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action. This was most notably illustrated by the 
joint British Commonwealth occupation force and the 
Canberra Conference of 1947. These developments were 
significant examples of inter-Commonwealth co-operation, 
but were essentially the manifestation of a weakened hand. 
The joint occupation force in Japan provided a 
particularly interesting example of Commonwealth 
co-operation - an experiment in the integration of 
national forces. The force originated in proposals for 
the final assault against Japan. New Zealand agreed to 
provide 
However, 
14 
a division of two brigades for this purpose. 
the sudden end of the war in August 1945 
dramatically changed plans. Given the huge American 
presence in occupied Japan, inter-Commonwealth discussion 
emphasised the need for an effective British presence 
15 
to give some balance. Rather than have separate 
Commonwealth forces, as Australia initially suggested, the 
United Kingdom stressed that a united force would most 
effectively represent Commonwealth interests and carry more 
weight with the United States: 
We feel very strongly that a joint Commonwealth 
force working together •.• would afford a valuable 
demonstration of our essential unity in matters of 
common concern and a good augury for our future 
close co-operation in defence matters. 16 
14Externa~ Affairs memo, 'British Commonwealth Force 
of Occupation for Japan', 14 December 1945, EA 87/11/14, pt.l. 
15 Attlee to Fraser, 17 August 1945, quoted Gordon, p.235. 
16secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Minister 
of External Affairs, 1 September 1945, The Surrender and 
Occupation of Japan ~~.)RobinKay (Wellington, 1982), 
pp.1273 - 74. 
174 
Agreement for a combined force comprising 
servicemen from the United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand and India was finalised 19 October 1945. 17 
New zealand agreed to provide an infantry brigade plus 
ancillary services and a fighter squadron. Fraser saw 
New Zealand's participation in the occupation force as 
appropriate, given the country's vital stake in the 
Pacific's future security. But he also maintained that: 
New Zealand should undertake this duty not only 
because it is in our interests as a Pacific country 
but also because ... we have been invited by the 
United Kingdom government to participate. 18 
The government was, in fact, aware that any Commonwealth 
force in Japan would be a token gesture and that manpower 
stringency would make the maintenance of a New Zealand 
contribution difficult. However, "solidarity with the 
19 Mother Country" ensured that Britain's request for 
participation was followed. The role of the dutiful 
dominion remained pervasive. 
The Commonwealth force was to be an integrated 
body under a single Commander-in - Chief. The Australian 
Chief of General Staff, Lt. General John Northcott, was 
appointed to this position, thereby placating Canberra's 
desire for a strong independent presence. While under 
the operational control of the Supreme Commander, the 
Commonwealth force controlled its own domestic administration 
17Australian Minister of External Affairs to New 
Zealand Minister of External Affairs, 19 October 1945, 
EA 87/11/14, pt.l. 
18Minister of External Affairs to Dominions' 
Secretary, 30 September, Contents of Press Statement, 
Surrender and Occupation of Japan, p.1287. 
19 Ibid . 
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and activities. In the execution of this, the 
Commander - in-Chief was responsible to the participating 
governments through the specially constituted Joint Chiefs 
of Staff in Australia . This unique institution was based 
in Melbourne, comprising the Australian Chiefs of Staff 
and service respresentatives from the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and India. Reflecting the increased devolution 
of defence responsibility, this organisation was seen as 
an important innovation: 
a further development in the closer integration of 
British Commonwealth co - operation, ensuring that 
each of the governments concerned has a full and 
effective voice in the joint undertaking. 20 
Despite the inter-Commonwealth agreement, 
American approval of the force was not so forthcoming. 
Australian-American negotiations dragged on into 1946, 
often over minor technicalities. Wellington was not 
impressed and the delay allowed the government to reappraise 
the value of the proposed force. Canberra was duly informed 
that: 
in view of the time which has elapsed since the first 
tentative announcement was made regarding the provision 
of this force and the way in which negotiations have 
dragged, enthusi~ sm for it has flagged considerably in 
New Zealand. There is a general feeling that this 
force is not needed and it appears questionable 
whether in the circumstances it is likely to yield 
any increase in British Commonwealth prestige. 21 
Thus, even before any troops had arrived in Japan, the 
government was seriously questioning the relevance and 
viability of the project. Such a half-heartedness was to 
mark New Zealand's participation in the occupation. 
20 l' M" t f E t 1 Aff' t N Austra lan lnlS er 0 x erna alrs 0 ew 
Zealand Counterpart, 19 October 1945, EA 87/11/14, pt.l. 
21Minister of Exter~al Affairs to Australian 
Counterpart, 19 December 1945,Surrender and Occupation of 
Japan, p.1323. 
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Commonwealth - American arrangements were finalised 
22 by 1 February 1946 and the New Zealand force subsequently 
arrived in Japan by late March. This comprised of an 
infantry brigade under Brigadier K. L . Stewart - formed by 
transferring from Italy all single men of the 13th, 14th 
and 15th reinforcements of 2 NZEF for a 6 month period -
and 14 Squadron RNZAF. The New Zealand presence amounted 
to 13% of the total Commonwealth force. 23 Initially 
given control of the Hiroshima prefecture, the BCOF's 
responsibility ultimately extended to south-east Honshu 
and the island of Shikoku. Military occupation involved 
the general tasks of maintaining security, demilitarisation 
and disposal of armaments, and repatriation. However, the 
responsibilities of military government and intelligence 
remained the sole prerogative of the United States. 24 The 
force was thus on an unequal footing with the Americans, 
while its four brigades were a miniscule presence compared 
to the military dominance of the United States. The policy 
of tokenism was very apparent. 
Formal directives were issued by Canberra on behalf 
of the contributing ~overnments to the Commander-in - Chief 
9 August 1946 (instructions had previously been in a draft 
form). The objectives of BCOF were thus officially spelt 
out: 
22Joint Statement by the Governments of U.K., 
Australia, New Zealand and India, 1 February 194~ The 
Surrender and Occupation of Japan, pp.1353-55. 
23Memor an dum , 'Withdrawal or Retention of J. Force', 
30 November 19 46, EA 156/1//1_ pt.2. 
24 . S t JOlnt tatemen , 1 February 1946, op. cit. 
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(a) To represent worthily the British Commonwealth 
in the occupation of Japan 
(b) To maintain and enhance British Commonwealth 
prestige and influence in the eyes of the Japanese 
and of our allies 
(c) To illustrate to, and impress on, the Japanese 
people, as far as possible, the democratic way 
and purpose of life. 25 
In addition, it was emphasised that in furtherance of 
Commonwealth co-operation, the Commander-in-Chief was to 
foster; 
in your headquarters and in force and base units 
the principle of the maximum integration of services 
and personnel of each country contributing forces 
to BCOF. 26 
To achieve this, the directive made clear that national 
contingents were not independent units but part of a 
unified force. For example, national commanders were 
required to consult with the Commonwealth Commander - in-Chief 
before communicating with their national authorities. 
This was a significant restriction compared to the relative 
autonomy Dominion forces enjoyed in the Second World War. 
The maintenance of a full New Zealand contingent in 
Japan was a considerable drain on manpower, given wider 
post-war requirements. And as the initial brigade was to 
be relieved after 6 months service, an extensive domestic 
d .. . d 27 recruitment an tralnlng programme was requlre . The 
first relief force of 4,200 finally left New Zealand during 
June/July 1946. 28 This force in turn required relief after 
25Directive to the Commander-in - Chief, British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, 9 August 1946 
EA 81 /4/ 3. 
26 Ibid . 
27Minister of Defence, Fred Jones, broadcast an 
appeal for volunteers as early as 5 February 1946, The 
Surrender and Occupation of Japan, pp.1361 - 64 . 
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12 months, thereby providing a continual numbers problem. 
The New Zealand Council of Defence discussed this dilemma 
in February 1947, highlighting the fact that the volunteer 
29 
system could not maintain the required troops. 
Consequently, the Minister of Defence, Fred Jones, announced 
8 July 1947, the intention of reducing the infantry 
contingent to 2,400, while maintaining the 300 strong air 
component (the latter received valuable training experience 
30 in Japan). A second relief force thus sailed for Japan 
in July 1947 numbering only 1,768. 31 
As well as the problems of recruitment, the integrated 
structure of the BCOF provided further complications. This 
policy was a considerable departu~e from the relative 
independence of the New Zealand expeditionary force in the 
war, albeit the differences in scale. However, Wellington 
bad not fully appreciated this, as the initial directive to 
the New Zealand Commander was based on instructions given to 
General Freyberg in the Middle East. 32 Such an anomaly 
inevitably caused conflict with BCOF headquarters. The New 
Zealand Commander, Brigadier K.L. Stewart, complained soon 
after his arrival of " the "difficulties and differences of 
opinion" with the Commander-in-Chief, General Northcott. 33 
Stewart regarded the integration policy as excessive, 
m ~in taining that a self contained force was a more effective 
arrangement. Northcott also highlighted the problem: 
28 AGR Chief of General Staff, 20 June 1947, 
AJHR, 1948,H-19, p.l. 
29 . f M t' f N Z C . 1 f De fe e Mlnutes 0 ee lng 0 •• ounCl 0 nc, 
20 February 1947, EA 81/14 / 4, pt.l. 
30NZPD , 8 July 1947, Vol. 276, p.284. 
31 AGR Chief of General Staff, 20 June 1948,AJHR,1949, 
H-19. 
32Memorandum for the Commander, N.Z. Army Force of 
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There are differences in organisation as well as 
psychological variations between elements of BCOF 
which make complete integration difficult ... it 
must be realised that all national contingents ... 
existed as independent forces 34or many months before their concentration in Japan. 
It was consequently necessary for the Chiefs o f Staff to 
issue new directives, making explicit the extensive authority 
of BCOF headquarters vis-a-vis the national responsibility 
35 
of the New Zealand Commander. 
Problems of morale were also present. The New 
Zealand troops found devastated post-war Japan an alien 
and inhospitable environment, with limited amenities and 
36 frequent supply shortages. There was also resentment that 
the American forces were perceived as enjoying superior 
facilities. The New Zealand press subsequently highlighted 
troop dissatisfaction, for example, a Dominion headline 
7 July 1947 reported "J Force men say food monotonous and 
leave scarce". In response to this negative publicity, 
the Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff 
travelled to Japan to inspect facilities and improve ~orale. 
In a broadcast to the New Zealand forces, Jones admitted: 
that conditions in Japan have not always been as 
good as they are now ... but a vast improvement has 
been made •.. 37 
The New Zealand government was never particularly 
enthusiastic about J force and was given the further 
opportunity to reappraise its participation in late 1947, 
in the wake of Britain and India's decision to withdraw. 
Occupation, . 25 October 1945, EA 87/11/4, pt.l. 
33Commander, 2nd NZEF (Japan) to Chief of General 
Staff, 7 April 1946, Surrend~r and Occupation of Japan, 
p.1370-73. 
34Report by Lt.Gen. J. Northcott,25 July 1946, 
EA 87/11/14, pt.l. 
35Minutes of N.Z. Chiefs of Staff Committee, 
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Given this situation and the ongoing difficulty of 
providing further relief when the current force completed 
its tour of duty in July-August 1948, the government saw 
the opportunity to exit. Cabinet discussed the matter 
with General Robertson, the new Commander-in-Chief, in 
February 1948. Despite his plea for some continued 
presence, Fraser was adamant that the entire contingent 
38 
should return. The required six months notice was given 
in April and the last New Zealand Army and Air Force 
personnel left Japan 25 November 1948. 
The occupation force provided a novel experiment in 
regional Commonwealth co-operation; integrating the nations 
most concerned with the future security of the Far East and 
the Pacific into a single force, with command based in 
Australia. This reflected the increased devolution of 
defence responsibility to a regional context. However, a 
unitary force appeared to contradict the precepts of 
Dominion autonomy (and significantly Canada and South Africa 
did not take part) and was certainly difficult to achieve 
in practice. But by such a policy the Commonwealth hoped 
to have maximum influence in Japan vis-a-vis the United 
States. Ironically, while the post-war era confirmed 
Dominion self-determination, the new balance of power - a 
world dominated by two great powers - meant that Commonwealth 
members needed greater co-operation to make their presence 
10 May 1946, EA 81/4/2a; Memo for Commander, 2 NZEF (Japan) 
22 October 194~ EA 87/11/4, pt.l. 
36 Brig . K.L. Stewart to Army Secretary, 20 August 1946, 
Surrender and Occupation of Japan, pp.1411-13; 
Brig. K.L. Stewart to Chief of General Staff,8 October 1946, 
ibid. p.1414. 
37Transcript of Jones' broadcast to N.Z. Forces, 
22 March 1947, EA 87/11/30, pt.l. 
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felt. The BCOF was thus a manifestation of a weakened 
Commonwealth, setting the precedent for a similar 
organisation in the Korean War. While playing a useful 
role in the military occupation and maintaining a visible 
Commonwealth presence, the force was really a token 
exercise and had limited influence with the Americans. 
New Zealand was quick to recognise this, while also facing 
the ongoing problems of recruitment, integration and 
poor morale. New Zealand's participation in the force was 
not a major success story, but it did highlight the changed 
international environment. 
The need for Commonwealth solidarity in relation 
to American policy in Japan was also the catalyst of the 
Canberra Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty, 26 August -
39 1 September 1947. As with the BCOF, the Australian 
government organised the proceedings; evidence of Canberra's 
apparent regional Commonwealth leadership. The conference 
was also significant as the first major Commonwealth 
meeting held outside the Northern Hemisphere, further 
illustrating the special interest of the South Pacific 
Dominions in the Ja~anese peace settlement. Canberra and 
Wellington were particularly concerned that the United 
States seemed increasingly prepared to rehabilitate Japan 
as a strong bastion against the spread of Communism. 
MacArthur's claim in July 1947 that Japan had undergone a 
"spiritual revolution,,40 and was ready to return to the 
international community was incredulously received. By 
contrast, the Tasman neighbours saw their security dependent 
38Report of N.Z. Cabinet Meeting with Commander - in -
Chief, BCOF, 7 February 1948, Surrender and Occupation of 
Japan, pp.1474- 77. 
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on a harsh peace, ensuring there could be no revival 
of Japanese expansioni s m. It was in this atmosphere that 
the Commonwealth delegations (including the newly 
independent India and Pakistan, and Burma making its brief 
appearance as a de facto dominion) met to discuss the 
issues involved in formalising a Japanese peace treaty and 
to find consensus for dealing with Washington. 
Fraser strongly expressed the Australasian 
viewpoint: 
We of New Zealand and Australia are very anxious 
that the other members of the British Commonwealth 
should understand our position, politically and 
geographically ... and appreciate our particular 
interests and the dangers which the future may hold 
for us. 41 . 
While not advocating a Carthaginian peace , Fraser 
maintained that "the Japanese must be made to feel that 
they did start something" and that all war potential be 
eliminated. The Conference consequently agreed that 
Japanese armament industries should be prohibited and that 
strict limits be imposed on industrial capacity.42 
However, the loose structure of the Commonwealth 
could not provide a strong counterpoise to American policy. 
In fact, the "MacArthur Constitution" was already being 
formulated, independently of the other allied powers. 
New Zealand realistically recognised that the Canberra 
proposals meant little without the agreement of the United 
States,"whose part in the defeat of Japan and in the future 
control of Japan was and will be almost decisive.,,43 
39 Japanese Peace Settlement , Report of British 
Commonwealth Conference, Canberra 1947 , AJHR,1947,A - 12. 
40 Gordon, p.242. 
41 , ° h t fO t Fraser s openlng speec a lrs session, 
26 August 1947, EA 102/9/24. 
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Despite the Canberra Pact's assertion of the need for 
a strong Australian - New Zealand say in the post-war Pacific 
settlement, they were to have a minimal impact, 
notwithstanding their vested interests. The experiences 
of the BCOF and the Canberra Conference were thus 
sobering ones for the Commonwealth - evidence of its 
diminished influence in the post-war world. 
II. DEFENCE TIES WITH AUSTRALIA: REGIONAL LEADERSHIP 
OR PARTNERSHIP? 
The Canberra Pact provided a significant basis for 
developments in trans-Tasman defence co-operation. While 
many of its provisions were overly ambitious, the agreement 
was a conscious response to the changed strategic 
situation in the Commonwealth. With the decline of the 
United Kingdom's defence capacity, Australia and New Zealand 
clearly had to take increased responsibility for their 
regional security - a main support area for the Commonwealth. 
Given its geographic position and wartime experience, 
Australia regarded itself as the appropriate Commonwealth 
leader in the Pacific. Thus, under the assertive leadership 
of Herbert Evatt, the Minister of External Affairs, 
Australia took the initiative, with New Zealand often 
confined to a supporting role. The Canberra Pact was 
itself primarily an Australian creation, while Canberra 
represented the Commonwealth on the Allied Council in Japan 
and co-ordinated arrangements .for the BCOF. Australia also 
claimed administrative responsibility for joint Commonwealth 
ventures in the Pacific, such as the proposed Joint 
Intelligence Bureau. 
1 84 
New Zeal a nd wa s equally willing to in c rease its 
capacity in the Pacific, as evidenced at the 1946 Prime 
Ministers' Meeting. But as a more isolated and more 
Anglophile nation, with a government strongly committed to 
the ideal of universal collective security, the importance 
of regional defence did not loom as large as across the 
Tasman. Nevertheless, Wellington strongly resented any 
implication of Australian dominance in the Pacific, 
insisting on an equitable partnership. A distinct trans -
Tasman rivalry thus prevailed; a symptom of the special 
ANZAC relationship. New Zealand was clearly not 
prepared to accept her Australian cousin as a regional 
surrogate for Mother Britain. 
As discussed in Chapter I, the 1946 Prime Ministers' 
Meeting emphasised the increased regional distribution of 
Commonwealth defence responsibility. The Australian 
delegation strongly supported this move, taking it a step 
further by advocating the principle of: 
a Domin-ion acting in certain regions or for certain 
purposes on behalf of the British Commonwealth, 
including the United Kingdom itself. 44 
The propo s ed e x chang ~ of service liaison staffs aimed to 
co - ordinate such regional initiatives. The constitutional 
implications of this idea were contentious, but Australia 
saw such a role as i ts due, with Chifley expressing to 
the meeting that: 
There should be assigned to the Australian government 
machinery, res~onsibility for the development of the 
defence aspects of matters relating to regional 
security in the Pacific, in which the United Kingdom, 
42Minutes of Canberra Conference, 28 August 1947, 
EA 102/9/26, pt.l. 
43External Affairs Report on Canberra Conference, 
30 September 1947, EA 102/9/3, pt.l. 
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Australia and New Zea land are concerned, and 
provision should be made for the representation of 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand at appropriate 
level s on such machinery . 45 
New Zealand did not endorse this proposal of 
Australian hegemony. Reporting from London, Frank Corner 
expressed concern that by such a policy Australia "might 
46 
swamp New Zealand" ; "a leadership which we do not trust 
as much as the British".47 This distinct rivalry ensured 
that while there was consensus on the need for effective 
bi - lateral defence co-operation, the terms involved were 
not to be easily agreed on. 
Australia reiterated its views on regional defence 
co -o peration in formal proposals to the New Zealand 
48 government , 28 May 1947. This envisaged Australian defence 
machinery taking responsibility for the development and 
administration of joint security activities in the Pacific; 
thereby "acting as agents for the British Commonwealth" 
in peace and war. New Zealand and the United Kingdom were 
gu~anteed full and equal representation in this arrangement 
by constant inter-government communication and by the 
attendance of their High Commissioners and service 
representat ives at appropriate Australian defence 
institutions, when their interests were involved. Proposed 
ventures like the Pacific "Joint Intelligence Bureau would 
thus function in this way. Canberra saw the established 
44pMM (46) 8,quoted in Australian Government 
Memorandum,~o -o peration in Commonwealth D e fen c~,28 May 1947 , 
EA 81/4/3, pt.6. 
45 Ibid ., p.8. 
46corner to McIntosh,31 May 1946,EA 153/23 /1, pt.l. 
47corner to McIntosh and Wilson,27 May 1946, 
EA 153/23/1, pt.l. 
48Chifley to Fr ase r , 28 May 1947, enclosed Australi a n 
Government memorandum ' Co - ope r at ion in Commonwealth Defence' 
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practice of Australian and New Zealand troops serving 
under British command (as was the case with naval and 
air forces in the war as the ob vi ous precedent; now 
given a regional reversal of roles. 
In contrast with this desired arrangement, the 
Australian government highlighted what it saw as the 
unsatisfactory organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
in Australia. As a specially constituted multi-national 
institutiGn administering the Commonwealth force in Japan, 
this was usurping the authority of the Austral i an Chiefs 
of Staff. Canberra strongly maintained (as it had at the 
1946 Prime Ministers' Meeting) that control and maintenance 
of the BCOF should be transferred solely to itself, with 
the other contributing countries represented by their 
service liaison staff. Having already had both American 
and British forces working through its defence machinery 
in the Second World War, Australia saw no reason for this 
not to apply to the 49 small Commonwealth force in Japan. 
In effect, this proposal only really changed the theory of 
the BCOF's administration and not the practice; the 
Australian Chiefs of ' Staff already formed the permanent 
basis of the JCOSA and functioned as its agent. However, 
the sensitive area of Australia's national aspirations was 
at stake. 
Canberra's proposals were not well received in 
Wellington; Australia appeared to be seeking regional 
and memorandum by Australian Defence Committee on the JCOSA, 
EA 81/4/3, pt.6. 
49 Memo by Australian Defence Committee on the JCOSA, 
submitted to Fraser,28 May 1947, EA 81/4/3, pt.6. 
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leadership rath e r than the partnership inherent in 
Commonwealth co-operation and the terms of the Canberra 
Pact. While there was recognition that Australia was 
"the major partner in the British Commonwealth in the 
Pacific",50 New Zealand was unwilling to see Australian 
defence machinery assume administrative authority in 
joint undertakings. As Fraser emphasised in his reply to 
Chifley: 
The New Zealand government are at all times anxious 
to co-operate with Australia on the basis of equality, 
but in the machinery proposed, that full measure of 
equality that should characterise co-operation between 
our two governments is not adequately provided. 51 
Fraser was adamant that any inter -Commonwealth Pacific 
enterprise (such as the BCOF and the proposed Joint 
Intelligence Bureau) should be controlled by special joint 
machinery, iike the present Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
Australia, thereby guaranteeing full equality in decision 
making: 
I feel that any other arrangement is alien to the 
general political agreement to which we have both 
subscribed and of the customary partnership of our 
people. 52 
Transferring re s ponsibility to the Australian defence 
authorities was seen to potentially restrict New Zealand ' s 
participation. These objections were endorsed by the 
New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. 53 
In discussions with the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, Lord Montgomery, in July 1947, Fraser 
50Fos s Shanahan, 'Co-ope ration in Commonwealth 
Defence' , 4 June 1947, EA 156/10/2, pt.1. 
51Fraser to Chifley, 14 July 1947, EA 81/4/3, pt.6. 
52 Ibid . 
53 N. Z . Chiefs of Staff Co mmittee, 'Co-ope ration with 
Australia in Commonwealth Defence', 25 July 1947,EA 81/4/3, pt.6. 
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strongly criticised Canberra's policy as "Aus:tralian 
. . I. ,,54 1mper1a 1sm . However, the United Kingdom's policy of 
maximum devolution of Commonwealth defence, supported 
Australian responsibility for strategic planning and joint 
operations in Asia and the Pacific. 55 Thus, while 
recognising New Zealand's concerns, Montgomery was not 
prepared to champion them. Minor differences over procedure 
should not, he declared, hinder the two nations' basic 
unity of purpose. Montgomery claimed that New Zealand's 
interests would be effectively represented by service 
liaison staff in Australia, and that once this presence · was 
established, the efficacy of Canberra's proposals would be 
56 
apparent. New Zealand was not, however, convinced. 
A trans-Tasman impasse was clearly apparent, 
highlighted by the August discussions between Foss Shanahan, 
the Assistant Secretary of External Af fairs, and 
Sir Frederick Shedden, the Australian Secretary of Defence. 
Shedden guaranteed that while regional defence activities 
would function through Australian machinery, New Zealand 
was ensured an equal voice; service representatives would 
be present at all le~els of decision making, while final 
policy decisions would remain the responsibility of the 
57 
contributing governments. Shanahan was not compliant, 
maintaining that a basis of equality could only be 
54Cabinet discussions with Viscount Montgomery, 
17 July 1947, EA 156/1/1, pt.2; Chiefs of Staff Committee, 
minutes of meeting with Montgomery,17-18 July 1947 , 
EA 81/4/2a, pt.4. 
55 Co l. H.E. Gilbert to Brig. W.G. Gentry, 7 July 1947, 
EA 156/10/2, pt.1. 
56 , . . f Note by Montgomery, Proposed Organ1sat1on or 
Defence in the South-West Pacific', wellington,17 July 1947, 
EA 81 / 4/2a. 
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achieved by a special joint Chiefs of Staff structure. 58 
Shedden recounted that his government was totally 
opposed to the continuation orextension of a body like 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia. This was a 
cumbersome institution, denying Australia its logical 
responsibility and was quite unsuitable to function in 
wartime. The United Kingdom, he contended, had no qualms 
about working through Australian defence machinery, thus 
making New Zealand's intransigence difficult to appreciate. 
Further, if New Zea land insisted on a special bi-lateral 
arrangement for defence co-operation, it would be at 
cross purposes with Britain and isolated from wider 
interMCommonwealth collaboration. 59 
Extensive communication between the two Prime 
Ministers did not resolve their differences. 60 New Zealand 
was prepared to accept Australian institutions taking 
responsibility for rudimentary policy, but affirmed that 
high level administrative decisions should be made by a 
special joint agency, responsible to all participating 
governments. The Canberra Conference in September allowed 
Fraser and Chifley to personally discuss the issue. The 
Australians were at pains to guarantee that New Zealand's 
participation in its defence machinery would be on a 
57Note by Shedden on Discussions with Shanahan, 
15 August 1947, EA 156/10/2, pt.1. 
58 Report by Shanahan on meeting with Shedden, 
22 August 1947 , EA 156/10 / 2, pt. 1. 
59 Note by Shedden, 15 Augu st 1947, op. cit. 
60chifley to Fraser, 13 August 1947; Fraser to 
Chifley, 25 August 1947, EA 156/10/2, pt.1. 
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basis of equality, ensuring sovereign control of policy 
and the assent of New Zealand representatives at all 
levels. If necessary, this would be confirmed by a formal 
. 61 provlso. 
Official New Zealand policy was still not 
t · f· d 62 b . h . d . d ' f sa lS le, ut glven t e Unlte Klng om s acceptance 0 
the general Australian proposals and support for the 
immediate disbandment of the JCOSA,63 the government was 
left with few options. Fraser thus informed Chifley on 
20 October that in the circumstances, New Zealand accepted 
the dissolution of the JCOSA and its replacement by the 
Australian Chiefs of Staff and service representatives 
64 (thi s formally took effect on 31 December 1947). In 
turn, Colonel L.S. Duff, the Chiefs of Staff representative 
on the JCOSA, was appointed New Zealand's Joint Service 
Liaison Officer in Australia. Despite this concession, 
Fraser still maintained that future joint Commonwealth 
ventures needed the administration of a special agency, 
responsible to all participating governments. Shanahan, 
however, told Duff that providing New Zealand was given 
a n equal say, the government would not press for such an 
65 
arrangement. 
61 . h .. C b t Sh h Hlg Commlssloner, an erra 0 ana an , 
1 September 1947, EA 156/10/2, pt. 1. 
62 Memo by Shanahan, 'Co-operation in British 
Commonwealth Defence', 11 September 1947, EA 156/10/2, pt.1. 
63 Memo from Head of New Zealand Joint Service 
Liaison Staff, London to Secretary, Chief of Staff Committee, 
2 October 1947, EA 156/10/2, pt.2. 
64Fraser to Chifley, 20 October 1947,EA 156/10/2, pt.1. 
65Shanahan to Duff,23 October 1947, EA 156/10/2, pt.1. 
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The protracted Australian - New Zealand 
disagreement was essentially a product of the s pecial 
trans- Tasman relationship - a mi x ture of fraternity and 
rivalry. Close defence ties were essential, but New 
Zealand wanted an equitable partnership, not the implic a tion 
of Australian precedence. Australia was not the Mother 
Country and the appearance of an Australian regional 
leadership was unacceptable. While ultimately accepting 
the practice of working through Canberra's defence 
machinery, Wellington emphasised this was on the basis 
of equality. Trans - Tasman defence co - operation did expand 
on this basis, with the Australian High Commissioner, 
Roden Cutler, stressing in March 1948 "it is obvious that 
Australia must work very closely with New Zealand in the 
Pacific".66 Developments such as the arrival of 
Australian service liaison staff in March 1948, combined 
naval exercises, visits between military leaders and the 
training of New Zealand officers at Duntroon showed a 
wide - ranging defence relationship. 
Commonwealth defence arrangements in the Pacific 
were taken a step further with the development of ANZAM 
in 1949. Under this arrangement, Australian defence 
machinery, in conjunction with New zealand and United 
Kingdom representatives, took responsibility for initiating 
contingency planning for the defence of sea and air 
communications in Malaya and the Pacific. ANZAM was somewhat 
nebulooSdNith planning limited .to the service level, involving no 
66Dominion, 20 March 1948. 
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government commitments and not intruding on internal 
defence policy. Nevertheless, it was a significant 
achievement in Commonwealth defence, representing a 
logical progression in Australia's proposals of regional 
co-operation. New Zealand was now seemingly prepared to 
accept Australian institutions taking the initiative in 
regional defence. 
The origins of ANZAM can be seen in the calls 
for closer regional defence co-operation, highlighted at the 
Prime Ministers' Meeting of October 1948. 67 Given the 
mounting cold war tensions and the impotency of the United 
Nations, Britain suggested that the existing inter-
Commonwealth service representation should be utilised 
for more effective defence planning and co-ordination, not 
68 just consUltation. Ironically, Britain had achieved 
a greater level of military co - operation with its 
European partners in the Western Union, than that attained 
in the more familial Commonwealth. It was therefore 
desirable that Commonwealth members should try to achieve 
similar results in the Pacific. 
Canberra subsequently proposed that the 
Australian Defence Committee and accredited New Zealand 
and British service representatives should examine the 
objectives and strategy of Commonwealth defence in the 
Pacific and consider peacetime planning. 69 London endorsed 
this initiative and proposed sending a special service 
67summary of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, 
October 1948, EA 153/26/1. 
68Report by Australian Defence Committee on U.K. 
Paper PMM(48) 'The World S ituation and its Defence Aspects' , 
11 November 1948, EA 156/1/1, pt.3. 
69Ibid. 
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mission to Australia in mid 1949 to further developments. 70 
New Zealand also welcomed these moves, although the 
government recognised that in the event of war, the Pacific 
was unlikely to be a vital theatre. 71 There was consequent 
concern that Australia was putting too much emphasis on 
72 regional defence rather than wider Commonwealth strategy. 
New Zealand thus saw regional defence as more of a long 
term precaution than an immediate concern. 
To provide a clearer view of regional defence 
responsibility, Fraser suggested to Chifley,20 February 1949, 
a joint meeting of the Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of 
Staff and the British service mission. 73 These discussions 
took place in Melbourne 22 - 26 August, amid considerable 
1 . 74 press specu atlon. Clearly, the logistics of modern 
warfare meant that peacetime defence planning was essential. 
It was, therefore, agreed that the Australian Defence 
Committee and the accredited representatives of Britain 
and New Zealand should take the initiative in planning 
the defence of sea and air communications in South - East 
Asia and the Pacific. 75 Australian defence machinery 
was now clearly established as the Commonwealth's regional 
agent and New Zealand accepted this arrangement by 
ensuring its interests were fully represented. Planning 
70Attlee to Chifley,29 December 1948,EA 156/1/1, pt.3. 
71 Memo, 'New Zealand's Defence Policy in the Pacific' , 
30 April 1949, EA 156/1/1, pt.3. 
72Air Vice Marshall A. de T. Nevil to Shanahan, 
22 February 1949, EA 156/1/1, pt.3. 
73Fraser to Chifley,20 February 1949,EA 156/1/1, pt.3. 
74Dominion, 19 August 1949; Evening Post, 
23 August 1949. 
75Meeting of Australian Defence Committee,19 August 1949 
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did not, however, extend to internal security, which 
remained the responsibility of the individual nations; 
and did not commit any governments to action, being 
specifically limited to a service context. Various names 
were suggested: ANZIM, ANZAC, though it was finally 
agreed to use the term ANZAM - Australia, New Zealand and 
Malaya. 76 In wartime it was envisaged that an ANZAM 
Chiefs of Staff (based on the Australian COS) would 
control the region's overall strategic defence. However, 
it was recognised that in such a situation, ANZAM could 
not hope to effectively function without the co-operation 
of the United States and needed to link in with American 
policy. 
III. THE UNITED STATES AND A PACIFIC DEFENCE AGREEMENT 
While the Commonwealth partners increased their 
defence co - operation in the Pacific, reality ensured that 
regional security was dependent on the United States. 
The Second World War had destroyed any notion of an 
exclusive Commonwealth Pacific defence. There was still 
a residual suspicion of American intentions, given past 
territorial expansion in the Pacific and a legacy of 
isolationism. However, New Zealand and Australia were 
very aware of their dependence on American naval power 
and were eager to formalise a defence agreement. 
Washington had rebuffed such overtures in 1946, even when 
Notes of Discussions between the Australian Defence 
Committee, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and U.K. Liaison 
Officer, 22- 26 August 1949, EA 156/2/4/1, pt.l. 
76Ibid • 
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the Commonwealth members tried to bargain with base 
rights in their Pacifi c territories . New Zealand was 
particularly concerned in securing protection against a 
revival of Japanese aggression, but was more prepared 
than Australia to accept the implicit guarantee provided 
by the United States' strategic and military strength. 
Nevertheless, Wellington regarded a formal defence 
arrangement with Washington as the desired end. 
The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Defence Paper 
of 1948 supported the creation of an "exclusive" Pacific 
collective security agreement, incorporating the English 
speaking nations of the United States, Britain, Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada. 71 Here were nations sharing the 
essential features of a common heritage and mutual 
confidence. It was recognised that, given American 
dominance in the Pacific, full scale hostilities were 
unlikely there, compared with Europe and the Middle East. 
However, an effective regionrudefence pact would ensure 
the security of New Zealand's vital strategic interests 
and communications, thereby leaving the government free 
to deploy its limit e d resources to "the fullest effect in 
the vital theatre of operations".18 The assurance of 
regional security was thus the desired condition for a 
wider Commonwealth commitment. 
Australia and New Zealand reiterated the importance 
of a Pacific Pact at the Prime Ministers' Meeting in 
79 October 1948. Evatt discussed the matter further in 
77 . Chiefs of Staff Paper, 'Arrangements for World 
Security and the Position of New Zealand' ,24 September 1948, 
EA 153/26 / 5, pt.l. 
7BIbid . 
79pMM (48) Minutes of 11th Meeting .. Confidenti a l 
Annex, EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
197 
Washington in November, but the American administration 
remained unwilling. Events in 1949 gave further impetus 
to a Pacific security agreement: the apparent American 
intention to rehabilitate Japan and end the occupation; 
an increased Communist threat in Asia, highlighted by 
Mao Tse-Tung's victory in the Chinese Civil War; and the 
promulgation of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO offered 
an appropriate model for the Pacific. The Speech from the 
Throne,28 June 1949, in expressing support for the North 
Atlantic Treaty, declared "that this community of interest 
would provide a basis for the conclusion of similar 
arrangements in the Pacific 80 region". The United States, 
however, had no intention of immediately assuming similar 
responsibilities in the Pacific, where it was already 
the supreme power. 81 
In response to the United States' adamancy, 
Australia, New Zealand and Britain increased their own 
inter -Commonwealth regiona~ defence planning as highlighted 
by ANZAM. It was hoped that such developments would 
provide the foundation for wider security arrangements. 
However, Fraser rec o gnised the viability of the existing 
modus vivendi and was not going to press the issue with 
Washington. As he realistically stated s 13 . September 1949: 
the Pacific Pact has been discussed ... the 
government was doing everything possible in 
connection with that matter, but New Zealand could 
not expect to compel a huge country like America 
to act. 82 
80 NZPD,Vol. 285,28 June 1949, p.2. 
81 ·Emphasised by Secretary of State Acheson in 
Statement,18 May 1949, quoted Reese, p.114. 
82 NZPD,Vol. 287, p.2062. 
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New Zealand was content to shelter under the implicit 
shadow of the United States until the time was appropriate 
to forge a formal treaty. 
The post-war Commonwealth saw a devolution of 
defence responsibility to a regional context. Clearly, 
the debacle of the imperial defence strategy in the 
Pacific in 1941, Britain's weakened position and 
established Dominion sovereignty meant that New Zealand 
was obliged to playa more active role in local security. 
The Canberra Pact thus provided an ambitious basis for 
New Zealand and Australia to assert Commonwealth 
leadership in the Pacific. Wellington was, however, 
concerned that Canberra seemed to want regional dominance 
rather than partnership, and insisted that defence 
co-operation be on the basis of equality. But Australasian 
security could not be confined to a solely Commonwealth 
context. The United States dominated the Pacific and 
controlled the destiny of Japan, despite attempts by 
Canberra and Wellington to influence developments. To 
ensure their security, New Zealand and Australia therefore 
desired to formalise a defence arrangement with Washington. 
The Truman administration was, however, unwilling to make 
any formal commitments, ensuring that Pacific defence 
arrangements remained confined to a Commonwealth context, 
such as ANZAM. The absence of the United States 
necessarily limited the effectiveness of Commonwealth 
defence, but the implicit security provided by American 
power was recognised. 
CHAPTER VI 
NEW ZEALAND AND "IMPERIAL DEFENCE" 
We know that we have to play our part not 
only in the defence of this country but 
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also in the defence of the British Commonwealth. 
- Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence, 
14 July 1948, NZPD,Vol. 280, p.607. 
Despite the post-war emphasis on regional 
defence, New Zealand's security could not be confined 
to this context. The legacy of two world wars implied 
that any future conflict would again be on a global 
scale. The Labour government remained committed to 
the establishment of a system of universal collective 
security and hoped that, despite its shortcomings, the 
United Nations would realise this. In turn, the 
Pacific was seemingly secure under the undisputed 
dominance of the United States. Wellington remained 
concerned about a possible Japanese revival, but was 
prepared to accept the implicit guarantee provided by 
American naval and air power. 
Bye 0 n t r a s t, E u r 0 pew a s the foe u s 0 f s t I' ate g i c 
concern. The Western/Soviet division of the continent 
was entrenched and relations between the two blocs 
progressively deteriorated. In the event of war, Europe 
would provide the vital strategic theatre. Faced with 
mounting cold war tension and an ineffective United 
Nations, New Zealand looked to traditional Commonwealth 
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defence ties, committing its surplus military 
resources to the defence of wider British interests. 
This was a tried and proven collective security system, 
whereby New Zealand defended itself by defending the 
wider Commonwealth. However, in the event of war, the 
Commonwealth could no longer function in isolation, 
actively needing allied support. By contributing to 
the Commonwealth's defence, New Zealand was, therefore., 
also contributing to the wider Western alliance based 
on the power of the United States. 
In New Zealand the continuing imperial 
connection was particularly evident in the organisation 
of the armed forces. They were standardised and trained 
on the British model, utilising mainly British equipment. 
The Royal New Zealand Navy, for example, borrowed most 
of its ships from the Admiralty on the condition that 
they were maintained to full British standards. 1 There 
was also considerable staff interchange; until 1960, 
at least one of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff was a 
2 British officer on secondment. The New Zealand armed 
forces thus funct i~ ned as a microcosm of their United 
Kingdom counterparts, ensuring effective collaboration. 
Further, following the 1946 Prime Ministers' Meeting, 
joint service liaison staffs were established in London 
and Melbourne. This system aimed to ensure that 
1 N. Z • COS Committee 'Report on the Composition , 
of the Armed Forces of New Zealand', 12 February 1947, 
EA 81/4/3, pt . 6 . 
2 I . C. MacGibbon, 'The Defence of New Zealand 
1945- 1957', pp.147- 148. 
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Commonwealth partners were fully informed of each 
other's policies, facilitating full consultation and 
collaboration. New Zealand was eager to achieve this 
end. 
Commonwealth membership did not, however, 
involve any definite military commitments. As sovereign 
nations, members determined their own defence policies, 
relative to their individual needs. While free to 
provide mutual support in wartime, there was no binding 
commitment to do so - as South Africa's potential and 
Eire's actual neutrality in 1939 illustrated. 
Commonwealth defence was thus an implicit, rather than 
an explicit alliance, strongly contrasted by the concrete 
security obligations developing between Britain and 
its European neighbours. However, in New Zealand's 
case, there was a definite understanding that it would 
"sink or swim,,3 with the United Kingdom. The continuity ' 
of emotional and economic dependency ensured that New 
Zealand's first line of defence remained wherever British 
interests were threatened. New Zealand thus willingly 
'. 
committed itself to the Commonwealth's security. As 
Peter Fraser emphasised in 1949, the country's destiny 
was "wholly and completely bound up in the British 
4 Commonwealth". 
3stated by Michael Joseph Savage at the 1937 
Imperial Conference. 
4Evening Post, 20 May 1949. 
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I . THE COMMONWEALTH REAFFIRMED 
In their analysis of post - war defence 
responsibility, February 1947, the New Zealand Chiefs 
of Staff emphasised the pre - eminence of Commonwealth 
defence ties. 5 While affirming that New Zealand 
remained committed to supporting the United Nations, 
this organisation had clearly not developed into'~n 
effective world authority" and the possibility of its 
breakdown was recognised. The established collective 
security of the British Commonwealth was consequently 
stressed: 
The primary and most concrete association is the 
British Commonwealth of Nations. Our membership 
in this organisation is so fundamental a 
requirement that comment is scarcely needed. 
This security organisation is not a matter of 
theories and treaties, it has been in active 
operation for many years ... As long as the 
integrity of the Commonwealth is preserved, the 
integrity of New Zealand is itself under 
guarantee. 6 
It was further maintained that New Zealand was 
"committed to support the British Commonwealth" in 
wartime and that it received "protection in return" . 7 
The experience of '1941 - 42 showed the pitfalls of this 
theory, but it remained the most tangible defence 
arrangement. 
While not envisaging any immediate threat of 
war, the Chiefs of Staff maintained that any future 
conflict was unlikely to be focused on the Pacific. 
Europe remained the centre of the world's balance of 
5 N.Z. COS Committee, 12 February 1947, 
EA 81/4/3, pt.6. 
6 Ibid ., p . ll. 
7 . d Ibl ., pp.1 - 2. 
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power. Thus, the pos s ibility of the 'Soviet Union's 
interests clashing with those of Britain and/or the United 
States could not be ruled out. In such a scenario, New 
Zealand would not be actively threatened compared to an 
enemy onslaught in Europe. The rationale therefore 
was: 
There must be no undue emphasis on the requirements 
of home defence, and organisation in peace - time 
must be directly related to probable overseas 
employment. 8 
New Zealand was expected to despatch its surplus 
forces for a joint Commonwealth offensive in the vit ~ l 
theatre of operations. This would involve contributing 
to a naval and air task force and the provision of an 
expeditionary force of an army division including an 
armoured brigade. 9 The latter (a nationally identifiable, 
tactically independent unit) remained New Zealand's major 
contribution to a Commonwealth war effort. However, 
mindful of changing strategic circumstances, particularly 
the fear of a resurgent Japan, New Zealand reserved the 
right to change its policies. 
To carry out its defence commitment effectively, 
it was apparent that the New Zealand armed forces 
required a higher level of preparedness. In future 
conflicts, technological advances in weaponry and 
communications meant that timing and efficiency would be 
crucial; there would be no "phony war" to allow a 
gradual mobilisation. Instead, Commonwealth partners 
would need to take immediate action to confront an 
8 Ibid ., p.21 . 
9 Ibid ., p.6. 
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aggressor; expeditionary forces would be required 
10 in the theatre of operations within three months. 
The difficulty facing New Zealand was, therefore, how 
to achieve a potential war - footing in peacetime. 
The Chiefs of Staff advocated a new training 
policy, relative to the needs of the respective 
services. For example, both the navy and air force 
largely comprised of specialist professional personnel, 
with 65-75% of regular forces maintained . . 11 ln peacetlme. 
They were thus able to be mobilised with reasonable 
efficiency. By contrast, the army was based on "unskilled" 
infantrymen, requiring only a skeletal permanent force. 
Therefore, to be able to provide a full expeditionary 
force in the exigency of a major war, the Chiefs of 
Staff concluded that some form of national service 
training was required. Only this system could provide 
the necessary store of trained manpower. The navy and 
air force would also benefit by obtaining reserves of 
12 
unskilled and semi - skilled personnel. However, 
peacetime conscription was a highly sensitive issue for 
the Labour goverQment; and it was to take another two 
and a half years before any practical steps were taken 
here. 
Given the advances in science and technology, 
the Chiefs of Staff also stressed the need for effective 
Commonwealth co-operation in defence research. Powerful 
new weapons were now in e vid ence: 
10Ibid ., p.21. 
11 Ibid ., p.22. 
12 Ibid ., p.23. 
the atomic bomb, 
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bacteriological weapons, rockets, advanced submarines 
and o ° f 13 sonlC alrcra t. While these weapons were 
not about to change basic military concepts, it was 
essential that Commonwealth defence remained technically 
ad van ced . Here was the concept of deterrence already 
in evidence. The first Commonwealth Conference on 
Defence Science had been held in London in November 
1946 and an exten~ive programme of scientific research 
was being undertaken throughout the Commonwealth, in 
a deliberate dispersion of activity. The vast 
hinterlands of Canada and Australia were ideal locations 
for this development. It was hoped that New Zealand 
would participate in such projects by seconding 
scientific personnel overseas and by undertiking research 
projects appropriate to the country's needs and 
f ° 1 ° ° 14 aCl ltles. It was also agreed to increase co- operation 
between the defence authorities and scientific 
institutions such as the D. S.I.R. and the universities. 
This resulted in the establishment of the Defence Science 
Advisory Committee, modelled on a similar organisation 
lOn B °t ° 15 rl aln. 
New Zealand's role in wider Commonwealth 
strategy was highlighted by the visit of the Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff, Lord Montgomery, in July 1947. 
This was a major occasion in the New Zealand calendar, 
and the huge crowds and civic receptions that greeted 
Montgomery throughout the country gave the appearance 
of a surrogate royal tour. However, a combination of 
13IblOd., P 2 3 10 p • - , • 
14 COS Paper, Defence Science,26 July 1947, 
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of Montgomery's ascetic personal habits and a busy 
schedule meant that the full potential of the nation's 
hospitality was restrained. 16 New Zealand's British 
identity was manifestly displayed and Montgomery was 
apparently embarrassed by the depth of loyalty shown 
to the Mother Country. In his public statements, the 
Field Marshall stressed to his compliant audience the 
importance of Commonwealth solidarity: 
The biggest factor for peace is a strong and 
united British Empire. We must look to the 
British Commonwealth which, through strength, 
is able to enjoy peace and security and through 
its purpose and singleness of mind enjoys the 
respect of the world. 17 
However, Montgomery's tour was not just public 
relations and flag waving; extensive talks were also 
held with the government and Chiefs of Staff. These 
disoussions on one hand noted the changes in post-war 
strategy - the increased regional responsibility of 
the Dominions and the need to rely on the United States. 
Yet Montgomery also emphasised the continuity of 
broader Commonwealth defence: 
EA 81/4/3, pt.6; COS Paper,N.Z. Participation in 
Commonwealth Defence Science,25 September 1947, 
EA 81/4/3, pt.6. 
15Defence Science - Note of discussion at Army 
Headquarters 16 May 1947 EA 81/4/3, pt.6~ COS Paper, 
N.Z. Participation in Commonwealth Defence Science, 
25 September, ibid. 
16 EA 59/3/209, pt.l. 
17 Comments at State Luncheon,17 July,quoted 
Dominion,18 July 1947. 
Your preparation should be such as to enable 
you to deal with a threat whether it develops 
in the Pacific or in another vital theatre 
elsewhere. 18 
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The essential condition here was that "the forces be 
handy and ready to gO".19 New Zealand was again 
expected to contribute troops to the main theatre of 
action, regardless of regional responsibility. 
In peacetime, Montgomery recommended that New 
Zealand only required (and indeed could only afford) 
a territorial army, supported by a professional cadre, 
providing effective training. However, to maintain 
sufficient numbers and provide the necessary level of 
preparedness for an emergency, he advocated some form 
of national ser vi ce. A possible model was Britain, 
where all 18 year old males were required to do 12 months 
national service, followed by 6 years in the territorials. 
In New Zealand 's case, Montgomery stated that a minimum 
of 3 months compulsory training was required to support 
b I ff " t d f .. 20 a reason a y e lClen e ence organlsatlon. Obviously, 
it was up to the government to decide what suited its 
own needs, and certainly, the requirements of industry 
" 
warranted consideration. But in Montgomery's view, 
the maintenance of a voluntary force was a neglect of 
duty. This was an endorsement of the earlier views 
expressed by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. 
Significantly, Montgomery did not identify a 
18cabinet discussion with Montgomery, 17 July 1947, 
EA 156/1/1, pt.2. 
19 Ibid . 
20Cabinet discussion with Montgomery, 17 July 1947 , 
EA 156/1/1, pt.2. 
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major potential enemy. Germany and Japan were conqu e red 
and occupied; and despite the Soviet Union's aggressive 
stance, wartime devastation meant that it lacked the 
industrial base to support a large scale war in the 
immediate future. However, in such an event, Montgomery 
defined British defence priorities as three- fold; 
ensuring the security of the United Kingdom; maintaining 
vital sea communications; and retaining a firm hold on 
the Middle East. 21 New Zealand was expected to fit 
into this scheme. 
II. MOUNTING COLD WAR TENSIONS 
By 1948 Soviet/Western relations had dramatically 
declined as the post-war division of Europe became 
polarised into two ideological/territorial blocs, with 
each side increasingly suspicious of the other's 
intentions. The establishment of Soviet client states 
in Eastern Europe, climaxed by the Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948, was perceived as graphic 
evidence of expansionism. Moscow was further seen as 
undermining Wes~ern interests by supporting insurrection 
in Asia and the Mediterranean . Cold war conflict 
was highlighted by the imposition of the Berlin blockade 
in July 1948 and the subsequent Western airlift. 
International peace had become precariously balanced; 
Fraser publicly lamented that "the world is not a bright 
22 
and encouraging place at the moment". 
21 Ibid • 
22Statements and Documents, extract from P.M.'s 
Statement to House of Representatives, 28 February 1948, 
p .170. 
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The United Nations proved woefully ineffective 
in dealing with the deteriorating international climate. 
Despite progress in social and economic activities, 
Fraser admitted that "unfortunately, its failures loom 
much larger and are .• : more serious than its successes".23 
The blame was laid with Soviet aggression and 
intransigence. While Wellington maintained a commitment 
to the United Nations' principles, there appeared no 
likelihood of achieving an effec~ive system of universal 
collective security. New Zealand, instead, had to rely 
on the established defence ties of the Commonwealth and 
ultimately, the wider Western alliance. Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter guaranteed the right to such 
collective defence measures. Contributing to a possible 
war with the Soviet Union thus became New Zealand's 
defence rationale. Such a strategy would have been an 
anathema to Wellington and Canberra in 1946, but 
subsequent events had countered initial idealism. 
Certainly, the legacy of pre-war appeasement convinced 
the New Zealand government that a hard line was needed. 
As Fraser stated: "this is not Munich, this is not a 
sounding of retreat in the face of any dictatorship 
24 plans". 
As the Cold War deepened and the United Nations 
floundered, New Zealand consciously reaffirmed Commonwealth 
defence ties. Solidarity with Britain was aptly 
23 Ibid ., p.171. 
24Statements and Documents, 28 February 1948, 
p.174. 
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illustrated during the Berlin crisis, July 1948 to 
May 1949. In response to the Soviet blockade, New Zealand 
lent three Dakota air crews to serve with the Royal Air 
Force in the relief of the besieged city.25 By firmly 
pledging support for Britain's policy here, New Zealand 
clearly renewed the traditional imperial commitment. 
The boundary of the nation's security manifestly remained 
in Europe. 
A further Prime Ministers' Meeting was 
scheduled for 1948 and this served to re-emphasise 
New Zealand's commitment to Commonwealth defence. The 
National opposition was quick to accuse the government 
of past neglect of the Commonwealth in favour of the 
discredited United Nations. Doidge espoused the 
traditional imperialist line: 
For three years Empire statesmen have been 
attending one international conference after 
another. I submit that our crying need has 
been for Empire conferences. We have 
concentrated on the patching up of the crazy 
pavements of the new world edifice whilst our 
own great Empire threatens to disintegrate. 26 
The Commonwealth meeting, Doidge maintained, should 
aim to formalise d~fence solidarity. 
In their advice to the government prior to the 
Prime Ministers' Meeting; the Chiefs of Staff also 
affirmed the importance of collective Commonwealth defence; 
restating their 1947 thesis with a heightened urgency. 
In the event of war, New zealand would inevitably help 
Britain by concentrating its military effort in the 
25 N. Z • Cabinet Meeting, 3 September 1948 , 
CAB 1/1/1-1/7/1. 
26 NZPD , 8 September 1948, Vol. 282, p.2126. 
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decisive theatre of operation s. The nation's security 
was thus given the broadest basis: 
any suggestion that .•• the action we would be 
prepared to take in time of war should be 
restricted to a defined geographical region 
has the most dangerous implications. 27 
New Zealand's defence remained within a Commonwealth - wide 
context. 
However, the demands of modern warfare required 
effective defence preparation in peacetime. To achieve 
this, the Chiefs of Staff advocated co - ordinated 
planning between Commonwealth members, thereby ensuring 
concerted action in event of an emergency. Certainly, 
the Commonwealth war effort in World War II would have 
been more effecti v e if a definite system of defence 
co - operation had been in prior existence. 28 New Zealand 
had hoped that the exchange of joint service liaison 
staffs ( following the 1946 Prime Ministers' Meeting) 
would foster this co-operation. But the Commonwealth 
was a free association not a military alliance and some 
members refused to compromise their sovereignty by 
agreeing to integrated planning. Liaison staffs were 
thus mainly limited to the role of exchanging 
information. 29 
Sovereignty, rather than solidarity, was the 
pre vailing feature of the post-war Commonwealth. While 
Wellington reaffirmed a commitment to the concept of 
imperial defence, this was the government's individual 
27COS (48) Arrangements for World Security and 
the Position of New Zealand, 24 September 1948, 
EA 153 / 26 / 5, pt.l. 
28 Ibid • 
29 Ibid • 
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choice, reflecting the continuing dependence on 
Britain. Canada and South Africa, by contrast, were 
less dependent and would not accept their sovereignty 
being compromised by "promise and commitment".30 In 
the past, an informal understanding had united the 
Commonwealth in emergencies, but there was no guarantee 
that this would continue. There was consequent concern 
in Wellington that the Commonwealth was dividing rather 
th "" 31 an unltlng. The addition of three Asian members 
and the election of a Nationalist government in Pretoria 
was seen to further weaken the vestiges of defence 
solidarity. New Zealand thus noted with regret that 
Britain and its neighbours in Western Europe had 
formalised concrete defence arrangements that the 
Commonwealth had been unable to achieve, notw±thstanding 
special ties. New Zealand hoped th~t the Commonwealth 
32 
could achieve a similar arrangement. 
On the eve of his departure for the London 
meeting, Fraser delivered an ardently pro - Commonwealth 
speech: 
Our countries ~re free and independent and 
sovereign, but ••• without our Mother Country 
and without the strength that unity means 
among our countries our sovereignty would 
count for little. 33 
The United Nations, he admitted, had not achieved 
initial expectations and while scheduled to attend the 
30Canadian High Commissioner to Fraser, 
30 June 1948, EA 153/26/1, pt.l. 
31 h " d b MIt h" 1 t ~ d" Emp aSlse y c n os ln etter 0 ana lan 
High Commissioner, 23 August 1948 1 EA 153/26/5, pt.l. 
32McIntosh t~ Canadian High Commissioner, 
23 August 1948, EA 153/26/5, pt.l; COS(48) Arrangements 
for World Security, op.cit. EA 153/26/5, pt.l. 
33 NZPD , 28 September 1948, Vol. 283, p.2592. 
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General Assembly in Paris he was sceptical that 
positive results would be achieved. The time for 
idealism was clearly over and Fraser invoked the 
] a n guage of the Cold War, attacking the "dark, turgid, 
34 dangerous flood" of Communism, seen to be emanating 
from Moscow. It was essential, he declared, that the 
Commonwealth take a firm stand against Soviet 
aggression in Europe: 
The Western nations of Europe are threatened ... 
among the Western nations is the United Kingdom 
the centre, focus and force of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations ... New Zealand, as 
previously, is in the position where her frontiers 
are the frontiers of the British Commonwealth. 
The frontiers of the British Commonwealth are the 
frontiers of democracy.35 
Here was the traditional doctrine of imperial defence, 
not far removed from Massey's time. However, it 
remained to be seen if the other Commonwealth members 
would endorse this commitment. 
In accordance with the constitu~ional structure 
of the Commonwealth and in continuity with its 1946 
predecessor, the 1948 Prime Ministers' Meeting 
(10-22 October) was not a policy- making summit. It 
was, rather, an informal consultation, involving a 
free exchange of views. Certainly, with the presence 
of three new Asian members, the image of a free 
association of sovereign nations was accentuated, rather 
than New Zealand's continued perception of an imperial 
family. The meeting's chairman, Clement Attlee, readily 
agreed that it was incongruous to talk of a "Commonwealth 
34 Ibid ., p.2599. 
35 NZPD , 28 September 1948, Vol. 283, p.2599. 
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view"; it was rather a matte r of fully a ppre ciati ng 
the individual policie s of Canada, India or New 
Zealand. Further, it was proposed that there should 
be more emphasis on matters involving particular 
dominions - a regional focus - rather than the 
36 traditional broad inter-Commonwealth approach. 
New Zealand did not accept such views. Fraser 
had earlier written to Chifley expressing his concern 
that the Commonwealth appeared to be "dr ifting apart " 
on "matters of vital importance".37 Consequently, 
Fraser told the meeting that his government was vitally 
concerned with developments in Europe and would oppose 
any moves confi ning consultation to countries from a 
parti c ular region. The Commonwealth, he maintained, 
should be striving to achieve a common defence policy, 
and suggested a re -examination of John Curtin's 1944 
proposals for the creation of a Commonwealth 
SecI·etariat. 38 The advocacy of permanent machinery and 
defence commitments was not a diminution of New Zealand's 
independence, but the result of inherent interdependence, 
heightened by the unstable international situation. 
Unlike Canada's North American destiny, South Africa's 
aspiring Afrikaner nationalism or India's newly found 
independence, New Zealand's identity and security remained 
externally focused, centred on a united British Commonwealth. 
36 pMM (48) Minutes of 7th meeting, 18 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
37Fraser to ChifleYi 27 May 1948, EA 153/26/1, pt.l . 
38 pMM (48 ) Minutes of 4th meeting, 12 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
215 
In contrast to the international optimism of 
the 1946 meeting (where Australia and New Zealand 
criticised the anti - Soviet views of the British 
government), there was a general Cold War consensus 
regarding the apparent Soviet threat. Fraser reflected 
the feelings of most leaders by asserting "that under 
Russian inspiration Communism was becoming synonymous 
with aggression".39 However, Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin pointed out that Moscow wanted to achieve 
40 its ends "by all means short of war". This primarily 
involved supporting insurrection in underdeveloped 
countries. It was, therefore, agreed that positive 
social and economic policies (following the example of 
the post-war rehabilitation of Western Europe) were the 
most appropriate methods of combating the spread of 
C . 41 ommunlsm. 
The British authorities still maintained that 
the Soviet Union was unlikely to provoke war in the 
immediate future, particularly as it lacked sufficient 
economic infrastructure, airpower or atomic weapons. 
But effective defence planning was essential; in the 
event of armed conflict, the Soviet Union's vast 
military forces would have immediate numerical advantage 
and could threaten to overrun much of Europe and the 
Middle East. The armed forces, therefore, had to be in 
a position to be able to strike back "hard and 
immediately".42 Despite advances in technology, the 
39 Ibid • 
40 pMM (48) Minutes of 3rd meeting, 12 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
41 pMM (48) Minutes of 3rd and 4th meetings, 
12 October 1948, EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
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United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff disreg a rded the 
possibility of a "push button war"; e stablished military 
strategies would remain. In the event of war, Britain's 
defence priorities were spelt out: the immediate defence 
of the British Isles; a strategic offensive in Europe; 
the maintenance of communications with the Commonwealth 
and the United States; and the defence of the Middle 
43 East. Here was a strategy that New Zealand easily 
endorsed. Though, clearly, this could not be achieved 
in a solely Commonwealth context; the active support 
of Western Europe and particularly, the United States 
was essential. 
While the special defence responsibilities of 
individual Commonwealth nations was recognised, the 
British Chiefs of Staff emphasised that effective defence 
preparation required close co-operation and consUltation. 
If governments would agree to co - ordinate their 
respective strategies and unite on general principles 
and objectives, the securJty of members would be greatly 
strengthened. It was thus hoped that a greater 
utilisation of the joint service liaison system would 
allow military staffs the opportunity to co - operate more 
extensively on a planning level - subject to the approval 
44 
of respective governments. 
Fraser gave strong support to Britain's proposals, 
42 Lord Tedder, PMM(48) Minutes of 11th meeting, 
20 .0ctober 1948, EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
43 U. K. COS 'Commonweal th Defence Co - operation', 
23 September 1948, EA 153/26/1, pt.l. 
44 pMM (48), U . K. Government memo 'The World 
Situation and its Defence Aspects'; U.K. COS memo, 
'Commonwealth Defence Co - operation', 23 September 1948, 
EA 153/26/1, pt.2; PMM(48) Minutes of 11th meeting, 
20 October 1948, EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
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but in contrast to the Canadi a n or South African 
delega t ions, h i s emphas is was on unitary Commonwealth 
defence rather than a regional division of responsibility.45 
While acknowledging New Zeal a nd's vested interest in 
Pacific security, he maintained that this was not an 
area of strategic priority. In any case, regional 
concentration was seen as counter productive as no 
country - given technological advances in warfare - could 
stand in isolation. Fraser thus asserted that 
Commonwealth governments should pool their defence plans 
and even asked the British authorities to recommend how 
N I d ld b t . b . . ff 46 ew Zea an cou est con rl ute to a JOlnt war e ort. 
Here was a stance in c ontinuity with the ardent imperialism 
of earlier conservative governments. 
Defence co - operation was, of course, part of 
wider inter- Commonwealth consultation, including foreign 
and economic matters. As sovereign nations, members 
were free to consult and co- operate, but there could be 
no compulsory obligations and standing machinery was 
unacceptable (though not to New Zealand). The Prime 
Ministers did, however, agree to submit proposals to 
their governments formalising the accepted methods of 
consultation - more frequent Ministerial meetings and 
a greater exchange of information. At Fraser's suggestion, 
a paragraph on defence was included: 
In furtherance of the general aim of co - operation 
between all peace - loving nations to deter and 
resist aggression there will be close consultation 
between Commonwealth governments to arrange 
co - operative action in matters of defence, 
including those matters which arise from a common 
interest in a particular region. The military 
advisers of those governments will consult 
45 h . f McIntos ln ormed Shanahan that New Zealand was 
together to frame proposals and plans for 4 
submission to their respective governments. 7 
It was up to indivIdual Dominions to decide the 
degree of co - operation desired. In New Zealand's 
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case, extensive planning did develop, both regionally -
culminating in the ANZAM arrangement - and from a 
wider imperial commitment. 
New Zealand's continued commitment to 
collective Commonwealth defence was highlighted at the 
brief Prime Ministers' Meeting in April 1949. While 
forced to accept India's repudiation of common 
allegiance, Fraser wanted an assurance that member 
nations would continue to provide mutual assistance in 
t . 48 war lme. In Fraser's view this was the essential 
test of the Commonwealth's viability: 
it was the essence of the Commonwealth that 
its members should desire to help one another, 
whether in peace or war. 49 
Nehru was quick to repudiate this narrow interpretation 
of the responsibilities of membership.50 Certainly, 
since the Chanak Crisis of 192~ the independence of 
/ 
members' defence policies wast apparent. But New Zealand's 
dependence on Britain, coupled with the cold war, 
saw Wellington unilaterally invoke a revised imperial 
strategy. 
This policy was illustrated with regard to 
Hong Kong in 1949. In the wake of the Communist victory 
the only Dominion not stressing regionalism "first, 
foremost and last", 23 October 1948, EA 156/1/1, pt.2. 
46 pMM (48) Minutes of 11th meeting, 20 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
47 pMM (48) Annex Commonwealth Consultation, 
21 October 1948, EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
48 pMM (49) Minutes of 3rd meeting, 25 April 1949, 
EA 153/27/4, pt.l. 
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in the Chinese Civil War, the security of the Crown 
Colony was potentially at risk. Peking was primarily 
pre - occupied with the immense problems of consolidation 
and reconstruction, but a weakened Britain and the 
lack of geographical barriers left Hong Kong open to 
attack or, at least, subversion. In fact, the British 
51 government seriously considered abandoning the colony. 
London, however, finally resolved to stand firm, 
canvassing support from its Commonwealth partners. 
The New Zealand Cabinet discussed the matter on 
10 June 1949. Fraser recognised some legitimacy in 
China's claim to the territory, but it was agreed 
that any British capitulation would be a very dangerous 
precedent, particularly in the face of developments in 
South-East Asia. 52 New Zealand subsequently provided 
three Dakota aircraft and 57 personnel to help the R.A.F. 
carry supplies from Singapore to Hong Kong. Three 
frigates were also made available, if required. 53 
The Prime Ministers' Meetings of 1948 and 1949 
were particularly valuable in giving New Zealand the 
'. 
opportunity to consult with British defence authorities 
on the most effective contribution to a future 
Commonwealth war effort. In the event of war, the 
United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff recommended New Zealand's 
surplus military resources be concentrated in the vital 
49 pMM (49) Minutes of 6th meeting, 25 April 1949, 
EA 153/27/4, pt.l. 
50Ibid • 
51p. Darby, British Defence Policy - East of Suez 
1947- 1968 (London, 1973), p.18. 
52Cabinet Meeting, 10 June 1949, CAB 1/1/1-1/7/1. 
53 NZPD , 18 August 1949, Vol. 286, p.1381. 
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strategic t heatre, thereby endorsing the earlier 
vi ews of their New Zealand counterparts. Obviously, 
wartime conti ngen cies would determine the extent of 
this imperial contribution, but the apparent security 
of the Pacific indicated that the focus of New 
Zealand's military action would not be regional. The 
British highlighted the crucial strategic importance 
of the Middle East - the focal point for inter-Commonwealth 
communication, a region with important Britis h bases, a 
buffer for Africa and Asia, and a major source of oil 
reserves - and suggested New Zealand would most 
effectively contribute to Commonwealt h defence here. 
However, in terms of New Zealand's vital trade routes, 
most of the nation's trade went via Panama rather than 
55 Suez; New Zealand would be defending imperial, rather 
than national interests. But the Middle East had 
provided the focus of New Zealand's military action in 
two world wars and was seen as the most appropriate 
location for future wartime acti vity . 
Wellington agreed that in the event of war it 
would despatch to the Middle East an expeditionary force 
of one infantry division, including an armoured brigade, 
as well as a tactical air force contingent and surplus 
56 
naval vessels. The pro vi sion of a large proportion 
of the air force was a significant departure from earlier 
plans which had restricted its role to Pacific defence -
54Council of Defence (49)2, A Statement of the 
Problems Confronting the Army in Event of an Emergency, 
26 February 1949, EA 81 /14/ 5, pt.l. 
55MacGibbOn, 'The Defence of New Zealand', p.154. 
56 CD (49)2 , A Statement of the Problems 
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evidence of the pervasivene s s of imperial security. 
Time was the essential factor in achieving this 
commitment. The British authorities stressed that in 
the face of a Soviet onslaught, troops would be required 
for action as soon as possible - there would be no 
breathing space for a" p h 0 n y war". It was, therefore, 
requested that the expeditionary force of some 25,000 
should complete formative training and embark by 
"0 + 50" and be ready for operation by "0 + 90 I' . 57 This 
contrasted with the 18 months required after the 
declaration of war in 1939, before the 2 NZEF was ready 
for active service, and even then insufficient training 
produced heavy casualties. 
Since 1947 the established consensus in defence 
circles was that military obligations could only be 
achieved by some form of national service. The New 
Zealand Chiefs of Staff and Lord Montgomery had both 
expressed this opinion. In turn, the Minister of 
Defence, Fred Jones, had told parliament on 14 July 1948 
that he believed a degree of compulsion was required to 
provide an adequate territorial force, let alone an 
expeditionary 58 one. There was strong support for such 
a policy from influential groups like the R.S.A. and 
the New Zealand Defence League. Major - General Howard 
Kippenberger, President of the R.S.A. and war hero, 
played a prominent role here. By March 1949, the R.S . A.-
backed Joint Defence Action Committee launched a 
newspaper campaign pressing for compulsory military 
. 59 
serVlce. 
Confronting the Army in Even t of an Emergency, 
26 Febru a ry 1949, EA 81/14/5, pt.l. 
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The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff strongly 
advocated a national service programme as the only 
satisfactory method of providing the requisite 
expeditionary force within the prescribed time limit. 
This was a particularly urgent need as the territorial 
system had not been revived after the war, putting 
the army in a worse position for mobilisation than 
in 1914 or 1939. Continuing with voluntary enlistment 
in peacetime was thus a luxury New Zealand could not 
afford. Upon the outbreak of war, such a system would 
require 15 months to train an expeditionary force, and 
given the heavy casualties received by 2 NZEF during 
its first engagements in 1941, this period was insufficient. 
Even with the immediate introduction of national service 
for 18 year olds, an expeditionary force of fully 
trained reservists would take six years to achieve. 60 
New Zealand clearly had to hope that war was not a short 
term prospect. 
National service in peacp.time was a very 
controversial and sensitive matter for the Labour 
government. It contravened traditional party principles 61 
and was potentially divisive, requiring a cautious 
approach, particularly in an election year. Fraser 
57 Ibid • 
58 NZPD , 14 July 1948, Vol. 280, p.605. 
59 W. R• McLennan,' The Last Years of the First 
Labour Government 1945- 49' (M.A. - Thesis, Unive-rslty of 
Auckland) 1963, p~255 . . 
60A Statement of the Problems Confronting the 
Army in the Event of an Emergency. Army H. Q. , 
26 February 1949, EA 81/14/5, pt.l. 
61 For example, the 1919 Labour Party 
resolved to abolish a ll military training. 
Gardner, pp.355-356. 
Conference 
McIntyre and 
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alluded to the government's problem when addressing 
the National Council of the Federation of Labour in 
February 1949 but was non - commital. 62 Faced with a 
political quandary, the government subsequently appointed 
a special Caucus Committee to examine the whole question 
of New Zealand's defence responsibilities and to advise 
on the most appropriate action. 
At the committee's first meeting, 29 March 1949, 
Fraser reminded the members of Labour's resolution on 
taking office in 1935, that they would: "Consider the 
situation and take what steps were necessary for the 
defence of the country".63 Fraser personally saw no 
alternative to compulsory military service. This was 
not, he stressed, an invocation of militarism, but 
a necessary contribution to the Commonwealth and 
therefore, New Zealand's security. However, he was also 
very conscious that this was a major political issue, 
in which the needs of the country, the government and 
11 . d . d t' 64 the Labour Party a requlre conSl era lone The 
government was in a dilemma; on one hand, there was the 
threat of dividing the party in election year; while, 
alternatively, the opposition was likely to gain 
political capital if no action was taken. 
Most of the committee supported the Prime 
Minister's lead. Nash proposed that national service 
should be promoted as a civic duty on the Swiss model, 
thereby hoping to placate the trade unions. Phillip 
62 Round Table, June 1949 Vol. 39, No. 155, p.293. 
63Caucus Committee on Defence, Minutes of first 
meeting, 29 March 1949, EA 81/24/3, pt.l. 
64caucus Committee on Defence, Minutes of third 
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Connolly noted that it was only right for New Zealand 
to increase its defence commitment, as the nation's 
present per capita expenditure of £7.4 compared 
unfavourably with Britain's £15.2 or Canada's £12.14. 
However, not all members were compliant. Angus McLagan 
maintained that there was insufficient threat to 
warrant national service; Germany and Japan were 
non-contenders and the Soviet Union seemed to prefer 
the methods of propaganda and subversion. Concern was 
also expressed about the political repercussions with 
many traditional Labour voters and of the effects on 
. d t 65 In us ry. 
The final report of the Caucus Committee 
reiterated that New Zealand's most appropriate and useful 
contribution to Commonwealth defence was despatching an 
expeditionary force to the vital theatre. To meet the 
required establishments involved here, the committee 
concluded that the following annual intake was necessary: 
Regular Forces 
Navy 350 
Army 500 
Air Force 500 
1,350 
Non - Regular Forces 
Navy 
Army 
Air Force 
280 
7,200 
500 
7,980 
66 
meeting, 13 May 1949, EA 81/24/3, pt.l. 
65 Caucus Committee on Defence, Minutes of third 
meeting, 13 May 1949, EA 81/24/3, pt.l. 
66Caucus Committee on Defence Report , 25 May 1949, 
EA 81 /24/1, pt.l. 
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Clearly, the more professional navy and air force 
were relatively self-s ufficient compared to the large 
manpower requirements of the army. Given the logistics 
involved, the existing voluntary system was deemed 
futile; national service was thus the only effective 
method available. The committee refuted the traditional 
contention of "no conscription in peacetime": 
The peculiar theory that its introduction must 
necessarily be delayed until the outbreak of 
hostilities arises from an madequate appreciation 
of the conditions today, the result of which 
might well prove to be suicidal ... The 
conditions that are likely to arise immediately 
upon the outbreak of any major war in the future 
and the substantial period now required to train 
men ... make it essential, if we are to meet our 
responsibilities, that the force be organised 
and substantially trained in peace time. 
The committee noted that existing legislation (the 
1909 Defence Act and Emergency Regulations) provided 
for compulsory military training, but concluded that 
a new A . 67 ct was more approprlate. 
68 Armed with cabinet and caucus approval, Fraser 
presented the government's policy for endorsement at 
the Labour Party's National Conference in May 1949. In 
attempting to make the proposal palatable, Fraser 
stressed the menace of the Soviet Union and the need 
to defend New Zealand by defending the British 
Commonwealth - "with which the destiny of New Zealand 
is wholly and completely bound up".69 New Zealand, he 
argued, needed to take this step to ensure its own 
67 . f Caucus Commlttee on De ence Repor~ 25 May 194~ 
EA 81/24/1, pt.l. 
68 b . . 0 1 1 1 Ca lnet Meetlng,2 May 1949, CAB 1 1 - 1/1/7. 
69 N.Z . Labour Party, Report of 33rd Annual 
Conference 1949, McIntyre and Gardner, p . 425 . 
security: 
We must be ready to defend the country. I 
must have my answer ... we will literally be 
criminals if we do not take every step to 
protect our shores. 70 
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A large portion of the party rank and file were 
not easily won over by this Prime Ministerial rhetoric. 
In fact, by the opening of the conference, some 16 
Trade Councils were openly expressing their opposition 
to the t f . t · 71 prospec s 0 conscrlp lone While the floor 
accepted resolutions regarding the effective defence 
of New Zealand and the Commonwealth, there was 
considerable opp6sition to the provision calling for 
compulsory national service, if the government saw such 
a measure as essential. Here was a betrayal of ·one 
of the basic tenets of Labour philosophy. An amendment 
was subsequently proposed re-st ating the party's 
"opposition to conscription in peace; and in war 
reasserts its support for equal conscription of wealth 
72 
and manpower". To a v oid a n embarrassing impasse, 
Fraser produced a compromise amendment requesting that 
the government: 
use all resources of the country essential 
for the defence a nd preservation of our people, 
our country and our Commonwealth and that if 
the resources are not available without 
compulsory National Service, the Government be 
requested to obtain the views of the electors 
on the question by a referendum. 73 
This was a significant concession as the government 
70 Quoted Round Table September 1949, Vol. 39, 
No. 156, p.388. 
71 McLennan, p.255. 
72 McIntyre a nd Gardner, p.425. 
73McIntyre and Gardner, p.425. 
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had originally proposed to use conscription as an 
election platform, rather than making it the subject 
of a special referendum - the dangerous consequences 
of which had been discussed. 74 
Official policy was finally announced in the 
Speech from the Throne, June 1949. The Governor -Ge neral 
declared that national service was the only effective 
means of providing the required troops for an emergency 
and that legislation providing for a referendum on 
the issue would be introduced. In response, the 
opposition strongly attacked the government, accusing 
it of vacillating and becoming a captive of its left 
wing. Here was an administration, Holland claimed, who 
were long aware of its responsibilities, but had 
f . . . . 75 alled to take any posltlve actlon. Some Labour 
backbenchers also expressed misgivings. For example, 
Frank Langstone (Roskill) argued that advancing 
technology threatened to make large expeditionary forces 
an anachronism and that the most suitable form of 
defence was a large air force with superior striking 
power. 76 Such comments reflected growing divisions in 
the party. 
The government subsequently mounted a large 
scale campaign for the referendum. As feared, national 
service did alienate many traditional Labour supporters 
as well as members of the intelligentsia. Fraser's 
74Caucus Committee on Defence, 6th meeting, 
19 May 1949, EA 81/24/3; pt.l; Cabinet Meeting, 
20 May 1949, CAB 1/1/1 - 1/1/7. 
75 NZ PD , 29 June 1949, Vol. 285, pp.33 -35. 
76 NZPD , 30 June 1949, Vol. 285, p . 83. 
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public meetings were disrupted by angry protestors 
and pamphlets were distributed highlighting the irony 
of Fraser's imprisonment in 1916 for opposing the 
77 
war effort. The results of the poll, held 3 August, 
strongly endorsed national service (534,031 to 160,998),78 
but it was significant that, despite the campaign's high 
profile and the Prime Minister's emphasis that it was 
79 
a "1 if e and de at h m a t _t e r" , 4 0% 0 f the e 1 e c tor ate 
stayed away. Certainly, the accompanying controversy 
dealt a hard blow to Labour; the government managed 
to rile both the left and the right. The National 
Party and its supporters saw the plebiscite as a show 
of weakness and a waste of time and money.80 In turn, 
many trade unionists and party activists saw the 
government betraying a basic Labour precept. However, 
the oonscription issue Wffimorea symptom than the 
cause of Labour's subsequent defeat in the general 
election - a focus for disillusionment with a long 
serving government. 
A lot of criticism has been levelled at Fraser 
over the reintroduction of compulsory military training -
the 1916 anti - war protestor turned Cold War crusader. 
However, the political reality of the government's 
position has to be realised. The Soviet Union's policies 
were perceived as threatening, requiring effective 
77 Thorn, p.269. 
78MacGibbon, 'Defence of New Zealand 1945-57', p.156. 
79 NZPD , 8 September 1949, Vol. 287, p.2221. 
80The opposition resoundly criticised the 
of £100,000 of public money when the government 
have taken immediate legislative action . NZPD, 
8 September 1949 Vol . 287, p . 1768. ----
spending 
could 
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countermeasures . Labour had witnessed the futility 
of pre - war appeasement and now saw the United Nations 
following in the impotent footsteps of its predecessor. 
It was, therefore, seen as essential to contribute to 
the proven arrangement of Commonwealth collective 
security (even if other member nations did not accept 
this commitment); and national service was deemed 
the only effective method of doing so. This decision 
was not taken lightly, evidenced by the long period of 
investigation - even indecision - and the government 
was very conscious of the political complications 
involved. Nevertheless, the ongoing commitment to the 
British Commonwealth was decisive. 
III. THE WESTERN UNION 
While some Commonwealth members remained 
unwilling to compromise their sovereignty by formal ising 
defence arrangements, the establishment of the Western 
Union saw Britain and its European neighbours forge 
extensive defence ties. The Brussels Pact, 17 March 1947, 
linked the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux 
nations in a treaty of mutual assistance. Permanent 
defence machinery was subsequently created: a military 
planning staff, secretariat, military supply board and 
committee of Defence Ministers. Negotiations were also 
proceeding to further underwrite the security of Western 
Europe by a North Atlantic Treaty, involving the United 
States and Canada. Such institutional arrangements 
were a considerable advance from the Commonwealth's 
231 
exchange of joint service liaison officers. New 
Zealand regretted that foreign nations could achieve 
a degree of military co-operation with Britain, that 
Commonwealth members were unable to, despite special 
t . 81 leSe 
Wellington welcomed moves to consolidate the 
security of Western Europe, but the implications of 
Britain's membership of the Western Union required 
serious consideration. In the Speech from the Throne, 
22 June 1948, the government expressed its hope that 
"a closer economic, defensive, and spiritual union" 
in Europe would not affect "the historic unity" of the 
British commonwealth. 82 There was some concern that 
Britain would now be even less involved in the Pacific, 
and would become excessively pre-occupied with European 
rather than wider imperial interests: 
We look with no enthusiasm on the sUbstitution 
of another group for the Commonwealth, and we 
see a positive danger to our own security if 
some members of the Commonwealth should concentrate 
too closely upon one region, namely, Western 
Europe and the Atlantic. 83 
There was also recognition that New Zealand would be 
increasingly tied to a wider Western European commitment, 
given the established obligations to Britain. 84 
London kept in close consultation with its 
Commonwealth partners over developments in Europe. 
81McIntosh to Canadian High Commissioner, 
23 August 1948, EA 153/26/5, pt.l. 
82 NZPD , 22 June 1948, Vol. 280, p.2. 
83 McIntosh to Canadian High Commissioner, 
23 August 1948, OPe cit; Joint Planning Council, 
Arrangements for Security, 17 September 194& EA 156/1/1, 
pt.2. 
84 Foss Shanahan, Defence Questions, 9 September 
1948, EA 156/1/1, pt . 2. 
232 
Attlee strongly refuted opposition claims that the 
Dominions were being abandoned in favour of foreigners 
While I want to get as close as we can with the 
other nations, we have to bear in mind that we 
are not solely a European power but8g member of 
a great Commonwealth and Empire •.. 
At the 1948 Prime Ministers' Meeting the Commonwealth 
leaders endorsed the Western Union as a regional 
association in accordance with the United Nations 
86 Charter. Bevin emphasised that it was not a defence 
bloc working at the expense of the Commonwealth, but 
"rather an association of nations on the lines of the 
87 Commonwealth". Nevertheless, the Western Union 
went considerably further in terms of defence 
co-operation than the Commonwealth. European defence 
was advanced again with the formal conclusion of the 
North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, confirming the 
precedence of the wider Western Alliance, centred on 
the power of the United States. 
In the post - war context it was manifestly 
anachronistic to speak in terms of a Commonwealth 
defence strategy. Member nations were free to determine 
their own defence policies and were not bound by any 
formal obligations. But, given a very real economic 
and emotional dependence on the United Kingdom, coupled 
with Cold War conflict, New Zealand chose to reaffirm 
85 House of Commons, 5 May 1948, Mansergh, 
Documents II, p.1133. 
86 pMM (48) Final Communique,22 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
87 . 
PMM(48) Mlnutes of 10th meeting, 19 October 1948, 
EA 153/26/4, pt.l. 
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its traditional commitment to collective Commonwealth 
security. The nation's first line of defence remained 
wherever British interests were threatened - evidently 
in Europe rather than the Pacific. New Zealand 
consequently, tightened its commitment to "imperial 
strategy", highlighted by the reintroduction of 
compulsory military training. In doing so, New Zealand 
was ultimately contributing to wider Western defence, 
though this was expressed in traditional Commonwealth 
terms. 
23 4 
CONCLUSION 
Some great achievements have been made in 
the matter of holding the British Commonwealth 
of Nations together. There has been a certain 
amount of give and take and a good deal of 
elasticity, but the cement that binds seems to 
be sufficient . . . It is largely a ma t ter of 
sentiment and of mutual benefit, but in spite 
of all the stresses and strains, that great 
precursor of any successful United Nations 
establishment, t he British ' Commonwealth of 
Nations, still carries on. 
Rev. C. Carr, NZPD, 5 July 1949 
Vol. 285, p.206. 
By the time of the defeat of the first Labour 
government in 1949, New Zealand ' s sovereign status was 
manifest. The Statute of Westminster had been finally 
adopted, an indigenous citizenship created, a greater 
participation in the international community achieved, 
and an increased role in Pacific affairs sought. 
Such achievements were seen as New Zealand's rightful 
due, as Peter Fraser asserted in November 1947: 
The nationhood of our country is accepted in 
common with that of every other British 
Dominion, and we expect as our natural right 
and function to be represented independently 
and to express opinions ... It is beyond 1 
argument that that is a right of our country. 
At the United Nations and the numerous economic and 
political conferences that dominated the post - war years, 
New Zealand enunciated its own policies, with its 
political leaders playing an active international role. 
Clearly, New Zealand had its own place to maintain in 
the world. 
1 NZPD , 7 November 1947, Vol. 279, p.532. 
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However, independence was not seen as an 
end in itself. The New Zealand government strongly 
advocated the cause of greater international co-operation, 
as illus t rated by the established ties of the British 
Commonwealth. Fraser had endorsed the Commonwealth 
as a model in microcosm for the newly established 
United Nations in 1945: 
We British peoples have learnt that, as well as 
being independent, we are interdependent ... 
the future of the world depends upon our 
r ecog nition of the interdependence of all 
nations, and upon the co-operation of one nation 
with another . • . That recognition ••. is even 
greater than a nation realising its own genius 
and wanting to break away from its existing 
association and claiming independence. 2 
New Zealand's independence was, therefore, supplemented 
by an inherent commitment to the Commonwealth. This 
was primarily the traditional bi - lateral relationship 
with the Mother Country, though other ties emerged in 
the post - war environment, notably increasing regional 
co-operation with Australia. 
Commonwealth membership was thus a 
fundamental paradox: the juncture of autonomy and 
unity. New Zealand saw this as the ideal balance . 
There were, however, tensions between the roles of 
independent small state and loyal Dominion. By 1949, 
any such balance had markedly tipped in the Commonwealth's 
favour, with traditional ties of trade, defence, 
constitutionalism and sentiment reaffirmed and even 
strengthened. This was aptly symbolised by the election 
2Statement by Frase r as Chairman of the 
Trusteeship Committee of the San Francisco Conference 
June 1945. Statements and Document s , p.93 . 
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in 1949 of a new National government, headed by a 
New Zealand born Prime Minister far more adamantly 
"imperialistic" than his British born Labour 
predecessor. 
, 
In economic terms, New Zealand remained 
inextricably bound to Britain, its major trading 
partner and the banker of its international currency 
reserves. Post-war exigencies saw the continuity of 
bulk purchasing, whereby New Zealand sent its surplus 
meat and dairy products to Britain at below market 
prices. In turn, New Zealand agreed to restrict 
imports and limit consumption to help maintain Sterling 
Area reser ves. There was some conflict here with New 
Zealand's own immediate interests, but the rationale 
was that New Zealand was helping itself by helping 
Britain's economic recovery. However, this served to 
reinforce a colonial economy and economic dependency. 
Professor Beaglehole's comments of 1938 still applied: 
"New Zealand, in fact, psychologically has remained 
a colony because economically it has remained a 
colony.,,3 
In terms of defence, Commonwealth ties 
remained pre - eminent. The post - war period confirmed 
Britain's inability to exercise a major role in the 
Pacific, but New Zealand and Australia attempted to 
counter this by increased regional co - operation. The 
Canberra Pact provided an extensive (if over ambitious) 
3J • C. Beaglehole, 'New Zealand in the 
Commonwealth: An Attempt at Objectivity', Contemporary 
New Zealand, New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs (Wellington, 1938), p.3. 
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basis for a "regional sphere of British influence" 
and was followed by such developments as the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in Australia and ANZAM. However, 
without the participation of the undisputed Pacific power, 
the United States, such arrangements were necessarily 
limited in scope. But, Washington was not prepared to 
enter into any security arrangements with the Pacific 
Dominions, thereby ensuring the continued primacy of 
Commonwealth regional defence. On a wider scale, 
the Labour government's initial hopes for an effective 
system of universal collective security, under the 
aegis of the United Nations, were dashed as the divisions 
of the Cold War became entrenched. Initial international 
idealism was thus replaced by a re - emphasis on 
traditional imperial defence . This was dramatically 
highlighted by the re - introduction of compulsory 
military training in 1949, thereby ensuring that New 
Zealand could effectively contribute to the defence 
of British interests in the Middle East. This commitment 
was maintained until 1955. Here, then, was the 
traditional notion that New Zealand's first line of 
defence was wherever the Empire was threatened - in 
direct continuity with the policies of past conservative 
governments. 
In constitutional terms, New Zealand's 
independence was still expressed as part of a wider 
Commonwealth identity. The British monarch was the 
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head of state and loyalty to the Crown was pronounced. 
New Zealanders saw themselves as a "British" people (in 
its broadest sense) and referred to the United Kingdom 
as "home". As Fraser expressed in 1947: "We are 
people of the same race, or have been merged into the 
one British.,,4 This did not demean New Zealand's 
sovereignty, but reflected important mythical and 
emotional bonds. Consequently, while the adoption of 
the Statute of Westminster and the establishment of 
a New Zealand citizenship confirmed independence, they 
primarily served to reinforce Commonwealth unity 
rather than a distinct national identity. 
New Zealand's devotion to the Commonwealth was 
particularly illustrated by its conservative approach 
to Asian membership. The government welcomed a 
resolve to the protracted issue of Indian independence, 
but adamantly opposed any perceived weakening of an 
effective Commonwealth united by common allegiance to 
the Crown and mutual support in war and peace. The 
Indian government's policies of republicanism and 
non-alignment thus contradicted Wellington's view of 
the Commonwealth. The implicit basis of the 
Commonwealth was, however, a free association of 
sovereign nations; while New Zealand was free to define 
its Commonwealth relationship in definite commitments, 
other members did not, as Canada and South Africa had 
long showed. India's continued membership as a 
4 NZPD, 7 November 1947, Vol. 279, p.534. 
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republic was ultimately accepted but on the condition 
that New Zealand's status was unaffected . 
By emphasising traditional Commonwealth ties 
New Zealand, in fac t , ~ose to downplay significant 
post - war changes. The Commonwealth was not, by its 
very nature, a united bloc, and was even less so in 
the new international environment . Individual 
sovereignty, coupled with a weakened Britain, ensured 
that the Commonwealth could not be compared to the 
military and economic might of the United States and 
the Soviet Union . Commonwealth members had, in fact, 
become in practice part of the wider Western 
alliance based on American power . This is not to 
suggest New Zealand was blind to international reality; 
Wellington's desire to forge a regional defence 
agreement with Washington and to increase exports to 
the Dollar Area reflected realistic perceptions. 
However, established emotional and material bonds to 
Britain - continued security in a changing world -
meant that New Zealand remained the bastion of the 
"Old Commonwealth l • in a new age . 
2 40 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY 
1. UNPUBLISHED 
(A) Official Papers - National Archives, Wellington 
CAB 1/1/1 - 1/1/7 
EA 56/1/3, pt. 1A 
EA 56/2/2, pt. 1 
EA 56/2/5, pt. 1 - 4 
EA 58/1/1, pt. 1A 
EA 58/2/2/1, pte 2 - 3 
EA 58/2/2/4, pte 1 
EA 58/2/2/9, pte 1 
EA 58/207/1, pte 1A 
EA 59/2/102, pte 1 
EA 59/2/143, pt. 1 
EA 59/3/209, pt . 1 
EA 59/3/331, pt . 1 
EA 59/3/344, pt. 1 
EA 59/3/381, pt. 1 
EA 59/3/452, pt. 1 
Cabinet Papers 1948-49. 
New Zealand's interest 
in the Pacific 1944- 47. 
External Affairs Committee, 
notice of meetings 1947- 56 . 
External Affairs Committee, 
Master set of documents and 
papers 1947-51. 
U. K. Foreign Policy. 
Trade with U.K. 
Trade with U.K. 
Trade, Primary Products. 
External Relations, Ireland . 
New Zealand delegation to 
Commonwealth Conference on 
Japanese Peace Settlement, 
Canberra, 1947. 
Nash and party to 
conference on dollar crisis, 
London, 1949. 
Visit of Lord Montgomery . 
Visit of Eamon de Valer a. 
Visit of Sir Norman Brook. 
Visit of Lord Listowell. 
Visit of Patrick Gordon 
Walker. 
EA 81/4/1, pt. 1 
EA 81/4/2A, pt. 4 
EA 81/4/3, pt. 1 - 6 
EA 81/14/1, pt. 1 
EA 81/14/2, pt. 1 
EA 81/14/3, pt. 1 
EA 81/14/4, pt. 1 
EA 81/14/5, pt. 1 
EA 81/24/1, pt. 1 
EA 81124/2, pt. 1 
EA 81/24/3, pt. 1 
EA 87/11/2, pt. 1 
EA 87/11/4, pt. 1 
EA 87/11/6, pt. 1 
EA 87/11/14, pt. 1 
EA 87/11/18, pt. 1 - 2 
EA 87/11/20, pt. 1 
241 
New Zealand Chiefs of 
Staff, Meetings and 
Agenda 1937-47. 
New Zealand Chiefs of 
Staff, Minutes of 
Meetings 1945- 47 . 
New Zealand Chiefs of 
Staff, Papers 1935 - 47. 
New Zealand Council of 
Defence, 1946- 48. 
New Zealand Council of 
Defence, Meetings and 
Agenda. 
New Zealand Council of 
Defence, Master set of 
telegrams. 
New Zealand Council of 
Defence, Minutes of 
Meetings. 
New Zeala~d Council of 
Defence, Papers. 
Caucus Committee on 
Defence, 1949. 
Caucus Committee on 
Defence, Meetings and 
Agenda. 
Caucus Committee on 
Defence, Minutes of 
Meetings. 
Recruitment and Training 
of 2 NZEF Japan. 
Directives to Commander 
of New Zealand land 
forces, Japan. 
Despatch of New Zealand 
forces to Japan. 
Land BCOF Command. 
Newspaper reports on 
BCOF. 
Reports from Commander - in -
Charge J. Force. 
EA 87/11/22, pte 1 
EA 87/11/28, pte 1 
EA 87/11/29, pte 1 
EA 87/11/30, pte 1 
EA 87/11/33, pte 1 
EA 102/9/3, pte 1 
EA 102/9/24, pt. 1 
EA 102/9/25, pt. 1 
EA 102/9/26, pt. 1 
EA 151/1/1, pte 3 
EA 151/1/4, pte 1 
EA 151/1/6, pte 1 
EA 151/1/7, pte 1 
EA 151/1/12, pte 1 
EA 151/1/21, pte 1 
EA 151/15/3, pt. 1 
EA 151/15/6, pte 1 - 2 
EA 153/20/6, pt. 1 
242 
JCOSA instructions. 
Visit of Journalists, 1947. 
Repa~riation of J. Force. 
Visit of Minister of 
Defence. 
Retention of New Zeal a nd 
personnel in Japan. 
Arrangements for Conference 
on Japanese Peace 
Settlement, Canberra, 
1947. 
Conference on Japanese 
Peace Settlement, 
Canberra, 1947. 
Documents at Canberra 
Conference. 
Minutes of Canberra 
Conference. 
Commonwealth Affairs, 
1947- 49. 
Status of Great Britain 
and the Dominions. 
Position of Governors -
General. 
Intra- Commonwealth 
representation. 
Suggestions regarding the 
development of Commonwealth 
resources. 
Settlement of inter-
Commonwealth disputes. 
New Zealand Coat of Arms. 
New Zealand seals, stamps, 
letterheads. 
Prime Ministers' Meeting 
1944, Minutes and Speeches. 
Bound volume of Minutes and Memoranda of the 
Commonwealth Meeting, April 1945. 
EA 153/23/1, pt . 1 
EA 153/23/3, pt . 1 
EA 153/23/4, pt . 1 
EA 153/23/5, pt . 1 
EA 153/23/6, pt. 1 
EA 153/23/8, pt. 1 
EA 153/23/9, pt. 1 
EA 153/25/1, pt. 2 
EA 153/26/1, pt. 1 - 2 
EA 153/26/2, pt. 1 
EA 153/26/4, pt. 1 
EA 153/26/5, pt. 1 
EA 153/27/1, pt. 1 
EA 153/27/3, pt . 1 
EA 153/27/4, pt . 1 
EA 153/27/5, pt. 1 
EA 153/28/3, pt. 1 
EA 153/28/5, pt. 1 - 2 
EA 153/28/7, pt . 1 
243 
Prime Minis t er s ' Meeting , 
1946 . 
Minutes of Prime Ministers' 
Meeti 'ng, 1946 . 
Papers issued at Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, 1946. 
Reports of Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, 1946. 
Arrangements at Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, 1946 . 
Communiques at Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, 1946. 
Minutes of S pecial 
Meeting on Nationality, 
1946. 
Informal Meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, November 1947. 
Prime Ministers' 
Meeting, 1948. 
Arrangements of New 
Zealand Delegation at 
Prime Ministers' Meeting. 
Minutes and Papers of 
Prime Ministers' Meeting, 
1948. 
New Zealand Briefs for 
Prime Ministers' Meeting . 
Prime Ministers' Meeting, 
1949. 
Master set of Cables at 
Prime Ministers' Meeting . 
Minutes of Prime Ministers' 
Meeting, 1949. 
Documents issued at Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, 1949. 
Economic Discussions 1949 - 50 . 
New Zealand Economic Briefs, 
1949 - 50. 
Economic Papers. 
EA 153/28/9, pt. 1 
EA 153/29/1, pt. 1 
EA 154/4/1, pt. 2B 
EA 154/4/3, pt. 1B 
244 
New Zealand Economic 
Reports. 
Conference on South - East 
Asia, Canberra 1949. 
Commonwealth Trade 
1945- 48. 
Commonwealth Economic 
Committee. 
EA 154/4/6, pt. 1B & 2 Commonwealth Tariff 
Preferences. 
EA 154/7/2, pt. 1 - 2 
EA 154/7/3, pt. 1 - 4 
EA 154/7/7, pt. 1 
EA 154/11/2, pte 1 
EA156/1/1, pte 1-3 
EA 156/1/7, pt. 1A 
EA 156/1/15, pt. 1 
EA 156/1/18, pte 1 
EA 156/2/1, pt. 1A 
EA 156/2/4/1, pt. 1 
EA 156/6/1, pt. 1 
EA 156/10/1, pte 1 
EA 156/10/2, pte 1 - 2 
EA 157/3/9, pt. 1 
EA 157/3/13, pte 1 
Sterling Area Monetary 
and Financial Policy 
1947- 57. 
Sterling Area Dollar 
Deficit 1948-51. 
Sterling Area Balance of 
Payments. 
Commonwealth Liaison 
Committee. 
Imperial Defence 1946- 56. 
Alliances between Military 
Units of the British 
Commonwealth. 
Services 1946-48. 
Cabinet Overseas Defence 
Committee. 
Pacific Defence 1929-49. 
ANZAM Area 1949-55. 
Committee of Imperial 
Defence, 1929- 49. 
Commonwealth Defence 
Liaison. 
Australian-New Zealand 
Defence Cooperation. 
Commonwealth Cooperation 
in Aeronautic Research. 
Australian-New Zealand 
Conference, Wellington 1946 . 
EA 159/1/1, p t. 1A 
EA 159/1/5, pt. 1 - 4 
EA 159/2/1, pt. 1 - 7 
EA 159/2/2, pt. 1 
EA 159/2/16, pt. 1A 
EA 159/2/25, pt. 1A 
EA 159/4/1, pt. 1 
EA 159/4/3, pt. 1 
EA 159/4/3/3, pt. 2 
EA 159/4/3/4, pt. 1 
EA 205/3/4, pt. 7 - 10 
EA 207/4/2/1, pt. 5 - 7 
T61/3/4/2 
T61/3/5, pt. 1 
2. PUBLISHED 
(A) Official Papers 
245 
General Constitutional 
Develo/?ments. 
Statute of Westminster. 
Nationality. 
Nationality and Status 
of Individuals. 
Irish Citizenshjp. 
Indian Citizenship. 
Dominion Legislation . 
Use of word 'Foreign'. 
Change in the Status of 
Eire. 
Change in the Status of 
India . 
India's Constitutional 
Status. 
Ireland's Constitutional 
Status . 
Prime Ministers' Meeting 
1948. 
Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers' Meeting 
July 1949 - Correspondence 
and Minutes . 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives. 
Australian - American Relations since 
A Documentary History, G. St. J. 
J.M. Siracusa (Eds . ) (Sydney: 
Rhinehart and Wilson, 1976). 
1945: 
Barclay and 
Holt, 
Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth 
Affairs 1931 - 1952, Nicholas Mansergh (Ed.), 
2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1953) . 
246 
Documents on New Zealand External Relations, 
vol. I: The Australian- New, Zealand 
Agreement 1944, Robin Kay (Ed.) 
(Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 
Department of Internal Affairs, 1972). 
Documents on New Zealand External Relations, 
vol. II: The Surrender and Occupation of 
Japan, Robin Kay (Ed.) (Wellington: 
Historical Publications Branch, Department 
of Internal Affairs, 1982). 
New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and 
Documents 1943-1957 (Wellington: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 1972). 
New Zealand Official Year Books 1950 and 
1951 - 52 (Wellington: Government Printer, 
1951 and 1952). 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates. 
Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History, 
W. David McIntyre and W.J. Gardner (Eds.) 
(Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
(B) Newspapers and Periodicals 
The Dominion 
Evening Post 
The Press 
Round Table 
(C) Books and Memoirs 
Attlee, Clement R.A., As It Happened 
(London: Heinemann, 1954). 
Attlee, Clement R.A., Empire into Commonwealth 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
Evatt, Herbert V., Australia in World Affairs 
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1946). 
Pearson, Lester B., Memoirs volume II: 
1948-1957, The International Years 
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1974). 
247 
SECONDARY 
(A) Books and Pamphlets 
Ball, Margaret M., The "Open Commonwealth" 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 1971). 
Bartlett, C.J., The Long Retreat: A Short 
History of British Defence Policy 1945- 1970 
(London: MacMillan Press, 1972). 
Beaglehole, J.C., McIntosh, A. D., 
Ross, Angus, Sutch, W.B., Turner, B.R ., 
et ~l, Contemporary New Zealand: A Survey 
of Domestic and Foreign Policy (Wellington: 
New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs, 1938). 
Bell, Phillip W., 
Post - War' World 
Press, 1956). 
The Sterling Area in the 
(London: Oxford University 
British Central Office of Information, 
Consultation and Co-operation in the 
Commonwealth (London, 1961). 
Brown, Bruce M., New Zealand Foreign Policy 
in Retrospect 1947- 1954 (Wellington: 
New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs, 1970). 
Burnett, Alan and Robert, The Australian and 
New Zealand Nexus (Canberra: Australian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1980). 
Conan, A.R ., The Sterling Area (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1952). 
Cowen, Zelma n , The British Commonwealth of 
Nations in a Changing World (Melbou rne: 
F.W. Cheshire, 1965). 
Currie, A.E., 
Westminster 
New Zealand and the Statute of 
(Wellington: Butterworth, 1944). 
Darby, Phillip, 
Suez 1947- 1968 
Press, 1973) . 
British Defence Policy East of 
(London: Oxford University 
Eayrs, James G., In Defence of Canada: 
Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto : 
University of Toronto Press, 1972). 
248 
Goldsworthy, David, Colonial Issues in 
British Politics 1945- 1951 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971). 
Gordon, Bernard K., New Zealand Becomes a 
Pacific Power (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960). 
Gordon Walker, Patrick C., The Commonwealth 
(London: Seeker and Warburg, 1962). 
Gould, J.D., The Rake's Progress: The New 
Zealand Economy Since 1945 (Auckland: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1982). 
Harvey, Heather J., Consultation and 
Co-operation in the Commonwealth (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1952). 
Holland, R.F., Britain and the Commonwealth 
Alliance (London: MacMillan Press, 1981). 
Judd, David and Slinn, Peter, The Evolution 
of the Modern Commonwealth 1902-1980 
(London: MacMillan Press, 1982). 
Kelly, David J., 
Reed, 1968). 
Peter Fraser (Wellington: 
Kennaway, Richard N., 
Policy 1951-1971 
1972). 
New Zealand Foreign 
(Wellington: Hicks Smith, 
Larkin, T.C., New Zealand and Japan in the 
Post - War World (Wellington: New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs, 1969). 
McIntyre, W. David, Colonies into Commonwealth 
(London: Blandford Press, 1974). 
McIntyre, W. David, The Commonwealth of Nations: 
Origins and Impact, 1869 - 1971 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1977). 
McKenzie, Craig, Walter Nash: Pioneer and 
Prophet (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 
1975). 
Mansergh, Nicholas, The Commonwealth and the 
Nations (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1948). 
Mansergh, Nicholas, The Commonwealth Experience 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969). 
Mansergh, Nicholas, Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External 
Policy 1931 - 1939 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1952). 
249 
Mansergh, Nichol a s, S urvey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs: Prob~ems of Wartime 
Co - operation and Post - war Change 1939- 1952 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958). 
Medlicott, W.N., British Foreign Policy Since 
Versailles (London: Methuen, 1968). 
Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War 
(Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 1978). 
Millar, T.B., Australia's Defence (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1965). 
Millar, T.B., Australia's Foreign Policy 
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1968). 
Millar, T.B., The Commonwealth and the United 
Nations (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 
1967) . 
Miller, J.D.B., 
(Baltimore: 
Britain and the Old Dominions 
John s Hopkins Press, 1966). 
Mullins, R.M., 
(Wellington: 
1972) . 
New Zealand's Defence Policy 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Northedge, F. S ., Descent From Power: 
Foreign Policy 1945- 1973 (London: 
Allen and Unwin) 1974). 
British 
George 
Olssen, Erik, N., John A. Lee (Dunedin: 
University of Otago Press, 1977). 
O'Neill, Robert J., Australia in the Korean 
War 1950- 53, Volume I: Strategy and Diplomacy 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1981). 
Rajan, M.S., The Post - War Transformation of 
the Commonwealth (London: Asia Publishing 
House, 1963). 
Reese, Trevor R., Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States: A Survey of International 
Relations 1941-1968 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1969). 
Sinclair, Keith, A History of New Zealand 
(London: Allen Lane, 1980). 
Sinclair, Keith , .Towards Independence (Auckl a nd: 
Heinemann, 1975). 
S inclair, Keith, Walter Nash (Auckland: 
Auckland Univer s ity Press/OUP, 1976). 
2 50 
Thorn, James, Peter Fraser (London : 
Odhams Press, 1952). 
Tunstall, W.C.B . , The Commonwealth and 
Regional Defence (London: Athlone Press, 
University of London, 1959). 
Watt, -Alan S., The Evolution of Australian 
Foreign Policy 1938- 1965 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967). 
Wheare, K.C., The Constitutional Structure 
of the Commonwealth (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1960). 
Wheare, K.C., The Statute of Westminster and 
Dominion Status (4th edition) (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1949). 
Wheeler - Bennett, John W., King George VI: His 
Life and Reign (London: MacMillan Press, 
1958). 
Wood, F.L.W., The New Zealand People at War: 
Political and External Affairs . Official 
History of New Zealand in the Second World 
War, 1939 - 45 (Wellington: War History 
Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1958). 
(B) Articles 
Beaglehole, J . C., 'The Development of New 
Zealand Nationality', Journal of World 
History, 2, 1 (1954). 
Beaglehole, J.C., 'The Old Empire and the 
New' and 'The Statute and Constitutional 
Change', New Zealand and the Statute of 
Westminster, J.C. Beaglehole (Ed.) 
(Wellington: Vi ctoria University College, 
1944). 
Brecher, Michael, 'India's Decision to Remain 
in the Commonwealth', Journal of Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics, 12, 1 (1974). 
Carter, Gwendolen, M., 
the Commonwealth', 
(December 1949). 
'The Asian Dominions in 
Pacific Affairs, 22, 4 
Carter, Gwendolen, M., 'New Trends in British 
Commonwealth Relations', Pacific Affairs, 
17, 1 (March 1944). 
Chapman, Robert, 'From Labour to National', 
The Oxford History of New Zealand, W.H. Oliver 
and B.R. Williams (Eds . ) (Wellington: Oxford 
University Press, 1981). 
251 
Conan, A.R., 'The Sterling Area: 
Under Stress', Round Table, 60, 
(November 1970). 
Success 
240, 
Cunninghame, R.R., 'The Development of New 
Zealand's Foreign Policy and Political 
Alignments', New Zealand's External 
Relations, T.C. Larkin (Ed.) (Wellington: 
New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 
1962). 
Gopal, Sarvepalli, 'Nehru and the Commonwealth L , 
Retreat ~rom Power: Studies in Britain's 
Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, 
vol. II, David Dilks (Ed.) (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1981). 
Gordon Walker, Patrick, C., 'The British Labour 
Party and the Commonwealth', Round Table, 
60, 240 (November 1970). 
Hawke, G.R., 'The Growth of the Economy', 
The Oxford History of New Zealand, W.H. Oliver 
and B.R. Williams (Eds.) (Wellington: 
Oxford University Press, 1981). 
Hodson, H.V., 'The Crown in the Commonwealth', 
Parliamentary Government in the Commonwealth, 
S.D. Bailey (Ed.) (London: Hansard 
Society, 1951). 
Jackson, Keith, 'A Hostage to Fortune: New 
Zealand Foreign Policy 1945-76', Round Table 
68, 269 (January 1978). 
Laking, George, 'The Evolution 
Independent Foreign Policy', 
Zealand: The Foreign Policy 
J. Henderson, K. Jackson, R. 
(Auckland: Methuen, 1980). 
of an 
Beyond New 
of a Small State, 
Kennaway (Eds.) 
Lipson, L., 'A Foreign Policy for New Zealand', 
New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster, 
J.C. Beaglehole (Ed.) (Wellington: Victoria 
University College, 1944). 
Lough, N.V., 'New Zealand's External Economic 
Relations', New Zealand's External Relations, 
T.C. Larkin (Ed.) (Wellington: New Zealand 
Institute of Public Administration, 1962). 
Lyon, Peter, 'Britain and the Commonwealth', 
Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign 
Policy, Michael Leifer (Ed.) (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1972). 
McGechan, R.O., 'The Statute of Westminster: 
Legislative Powers of the New Zealand 
Parliament', New Zealand Law Journal, 20, 2 
( 1944) . 
252 
' S tatus and Legislative McGeehan, R.O., 
Inability' , 
Westminster, 
(Wellington: 
1944) . 
New Zealand and the Statute of 
J.C. Beaglehole (Ed.) 
Victoria University College, 
MacGibbon, Ian, C., 'The Defence of New 
Zealand 1945- 1957', New Zealand in World 
Affairs, vol . I (Wellington: New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs, 1977). 
MacGibbon, Ian, C., 'History of New Zealand 
Defence', New Zealand Foreign Policy and 
Defence (Dunedin: University of Otago, 1977). 
McIntosh, Alister, D., 'Administration of an 
Independent New Zealand Foreign Policy', 
New Zealand's External Relations, T.C. Larkin 
(Ed.) (Wellington: New Zealand Institute 
of Public Administration, 1962). 
McIntosh, Alister, D., 'The Changing and 
Continuing Commonwealth 1947-63: Some 
Personal Impressions', The Commonwealth: 
Its Past, Present and Future (Wellington: 
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 
1973) • 
McIntosh, Alister, D. 'The Origins of the 
Department of .External Affairs and the 
Formulation of an Independent Foreign Policy', 
New Zealand in World Affairs, vol. I 
(Wellington: New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs, 1977). 
McIntosh, Alister, D., 
Fraser in Wartime: 
New Zealand Journal 
(April 1976). 
'Working with Peter 
Personal Reminiscences', 
of History, 10, 1 
McIntyre, W. David, 'Peter Fraser's Commonwealth: 
New Zealand and the Origins of the New 
Commonwealth in the 1940's', New Zealand in 
World Affairs, vol. I (Wellington: New 
Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 
1977) • 
McLeod, A., 'New Zealand, Britain and the 
Commonwealth Old Relations have a Future', 
Round Table, 61 (October 1971). 
Mansergh, Ni c holas, 'Commonwealth Foreign 
Policies 1945- 56' and 'Commonwealth 
Membership' Commonwealth Perspectives 
( D u r h am, N. C.: D uk e Un i v e r sit Y Pre s s, 1 958 ) . 
Mansergh, Nicholas, 'The I~p~ications of Eire' s 
Relationship with the Brltlsh.Commonwealth of 
Nations', International Affalrs 
(January 1948). 
253 
Nash, Walter, 'Parliamentary Government in 
New Zealand', Parliamentary Government in 
the Commonwealth, S.D . Bailey (Ed.) 
(London: Hansard Society, 1951). 
Noonan, Rosslyn, 'Peter Fraser' New Zealand's 
Heritage (Wellington: Paul Hamlyn, 
1971 - 1973). 
Oliver, W.H., 'The Awakening Imagination' 
The Oxford History of New Zealand, 
W.H. Oliver and B.R. Williams (Eds.) 
(Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
Ross, Angus, 'New Zealand and the Commonwealth 
to 1939', The Commonwealth: Its Past, 
Present and Future (Wellington: New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs, 1973). 
Ross, Angus, 'New Zealand and the Statute of 
Westminster', The First British Commonwealth: 
Essays in Honour of Nicholas Mansergh, 
N. Hillmer and P. Wigley (Eds.) (London: 
Frank Cass, 1980). 
Ross, Angus, 'New Zealand and the Statute of 
Westminster', New Zealand's Heritage 
(Wellington: Paul Hamlyn, 1971-1973). 
Ross, Angus, 'Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful 
Daughter? New Zealand and the Commonwealth 
in the Inter - War Years', Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, 10 (1972). 
Thomas, Brinley, 'The Evolution of the Sterling 
Area and its Prospects', Commonwealth 
Perspectives (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1958). 
Wilson, J.V., 'New Zealand's Participation in 
International Organisations', New Zealand's 
External Relations, T.C. Larkin (Ed.) 
(Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public 
Administration, 1962). 
Wilson, Robert, R., 'The Commonwealth and the 
Law of Nations', Commonwealth Perspectives 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958). 
Wood, F.L.W., 'The Fourth British Empire', 
New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster 
J.C. Beaglehole (Ed.) (Wellington: Victoria 
University College, 1944). 
Wood, F.L.W., 'New Zealand Foreign Policy 
1945-1951', New Zealand in World Affairs, 
vol. I (Wellington: New Zealand Institute 
of International Affairs, 1977). 
Wood, F.L.W ., 'Report from New Zea l a nd', 
Pacific Affairs, 22, 1 ,(March 1949) 
254 
Wood, G.A., 
Zealand' , 
'The Former Dominion of New 
Political Science, 26,1 (1974). 
(C) Unpublished Work s 
Clemow, C.W.A., 'New Zealand, The Commonwealth 
and the Korean War' (M.A. thesis, 
University of Auckland, 1967). 
Eaddy, R.R., 'New Zealand and the Korean War 
in the First Year' (M.A. thesis, 
University of Otago, 1983). 
Filer, David, J., 'The New Zea land Armed 
Services: Their Dev e lopment in Relation to 
Defence Policy, 1946- 1972' (M . A. thesis, 
University of Canterbury, 1972). 
Harland, W.B., 'New Zealand's Security Problem 
in the Pacific 1939 - 1951' (M.A. thesis, 
Victoria University College, 1954). 
McKinnon, M.A., 'The Impact of War: A 
Diplomatic History of New Zealand's Economic 
Relations with Britain, 1939- 1954' 
(Ph.D. thesis, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1981). 
McLennan, W.R., 'The Last Years of the First 
Labour Government 1945- 49' (M.A . thesis, 
University of Auckland, 1963). 
